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GLOSARRY 
 
Avian Influenza: Influenza A caused by strains of a subtype H5N1 that have                                           
     produced epidemics in domestic birds with periodic associated human infections,  
     commonly known as bird flu.  
 
Capacity: The combination of all the strengths and resources available within a  
     community, society or organization that can reduce the level of risk, or the effects of a  
     disaster1. Capacity and vulnerability can usefully be considered as part of the same    
     continuum, since one increase as the other decreases. 
 
Hazard: “A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon, human activity or  
     condition that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, loss of livelihoods  
     and services, social and economic disruption or environmental damage.”2  
 
Sustainable Livelihoods: “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities  
     required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and  
     recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and  
     provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation.”3 
 
Mitigation: “The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related  
     disasters.”4 
 
Poverty: "Poverty is a human condition characterized by the sustained or chronic  
     deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for  
     the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic,  
     political and social rights."5 
 
Preparedness: Activities and measures taken before hazard events occur to ensure  
     effective response to the impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and  
     effective early warnings and the temporary evacuation of people from threatened  
     locations. 
 
Prevention: “The outright avoidance of potential adverse impacts of hazards and related  
     disasters through action taken in advance.”6 
                                                            
1 UN/ISDR, (2009), “Terminology: Basic Terms of Disaster Risk Reduction”,  Available at: 
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/terminology/terminology-2009-eng.html 
2 Ibid.  
3 Chambers, Robert and Gordon Conway, “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st 
Century”,  IDS Discussion Paper 296, (Brighton, UK: IDS, February 1992). 
4 UN/ISDR (2009).  
5 United Nations Committee on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, (2001). “Poverty and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” 10/05/2001.  
6 UN/ISDR (2009).  
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Resilience: “The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to    
     hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable  
     level of functioning”.7 
 
Disaster Risk: The product of hazard and vulnerability measured in terms of the  
      quantitative and qualitative damage expected as a result of the exposure of vulnerable  
      people to hazard. 
 
Risk Analysis: A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by  
     analyzing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that  
     could pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods and the  
     environment on which they depend. 
      
    
Vulnerability: “The potential to suffer harm or loss, related to the capacity to anticipate a  
     hazard, cope with it, resist it and recover from its impact. Both vulnerability and  
     resilience, are determined by physical, environmental, social, economic, political,    
     cultural and institutional factors.8 
 
Restocking: In the context of avian influenza, “restocking refers to the process of  
     introducing new birds to replace those lost through death caused by the disease or    
     through culling to prevent spread of the disease”9.  
 
 
Traditional Poultry Keeping: Poultry keeping within a household setting with flocks of  
     less than 500 birds on rooftops, backyards or in the house with the aim of  
     producing meat and eggs for home consumption and sales on a small scale.  
 
 
      
 
                                                            
7 UN/ISDR, (2004),“Terminology: Basic Terms of Disaster Risk Reduction”,  Available at: 
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm 
8 Twigg, John , "Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis", Tools for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction, 
Guidance Note No. 9, ProVention Consortium, 12.  
9 FAO, (2009), “Avian Influenza Glossary”, Available at: http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/glossary.html  
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ABSTRACT 
 
             The study provides an overview of the literature on disaster risk reduction, its 
relation with various development approaches and the livelihood framework. The study 
also examines the theoretical debates surrounding the relation between disasters and 
sustainable development. In addition, the study explores the various disasters that 
occurred in Egypt between 1990 and 2008. The study explores “rapid onset” natural 
disasters in Egypt (earthquakes and floods), a number of frequent human-made disasters 
(road, maritime, train accidents and fires), and “slow onset” hybrid disasters (Avian and 
Human Influenza and landslides) and their scope, causes, and implications on the 
livelihoods of the affected population. In addition, the study reviews the current legal 
framework as it relates to disasters in Egypt and the various institutions at the national 
and local levels. In addition, the case study examines the Avian and Human Influenza 
(AHI) crisis between February 2006 and April 2009 in Egypt and explores its impact on 
the livelihoods of traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum. The field work conducted for 
this study explores the reasons behind the increased vulnerability to bird flu among 
traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum, and examines the ways in which the AHI crisis 
affected their livelihood assets and strategies. Moreover, the study explores the role of 
veterinary services in prevention and mitigation of the AHI crisis and how it affected the 
susceptibility to AHI.  
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
STUDY JUSTIFICATION AND RATIONALE 
             The political circumstances surrounding disasters in Egypt was the main reason 
behind the researcher’s choice of this topic. The GoE constantly reacts after a crisis has 
taken place, and the government’s emergency response and relief efforts are always 
chaotic, delayed, unplanned, and inefficient. Moreover, it is apparent that in several crises 
the government did not employ any preventive measures to reduce the risks of disasters 
before they occurred, despite the fact that these potential disasters risks are extremely 
visible. It is against this background that the researcher explored Disaster Risk Reduction 
(DRR) theory and how it can be applied to the Egyptian context. DRR is based on the 
premises that disasters are not random events and that their occurrence and impact 
depend on people’s vulnerability and their ability to cope with hazardous events. Upon 
further investigation, the researcher discovered that “pre-disaster planning” can indeed 
contribute to reducing vulnerability and increasing the capability of the affected 
communities, thus leading to improved livelihoods.  
            Until the mid 1970s, development theorists believed that disasters were natural 
phenomena that could only be responded to after the disaster takes place (crisis 
management, post-disaster relief, and humanitarian/emergency aid). In the late 1970s, it 
was realized by development scholars that disasters are not unforeseen “natural events” 
that governments should implement preventive measures even before a disaster takes 
place. In addition, despite the fact that humanitarian assistance was increasing compared 
to development assistance, disaster relief was a short term solution that failed to cope 
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with the increased losses resulting from “complex disasters”. These developments led to 
the recognition, in the 1980s, that disasters are the result of accumulated risk produced by 
years of accumulated vulnerabilities due to economic, social, political and cultural 
factors. DRR is a means of bridging the gap between development and humanitarian 
agendas. The reason why the researcher chose to examine DRR as a development 
approach is that DRR measures take a long-term approach designed to protect livelihood 
assets of communities and individuals from the impact of hazards1.  
            This topic has not been extensively dealt with before with respect to Egypt both in 
theory and in practice. This study is a modest attempt to contribute to the literature 
through linking DRR to various development approaches, examining how disasters are a 
result of the interaction of vulnerability and hazards, and through viewing disasters from 
a livelihood lens. In addition, there is limited scholarly documentation of disasters in 
Egypt and their impact on livelihoods. This study will attempt to fill this gap by 
documenting recent disasters that took place in Egypt from 1990 until 2008. Also, this 
study will examine the impacts of these disasters on vulnerable populations’ livelihoods, 
in specific, and on development efforts in general. DRR is still not adopted as a 
mainstream approach in development planning within the GoE since it is not popular 
among developing countries. This study will contribute to policy making by looking at 
the current structure and mechanisms that deal with disasters in Egypt before they even 
take place and examine whether they adopt a DRR approach or not. The case study will 
examine the Avian and Human Influenza (AHI) crisis and how the increased 
vulnerability of the traditional poultry sector in Fayoum as a result of embedded cultural 
                                                 
1 CONCERN USA, “Approached to Disaster Risk Reduction”, Emergency Unit, September 2005, 
Available at: http://www.concernusa.org/media/pdf/2007/10/Concern_ApproachestoDRR%20paper%20-
%20final.pdf , 1.  
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practices and unhygienic poultry keeping methods among other factors2 are increasing 
the AHI risk among traditional poultry keepers and increasing its likeliness of turning 
into a pandemic stage, an area which has not been thoroughly investigated even after the 
continuous AHI outbreaks.   
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following key questions will be examined: 
1. What is the relation between disasters and development approaches in theory? And 
how can the DRR approach utilize the sustainable livelihoods approach?   
2. What is the correlation between disaster risk, sustainable livelihoods and sustainable 
development in the case of Egypt? 
3. What are the governmental bodies that deal with disasters in Egypt? What are their 
functions and responsibilities?  
4. Is DRR mainstreamed in current development planning and policies of entities at the 
strategic, central and local levels in Egypt?  
5. What are the elements that make up the vulnerability context of traditional poultry 
keepers in Fayoum?  
6. How did Avian Influenza affect the livelihoods of traditional poultry keepers in 
Fayoum?  
7. How did the policies and processes dealing with the Avian Influenza crisis at the local 
level affect the access of poultry keepers to livelihood resources and the formulation of 
their livelihood strategies?  
 
                                                 
2 All factors contributing to the vulnerability context of traditional poultry keepers to AHI will be examined 
in chapter 5.  
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RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The following preliminary statements can be made from Figure 1: Problem Tree, which 
the author developed: 
1. One of the root causes of the problem is the absence of a culture of prevention among 
government officials and vulnerable communities. 
2. The lack of political will, inadequate qualified human resources, and budget 
constrains limit the capability of the GoE to reduce disaster risks. 
3. The GoE failed to incorporate both hazard mapping and vulnerability assessment, i.e. 
risk analysis, in government planning.  
4. There is a lack of national comprehensive strategy for reducing the risk of disasters in 
Egypt.  
5. People's vulnerability increased due to a combination of dynamic pressures (such as 
rapid urbanization) and root causes (such as a lack of prevention and mitigation efforts).  
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Figure 1: Problem Tree 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of the thesis is to access whether disaster risk reduction can contribute to the 
attainment of sustainable livelihood outcomes. In order to reach the above goal, the 
objectives of the research are to: 
1. Examine the relation between disaster risk, vulnerabilities, and hazards; 
2. Explore the link between DRR discourse, development approaches, and the 
Sustainable Livelihood Approach; 
3. Explore whether there is an interconnection between disasters/hazards, 
vulnerabilities, and livelihoods in the Egyptian context;  
4. Examine how disaster impacts on livelihoods will be a key obstacle for the GoE 
in achieving the MDGs; 
5. Examine and analyze current legal and institutional arrangements dealing with 
disasters in Egypt and the extent to which they are in line with the DRR approach; 
6. Examine the Avian and Human Influenza Crisis in Fayoum, the AHI vulnerability 
context, impact on the livelihoods of poultry keepers, and explore the governments’ 
prevention and mitigation efforts.  
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
            Low level hazards are magnified by high vulnerabilities in Egypt, which lead to 
increase in disaster risk among vulnerable groups. Impact of disasters will destroy 
people’s livelihood assets as a result of income and capability deprivation and thus result 
in the failure of the attainment of sustainable livelihood outcomes in the Egyptian 
society.
7 
 
METHODOLOGY 
            This section explores the method of investigation that was utilized to test the 
research hypothesis and answer the research questions. The researcher used a qualitative 
approach to conduct the research since it is the most suitable way to gather in-depth 
information. Some scholars, especially political economists, claim that quantitative 
techniques provide more ‘‘rigor analysis’’ than qualitative techniques. However, this 
view is criticized on the basis that the determinant of whether the approach is ‘‘rigor’’ or 
not depends on the proper application of both techniques; both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques can lead to misleading conclusions if badly applied3. It is argued 
that different techniques are appropriate to different settings and different methods are 
essential to tackle different research questions and problems4.  
             The initial phase of this research involved an extensive review of the literature on 
disaster risk reduction in general. The literature review is based mainly on secondary 
sources from academic journals, books, as well as discussion papers of international 
development organizations. This was followed by a reliance on a combination of analyses 
of primary data and secondary sources to balance each other. The primary sources, 
utilized in chapters three and four, are official documents, reports on disasters in Egypt, 
and semi-structured interviews with government officials and DRR specialists in 
international development organizations. This primary data on DRR was gathered in an 
informal and friendly environment due to the sensitivity of the issue of disasters and its 
taboo nature among government officials.  Moreover, the case study formulated on AHI 
                                                 
3 White, Howard, “Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in Poverty Analysis”,               
World Development, Vol. 30, Issue 3, (2002): 511. 
4 Ibid.  
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was mainly based on primary data collected during the field work in Fayoum 
governorate.  
Choice of Governorate 
            The reason why the researcher has chosen the Fayoum governorate for the field 
work is that Fayoum is a hot spot for AHI in Egypt since it is characterized by a moderate 
weather all year round and has two important natural attractions for migratory water 
birds, which are Qarun Lake and Wadi El Rayan Lake. The location of Fayoum, with its 
natural attractions, is an important factor that increases its vulnerability to HPAI.  It is 
also one of the largest poultry producing governorates in Egypt and terribly affected by 
the AHI Crisis. Despite the fact that the impact on the traditional poultry keeping sector 
was not accounted for in the statistics gathered by the government, the GoE official data 
revealed that the AHI impact on commercial farms in Fayoum was immense.  Medium 
and large commercial farms lost an estimated 725,000 birds in Fayoum only5. In addition, 
Fayoum reported seven H5N1 confirmed human cases, which put it in second place after 
Al Monofeya in terms of positive human cases.  Moreover, Fayoum is the worst 
governorate in Egypt in terms of Human Development. According to the UNDP Human 
Development Index (HDI) published in Egypt Human Development Report 2008, 
Fayoum HDI is 0.669, which ranks Fayoum in the 22 place out of 22 governorates6.  
Another rationale behind the researcher’s choice was the implementation of a UNDP 
funded project in Fayoum to mitigate the impact of AHI on poultry keepers by an NGO, 
the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which had strong local presence in Fayoum.   
                                                 
5 Catholic Relief Services, "Business Development Services to Mitigate the AI Risks of Women Micro-
entrepreneurs in Egypt", Project Proposal Submitted to UNDP, July 2006. 
6 UNDP, “Egypt Human Development Report 2008: Egypt’s Social Contract”, United Nations 
Development Programme, and The Institute of National Planning in Egypt, 2008: 301. 
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            The researcher’s choice of districts was primarily influenced by the CRS project 
and the location of the implementing CDAs, which are located in Fayoum and Tamiah 
districts. The reason why CRS chose to focus on Fayoum and Tamiah districts is because 
they are the poorest districts in terms of GDP and human development and they have the 
highest overall contribution to the informal sector in terms of labor. The researcher also 
conducted field work in these two districts to examine the variations between different 
villages and to explore whether each community had its own cultural and behavioral 
patterns, livelihood and coping strategies, and whether the project had different impacts 
on different villages.  In addition, the researcher chose to conduct the field work in a third 
district, which is Snoras district, which the CRS is not working in to compare and 
contrast information gathered from other two districts to have a richer study.  One of 
Business Enterprise Support Tools Foundation (BEST)7 staff was a key informant in 
Snoras district due to her extensive personal contacts and social capital. She arranged for 
personal interviews and group discussions with women in this district.  
Choice of NGO 
            The reason why the researcher has chosen to cooperate with the CRS is that it is 
the only NGO that is currently working on mitigating the impacts of Avian Influenza in 
Egypt from a long term DRR perspective and not from a short term emergency point of 
view, which is in line with the objectives of this study. The CRS project entitled Business 
Development Services to mitigate the AHI Risks of Women Micro-entrepreneurs in 
Fayoum, which is funded by UNDP, employed risk coping and mitigation initiatives that 
attempted to alter the socio-economic impact of AHI on traditional poultry keepers and 
                                                 
7 BEST in Fayoum is the implementing partner of CRS, which is the umbrella organization that facilitates 
project outreach and coordinates with CDAs.  
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the micro-poultry industry.  In addition, the CRS and UNDP gave the researcher the 
permission to undertake the proposed field work and the researcher utilized CRS wide 
social network of informants; Mr. Mohamed Ashraf, AHI Project Manager, provided 
outstanding support by arranging the researcher visits to Fayoum and scheduling the 
meetings with BEST employees, CDAs staff, as well as women BDS clients.  
Case Study Methodology 
            A case study was formulated to test the research hypothesis. The field work relied 
primarily on the Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) technique, which emerged in the 1970s 
and became popular in the development field in the 1980s. Robert Chambers described 
the RRA technique as “the attempt to learn about rural conditions in a cost effective 
way.”8 Chambers argued that RRA is a "fairly-quick and-fairly-clean” appraisal as 
opposed to the “quick and dirty” appraisal of rural development tourism and the “long 
and dirty” technique of extensive questionnaire surveys9. The RRA is the most suitable 
method for the purpose of this case study since one of the research objectives of the field 
work is to observe the cultural practices and behavioral patterns that increase poultry 
keepers’ vulnerability to AHI and examine the dynamics of the AHI crisis on women’s 
livelihoods. However, the researcher was careful not to fall into the RRA pitfalls. One of 
the RRA criticisms is that “rapid” has become a liability since it has been used to 
legitimize biased “rural development tourism”, which are brief rural visits by urban-based 
professionals10.  Robert Chambers argued that the word “rapid” was needed in the late 
1970s to offset the long and large questionnaires, however it is better to replace the first 
                                                 
8 Chambers, Robert, “Rapid Rural Appraisal: Rationale and Repertoire”, Public Administration and 
Development, Vol. 1, Issue 2, (1981): 95-106.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Chambers, Robert, “Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Challenges, Potentials and Paradigm”, World 
development, Vol. 11, No.10,(1994):1441.  
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R of RRA with “relaxed” rather than “rapid” in order to ensure that enough time is made 
available to see, listen and learn from the poor11.  
           In addition, the researcher adopted the Triangulation technique, one of the main 
principles of RRA, which uses a combination of methods from different sources to cross-
check and verify responses gathered in different ways, such as semi-structured interviews 
with key informants, focus group discussions, case studies, transect walks and direct 
observation.  This study proposes the application of the triangulation technique since it will 
attempt to overcome the reliability, accuracy and representative weaknesses of qualitative 
methods. Furthermore, in RRA, both the researcher and the researched collaborate and 
learn from each other to decide possible solutions to the research questions12.   
Field Work: RRA Methods 
             In order to examine the socio-economic impact of AHI in Fayoum, the researcher 
gathered primary data from the field in three districts in Fayoum governorate (Fayoum, 
Tamiya, and Snoras Districts) from 26th February to 20th March 2009. The field work 
involved semi-structured interviews, focus groups discussions, case studies, and transect 
walks and direct observation. Each method will be explained consecutively.  
a. Semi-structured Interviews  
             The semi-structured interviews are regarded as the core of the RRA technique 
and are based on a list of open ended questions, which provided the framework for 
discussions. There are three sets of semi-structured interviews; the first group consists of 
CRS project staff, BEST key informants and CDAs extension officers, while the second 
group consists of government veterinaries, and the third and most important group of 
                                                 
11 Ibid.  
12 Rifkin, S.B,  “Rapid Rural Appraisal: Its Use and Value for Health Planners and Managers”, 
Public Administration, Vol. 47, Issue 3, (1996): 509–526. 
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interviewees is composed of traditional poultry keepers. The researcher interviewed CRS 
project staff and BEST staff to gather essential information on the trends in different 
communities with respect to the reasons behind the spread of AHI, and the prevention 
and mitigation of AHI in Fayoum, and also to examine the challenges and constrains the 
project staff faced when dealing with government officials and traditional poultry keepers 
during project implementation. In addition, government officials were interviewed to be 
able to detect the gap in the local government’s initiatives in theory and practice. Also, 
the field work examined how government policies affected women’s asset accumulation 
and whether they enabled women to cope with the AHI crisis or not. The list of 
interviewees is available in Appendix 1.  
             With respect to the semi-structured interviews with women, the researcher 
interviewed a total number of 25 traditional poultry keeper in four villages. The 
researcher first piloted the interview questions with officials at BEST to make sure that 
they are culture sensitive, and that they will be well received by rural women, and as a 
result some modifications were made to the original questions. A sample of the 
questionnaire is attached in Appendix 2. With regard to the selection of interviewees, in 
Zawyet El Karatsa Village, Manshaet Baghdad Village in Fayoum district and Kafr 
Mahfouz in Tamiah district, four extension officers who are from the villages and are 
well acquainted with the households were asked to give suggestions of women. 
Moreover, with regard to Ezbet Al Hawashy Village and Al Adel village in Snoras 
district, Mrs. Manal Ibrahim, Specialist at BEST in Fayoum, was the key informant due 
to her wide range of contacts in this district. She was the one who organized and 
moderated the interviews and focus group discussions since the CRS is not working in 
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this area in Fayoum. The researcher made sure to interview beneficiaries of the Business 
Development Services (BDS) of the CRS project as well as non-BDS clients to ensure 
that the sample is inclusive of the entire community. In addition, the researcher used the 
“snowballing sampling” technique, where each women was asked to recommend another 
person to be interviewed. In order to overcome the bias of selection of interviewees, the 
researcher interviewed anonymous women in the villages walking in streets. The 
researcher also made sure that the interviews are conducted in an informal and 
forthcoming setting to be able to gather accurate information on women’s practices and 
behavior with respect to AHI.  The full list of women interviewees was compiled in 
Appendix 1.  
b. Focus Groups  
           Focus group discussions are particularly useful to obtain information regarding 
social norms, cultural customs and livelihood patterns. As part of the field work, the 
researcher conducted four focus groups (total of 40 women), in several villages/districts; 
the two focus groups in in Zawyet El Karatsa Village and Al Mandara Village in Fayoum 
district was for women who utilized CRS BDS services, while the other two focus groups 
in Al Adel Village in Snoras district consisted of women who did not work with CRS. 
The extension officers working with traditional poultry keepers played a key role in 
gathering women. In all four focus groups, women were suspicious of the researcher’s 
intentions and the reason behind the gathering. The researcher made it clear for women in 
the beginning of each focus group, that the researcher is a student working on a thesis and 
is not affiliated with any governmental entity, and that the researcher was there to learn 
from their experiences. At first, women were fearful and shy and refused to elaborately 
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discuss the issues at hand, however after intensive “icebreaking” techniques they 
gradually started opening up and discussing the issues raised.  Focus group discussions 
have several advantages, including access to a larger body of knowledge, and instant 
mutual checking13. The self-correcting mechanism during group discussions was revealed 
when for example a poultry keeper gives an excessively idealistic picture of her polutry 
raising and slaughtering practices in the wake of the AHI crisis and is immediately 
challenged and corrected by the other women in the group.  
c. Case Studies  
             During the field work, the researcher has formulated two case studies, which 
examined the household profile, livelihood assets pre and post AHI outbreaks, household 
members’ livelihood strategies before and after the AHI crisis, and poultry keepers 
coping techniques. The reason behind the researcher’s choice of these case studies is that 
the first case was characterized by outstanding success in mitigating the effects of AHI 
and the second one failed to employ coping strategies in the wake of the AHI crisis and 
stopped raising poultry altogether. Although examined cases cannot be generalized and 
are individual experiences, they provided significant in-depth in the data collected.  
d. Transect Walks and Direct Observation  
               Transect walks and direct observation are vital elements in any field work since 
one of the disadvantages of the RRA technique is that it can be misled by embedded 
myths within a community. Transect walks is based on the idea that the researcher walks 
systematically with an informant through a village, observing, asking, and listening while 
recording findings. The importance of walking, seeing and asking questions lie in their 
                                                 
13 Chambers, Robert, (1981), “Rapid Rural Appraisal”, 102.  
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ability to provide the researcher with vital information about customs and practices that 
are often regarded by rural communities as common daily routine that they can fail to 
narrate to an outsider. It was also interesting to observe the body language of the 
extension officers and how they interact with women. Moreover, direct observations 
during transect walks are valuable for cross checking differences between claimed and 
actual practices. According to Robert Chambers, rural people often have beliefs about 
their values and activities which do not correspond with the reality14. He continues to 
argue that it is common to be told about a custom that has either lapsed or perhaps was 
never practiced at all15. The observation technique can be insightful in the sense that it 
reveals the gap between actual actions and claimed practices. One of the best ways to 
study the socio-cultural patterns and local behavior of community members is by simply 
being there.  
e. Desk Research  
               The researcher conducted desk research on the CRS project in Fayoum based on 
the project document, project progress reports, and final evaluation report. In addition, 
the researcher also utilized secondary data found in the FAO/WFP impact assessment 
entitled "Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: Rapid Assessment of HPAI Socio-Economic 
Impact on Vulnerable Households in Egypt"16 conducted in four governorates in Egypt, 
in which Fayoum is one of them, since it utilizes the sustainable livelihoods framework to 
assess HPAI socio-economic impact on traditional poultry keepers and is in conformity 
with the research. In addition, another secondary source that was of great importance to 
                                                 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16 FAO/ WFP, (2007), Ellen Geerlings (ed.), “Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Rapid Assessment of 
the Socio-Economic Impact on Vulnerable Households in Egypt”,  A Joint Study by the FAO and WFP, 1. 
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the study was the UNICEF behavioral report entitled “Avian Influenza Survey: 
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of the Egyptian Public”17, which was a community 
survey in twelve governorates that provided information on Avian Influenza-related 
knowledge and attitudes.  The overall goal of this survey was to provide baseline data 
that would contribute to raising the awareness and improving the practices of the public 
related to AHI. The immediate objectives were to provide baseline data on the level of 
awareness of the most at-risk groups; establish a quantitative technique to understand 
attitudes and practices of the most at-risk groups related poultry breeding, cooking, 
buying, and slaughtering; and provide data on the perceptions of the most at-risk groups 
related to the roles of various parties in eliminating the disease. The researcher utilized 
these quantitative studies to compliment the research qualitative findings.  
RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
              In general the researcher did not encounter any major problems that necessitated 
changing the research design; however the researcher faced some minor challenges 
during the course of the research. One of the challenges was the inadequate theoretical 
critique of the DRR discourse. Despite the availability of a wide array of scholarly 
journals, books, working papers, policy papers, reports, guidelines, and case studies on 
DRR, however there is very limited academic material on critiques of DRR theory due to 
the novelty of the disaster risk reduction area of work.  
            Moreover, the nature of the study and the sensitivity of the topic of disasters in 
Egypt limited the willingness of some informants, especially government officials, to 
openly discuss disaster related issues, vulnerabilities, and impacts of disasters on 
                                                 
17  UNICEF, “Avian Influenza Survey: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of the Egyptian Public”, Final 
Study Report, (Cairo: El Zanaty and Associates, July 2007).  
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vulnerable communities’ livelihoods. In addition, similar terminologies, which had 
extremely different meanings and applications, were usually used interchangeable by 
government officials.  As a result, the information gathered from the CMDR at the central 
level and from different local levels at Fayoum governorate was based on the 
interviewees’ personal interpretations of risk reduction. This challenge was faced by 
cross checking all data obtained from personal interviews with supplementary sources 
such as official reports, minutes of committee meetings, and official guidelines. 
             Furthermore, there was limited access to primary documents and sources with 
regard to disasters in Egypt. The researcher encountered serious challenges while 
collecting data, for the third chapter, on recent disasters that occurred in Egypt due the 
scarcity of primary as well as secondary sources. The topic of disasters is still politically 
sensitive and considered a taboo issue among government officials in Egypt. The 
researcher had difficulty gathering required information for various hazards and disasters 
in Egypt since most of the available primary documents were classified. The researcher 
would overcome this challenge by utilizing the researcher’s wide network of informal 
connections to obtain necessary documents and reports and schedule interviews with high 
level officials. This challenge was also faced during the research process of the fourth 
chapter on the GoE institutional arrangements with regard to disasters; the researcher was 
not allowed to obtain a copy of the current laws and regulations dealing with disasters in 
Egypt, and had to rely on secondary sources for the legal framework section. These 
sources were not comprehensive since they did not cover all the laws and regulations 
with respect to disaster management. In addition, there was very few documentation of 
the socio-economic impact of disasters on the Egyptian population, and there was a lack 
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of secondary sources that link the socio-economic impacts of disasters to the stagnation 
of the development process in Egypt. Future studies would have to be conducted to 
review each and every disaster and its socio-economic impact on the affected 
communities in specific and its effects on the overall development process in general.  
             The fact that being a female researcher facilitated the field work in Fayoum to a 
great extent since it allowed the interviewer to engage poultry keepers in serious 
discussions in informal household settings. However, one of the challenges was that the 
researcher had to be accompanied at all times by an extension officer the poultry keepers’ 
households. Although the researcher work was definitely facilitated by the company of 
the extension workers, in some instances this was not a blessing since women refused to 
give any figures with respect to their income from poultry in front of the extension 
officer. The main reason behind this attitude is that women are afraid from the extension 
officer’s evil eyes, commonly known as Hasad, since the officer is usually a member of 
the same village. For sensitive subjects like income, women were suspicious of these 
questions and often responded with misleading and inaccurate data. Moreover, the 
researcher and the extension officer were not allowed to inspect women’s poultry at 
rooftops and in backyards so as not to figure out the exact flock size and not to observe 
how the poultry is kept and maintained. Poultry rearing is one of the important livelihood 
strategies among rural women in Fayoum and AHI is a very sensitive issue among 
poultry keepers since it means the loss if their main source of livelihood that is why 
women was fearful to share genuine information on their practices after the AHI 
outbreaks.  
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          Another research limitation is that the study was conducted just after the end of the 
CRS project, which did not allow the researcher to examine the long term impact of the 
project on women’s poultry keeping practices. Another constraint was the inability to 
acquire quantitative data from women with respect to the outbreak in poultry; recall was 
an unreliable technique for collecting data since poultry keepers could not support their 
arguments about the situation almost three years ago. When for instance the researcher 
asked about the numbers of dead or sick poultry during the initial AHI outbreaks in 2006, 
they would respond by “some died” or “all of the poultry died”. That is why in many 
instance the researcher compliments the qualitative findings with quantitative data from 
secondary sources.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE LINK BETWEEN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, 
DEVELOPMENT DISCOURCE AND LIVELIHOODS IN THEORY. 
 
                    
INTRODUCTION 
 
            The objective of the first chapter is to outline the theoretical origins of Disaster 
Risk Reduction (DRR) and its main principles, to reveal the relation between DRR and 
different development approaches in theory, to establish a theoretical link between the 
DRR approach and the sustainable livelihood approach, and to examine the theoretical 
debates surrounding disasters and sustainable development. The first section of the 
literature review will set the ground for the thesis by clarifying similar yet different 
concepts attributed to the disaster risk reduction literature and how inaccurate 
understanding of certain terminologies can cause great confusion in the DRR discourse. 
The reason why several DRR terminologies were explored in this chapter and were not 
just included in the glossary is because these concepts are often perceived by government 
officials as synonymous, however in theory these terminologies differ significantly. 
Terminologies such as “disaster management” and “disaster risk reduction” differ 
completely in theory since the first deals with managing response to disasters, while the 
second deals with managing risks and the underlying causes that lead to disasters. These 
differences have huge policy implications since dealing with a disaster after it takes place 
is totally different from trying to alter the root causes of disasters’ risks. It is very 
common among government officials in developing countries to inaccurately use 
“disaster management” terminology and attribute it with DRR concepts.  
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             Afterwards, the study will examine the construction of disaster risk by looking at 
the meanings and implications of concepts such as hazard and vulnerability. The notion 
of vulnerability will be closely examined in this section, since it is the entry point 
between the DRR approach and the livelihoods approach. The conceptual framework that 
will be used in this study is the Pressure and Release Model (PAR) examined in the Risk 
Analysis Framework section.  Afterwards, disaster risk reduction theoretical origins from 
the lenses of various development approaches will be examined.  
           The following section of the literature review will explore the theoretical linkages 
between disaster risk reduction and poverty reduction and how they are regarded as a 
“codependent pair”; the literature review will reveal how disasters were proven to hold 
back development gains and increase poverty, and at the same time how poverty is also 
attributed for increasing disaster risks. In addition, the sustainable livelihood approach to 
poverty reduction will be examined to explain how disasters were proven to increase 
communities’ vulnerabilities, and thus impede the attainment of their sustainable 
livelihood outcomes. Finally, the last section will look at the various critiques of the 
disaster risk reduction approach in the literature.  
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF KEY TERMINOLOGY 
            It is crucial before going into depth in the DRR approach to first define some key 
terminologies and differentiate between them. Despite the fact that DRR related 
concepts have different meanings and thus applications, they are used interchangeably 
both in the literature and in practice. This section will introduce basic concepts as to 
begin the study on solid grounds. The first question that should be raised is: what do we 
mean by a disaster? A disaster is “the occurrence of an extreme hazard event that 
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impacts on vulnerable communities”1 resulting in “serious disruption of the functioning 
of society, causing widespread human, material or environmental losses which exceed 
the ability of affected society to cope using only its own resources”2. The Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), established in Brussels, Belgium in 
1973 at the Université Catholique de Louvain and a part of WHO’s Global Programme 
for Emergency Preparedness and Response, outlined certain criteria for an incident to be 
called “a disaster”, and thus would be entered into CRED database known as EMDAT; 
the criteria are either when 10 or more people reported killed, 100 people reported 
affected, declaration of a state of emergency, or there is a call for international 
assistance3. In addition, the term "natural disaster" is widely used in the literature on 
disasters, which refers to the occurrence of “rapid onset” natural hazards such as 
earthquakes, floods, landslides, storms, hurricanes, volcanoes, tsunamis… etc.  
However, this study would not limit itself to rapid onset natural disasters but would also 
incorporate human-made disasters, and “slow-onset” hybrid disasters.     
            Thus, this study will deal with the three types of disasters, which are natural, 
human-made, and hybrid disasters for several reasons. The reason why this study will be 
dealing with “natural disasters” is the wide misconception associated with them, in which 
they are unavoidable “acts of God” that governments cannot prevent nor control and 
should only react to. This passive view is wide spread among governments in developing 
countries and local communities. Moreover, the reason why this study will be dealing 
with human-induced and hybrid disasters is due to their significant increase, high 
                                                 
1 Twigg, John , "Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis”, 12.  
2 Asian Disaster Reduction Center, (2003), “Glossary on Natural Disasters”, Available at: www.adrc. 
or.jp/ 
3The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). Available at: http://www.cred.be/ 
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occurrence and socio-economic impact. A study was made to quantify the frequency, 
nature and changes of human-made disasters in industrialized countries in the 20th 
century, by analyzing two disaster databases (EM-DAT and EMA), showed that there 
was an exponential growth in the frequency of human-made disasters due to an increase 
in traditional hazards4. Despite the fact that there has been an extensive literature on the 
frequency of natural disasters and a comprehensive understanding of their probable 
incidence and damages, there are few publications on human-made disasters and their 
impacts on sustainable human development. Recently, there has been a growing literature 
on human-made disasters manifested in the climate change literature as one of the most 
serious environmental problems and an obstacle to the achievement of sustainable human 
development5. The impacts of climate change on development are expected to manifest 
primarily through impacts on natural resources, on which the poor depend heavily, and 
on human health. Temporal and spatial changes in rainfall patterns and shifts in 
temperatures compound existing crises facing the water and agriculture sectors due to 
growing populations6.  
            Finally and most importantly, in many instances the disaster is a combination of a 
natural hazard and human-made actions, which are referred to as “hybrid disaster”7. For 
example, Avian and Human Influenza can be perceived as both a natural phenomena and 
a human induced disaster at the same time, since the origin of the AHI is natural but 
                                                 
4 Coleman, Les, “Frequency of Man-Made Disasters in the 20th Century”,  Journal of Contingencies and 
Crisis Management, , Vol. 14, Issue 1, (March 2006): 3-11.  
5 UNDP (2002). “Synthesis of UNDP Expert Group Meeting: Integrating Disaster Reduction with 
Adaptation to Climate Change”, (Havana,  Cuba: UNDP, 17–19 June 2002). 
6 Schipper, Lisa and  Mark Pelling, "Disaster Risk, Climate Change and International Development: Scope 
For, and Challenges To, Integration", Disasters, Vol. 30, Issue 1, (March 2006): 26.  
7 Shaluf, Ibrahim M, “Disaster Types”,  Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol.16, Issue 5, (2007): 
706.   
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human practices and behaviors is what causes the disaster. Therefore, this chapter should 
take into account this shortcoming of the literature and be more inclusive by 
incorporating both natural, human-made, and hybrid disasters in the definition of 
“disasters”. Then what does the term “disaster risk” refers to? 
             “Disaster risk” is the probability of harmful consequences or expected losses 
resulting from interactions between hazards and vulnerable conditions.  It is the 
“potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which 
could occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future time 
period”8. Then these losses could be reduced according to the “relatively new conceptual 
framework within the development field” 9, which is “disaster risk reduction”. DRR is 
defined as “reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the 
causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened 
vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and 
improved preparedness for adverse events”10 in order to “avoid (prevention) or to limit 
(mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of disasters” 11. 
           It is also necessary to differentiate between two fundamental terms that are 
inaccurately used interchangeably in the literature, which are “disaster risk reduction” 
and “disaster management” since they are inaccurately used by policy makers. These two 
terms are not synonyms; the key word that dramatically differentiates between these two 
phrases is the term "risk". DRR entails all efforts (pre-disaster) prevention, mitigation and 
preparedness compared with “disaster management” that deals with (post-disaster) 
                                                 
8 UNISDR, (2009), “Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction”.   
9 Action Aid, “Disaster Risk Reduction”, Human Security PolicyBriefing Note, (October 2006):1.  
10 UNISDR, (2009), “Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction”.   
11 UN-ISDR, (2007), "Guidelines for National Platforms for Disaster Risk reduction", 2.  
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rescue, relief, and humanitarian response. “Disaster management”, also known as 
“emergency management”, is “the organization and management of resources and 
responsibilities for addressing all aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, 
response and initial recovery steps”12. The revolutionary White Paper on Disaster 
Management (1999) in South Africa clearly emphasize that the difference between 
“disaster risk reduction” and “disaster management” is in “reducing risks”. The paper 
stated that a "fundamental purpose of the policy is to advocate an approach to disaster 
management that focuses on reducing risks – the risk of loss of life, economic loss and 
damage to property, especially to those sections of the population who are most 
vulnerable due to poverty and a general lack of resources… A shared awareness and 
responsibility needs to be created to reduce risk in our homes, communities, places of 
work and in society."13 While some theorists and practitioners also use a third more 
inclusive term that is “disaster risk management”, which incorporate both DRR pre-
disaster planning since it contains the term “risk” and disaster management post-disaster 
response and relief measures. “Disaster risk management” refers to both disaster risk 
reduction initiatives (prevention, mitigation and preparedness) and humanitarian action 
(emergency response, relief and reconstruction).14                 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
              For the past years, the DRR approach has been gaining significant weight in the 
development arena. DRR, according to the UNDP, is "the systematic development and 
application of policies, strategies and practices to minimize vulnerabilities, reduce 
exposure to hazards and the unfolding of disaster impacts throughout a society, in the 
                                                 
12 UNISDR, (2009).  
13 White Paper. 13.  
14 Schipper, Lisa and Mark Pelling, 24.  
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broad context of sustainable development."15 This definition should be complemented 
with another one that incorporates the notion of reducing risks. The UN/ISDR 1994 
definition complements the UNDP one by stating that DRR is “the conceptual framework 
of elements considered with the possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks 
throughout a society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the 
adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development”16. 
UN/ISDR further updated its definition of DRR in 2009 to refer to the “concept and 
practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the 
causal factors of disasters, including reduced exposure to hazards, and lessened 
vulnerability of people and property”17. Then how did DRR came about in theory?  
             The DRR theory is dominated by two schools of thought: the Neo-Marxists and 
the Behavioralists18. The first school of thought, the neo-Marxist, occupies a middle 
position between the classical Marxist and Weberian theories of class by incorporating 
Max Weber’s broader understanding of social inequality.  The neo-Marxist approach to 
disasters, which evolved in the 1970s, stressed the inequitable power relationships 
between the developed and the developing world that accelerated the process of 
impoverishment, which in turn exacerbated the vulnerabilities of marginal populations in 
the global South19. Since the neo-Marxists viewed disasters as deeply embedded within 
the social structures that shaped everyday development experiences, they argued that “the 
more complex understanding of vulnerability enables researchers to conceptualize how 
                                                 
15 UNDP definition. United Nations Committee on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, 2001.  
16 UN/ISDR, (2004), “Terminology: Basic Terms of Disaster Risk Reduction”.   
17 UNISDR, (2009).  
18 Pelling, Mark, “Paradigms of Risk”, in Mark Pelling (ed.) Natural Disasters and Development in a 
Globalizing World, (New York : Routledge, 2003):9.  
19 Gunewardena, Nandini and  Mark Schuller (eds.), Capitalizing on Catastrophe: Neoliberal Strategies in 
Disaster Reconstruction. (United Kingdom: AltaMira Press, 2008):6. 
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social systems generate the conditions that place different kinds of people (often 
differentiated along axes of class, race, ethnicity, gender, or age) at different levels of risk 
from the same hazard and suffering from the same event.”20  However, neo-Marxist 
approach was criticized for over-privileging economic class in its analysis and failing to 
identify the effect of vulnerability on “individuals” as an agency of analysis21.  
            The second school of thought that dealt with disaster research is the “behavioral 
approach”. Behavioralism emerged in political science in the United States when Charles 
E. Merriam, in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 
1925, stated “someday we may take another angle of approach than the formal… and 
begin to look at political behavior as one of the essential objects of inquiry”22. During the 
next decade the behavioral approach focused on studying individuals rather than larger 
political units; it was interested in studying what people said or thought. Armed with the 
newly developed tools of survey research, it turned away from the study of constitutions 
and from saying how states ought to be ruled to the study of the behavior of political 
actors and to statements about how states actually were ruled. Behaviorists were mostly 
drawn to subjects about whom quantitative data could be obtained, and thus the study of 
mass political behavior was promoted23. There is a misconception that "political 
behavioralism" is identical with "quantification" in political studies. Quantitative 
measurement and analysis of data is a commonly recognized as an important 
characteristic of behavioral work in politics, but it is by no means its central 
                                                 
20 Oliver-Smith, Anthony, “Disasters and Forced Migration in the 21st Century”, in I Understanding 
Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences,  (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2006),  3.  
21  Pelling, Mark. “Paradigms of Risk”, 9.  
22 Dahl, Robert A, “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful 
Protest”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, (Dec. 1961): 763. 
23 Political Dictionary, in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, (UK: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
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characteristic24. The 1970s witnessed an increased interest among behavioral scientists to 
address disaster- related issues; a special issue of the American Behavioral Scientist in 
1970 was entirely on organizational and group behavior in disasters25.   
               The behavioral approach to disasters emerged as a result of the “typical” 
misconceptions associated with individual behavior such as “personal and social chaos”, 
“disaster syndrome”, “social jungle”, and “being hostile”26. The behavioral approach 
responded to these stereotypes by arguing that, after recognizing a danger, the behavior 
of people is adaptive, aimed at protecting their families, others, and themselves27. 
Behavioralists even argue that “much of the initial rescue work is done by the victims 
themselves who do not wait to be told what to do, and contrary to the predominant image, 
that movement toward the impact area is more significant than movement away.”28  In 
general, behavioralists were pre-occupied with the ways in which individuals responded 
to disasters; however they didn't study how individuals influence the occurrence of 
disasters in any way. 29 They downplayed the role of social structures in shaping 
vulnerability, and thus they focused on disaster response and recovery (post disaster 
response and relief). The neo-Marxists criticized the non-political nature of the 
behavioralists30. The question that should be raised is: how did disaster risk reduction 
first evolved in the development discourse in general? 
                                                 
24 Wahlke, John C., “Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
73, No. 1, (March 1979): 10.  
25 Quarantelli, E.L. and R. R. Dynes, “Response to Social Crisis and Disaster’ Annual Review of 
Sociology”, 3 (1977): 23-49. 
26 “Editor’s Introduction”,  American Behavioral Scientist,  Vol.13, No. 3, (1970): 323-480.   
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Quarantelli, E.L., (ed),  Disasters: Theory and Research, (California: Sage, 1978). 
30 Pelling, Mark, “Paradigms of Risk”, 9.  
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            The development of the concept of disaster risk reduction came very late in the 
development literature; the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a sudden interest among 
development scholars to address the issue of disaster in theory. Until the mid 1970s, 
development theorists believed that disasters are “acts of nature” that can only be 
responded to after a disaster has taken place, which is known as humanitarian/emergency 
aid. The 1980s marked a new thinking in disaster research, in which disasters were no 
longer perceived as natural phenomena since they were proved to be the result of 
accumulated risks produced by the interaction of vulnerabilities due to economic, social, 
political and cultural factors and underlying hazards. Thus, the case for preventative 
action was made on these grounds.  
            G.N. Ritchie, founder of the Cranfield Disaster Management Center, had noted in 
1976 the importance of development in preventing disasters31. Frederick Cuny's book 
Disasters and Development, published in 1983, was the first serious attempt to address 
the ways in which disasters are a cause of underdevelopment and showed how disasters 
can interrupt the development processes32. Cuny argued that the increase in disaster risk 
is a consequence of the entrenched cycle of poverty in developing countries; He 
continued to argue that the roots of poverty and the roots of vulnerability are the same, in 
which the increased marginalization of the population is caused by high birth rates and 
the lack of resources to meet the needs of this exploding population33. Moreover, 
Kenneth Hewitt in 1983 in his book Interpretations of Calamity argued how western 
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societies developed “citadels of expertise” remote from the lives of ordinary people to 
“quarantine” disasters and deal with it as an “archipelago of isolated misfortunes” rather 
than a result of social and economic relations in the society34.  
            Moreover, Mary Anderson in 1985 published her early work  A Re-
conceptualization of the Linkages between Disasters and Development, which provided 
great insights into the relation between disasters and development; Anderson argued that, 
first, disasters are indicator of the failure of development, and second development is the 
process of reducing vulnerability to disasters35. In 1987, R.C. Kent dealt with the causes 
of disasters and how vulnerabilities can worsen conditions of disasters36.  In addition, in 
1989 Mary Anderson and Peter Woodrow advanced the concept of Vulnerability and 
Capacity Analysis (VCA) in Rising from the Ashes. The VCA framework differentiates 
between “needs” and “vulnerabilities” by arguing that vulnerabilities precedes disasters 
and is a result of long-term processes while needs are the short term demands of the 
community arising from the crisis itself37. Every society has both strengths and 
weaknesses (i.e. capacities and vulnerabilities) and when a disaster occurs this means that 
society’s vulnerabilities outweighs its capacities38. They continued to argue that 
“development is the process by which vulnerabilities are reduced and capacities 
increased.”39  
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            From this point onwards, an interest has emerged in linking disasters to the degree 
of development of nations and to the disparities that exist within a nation. Fredrick 
Krimgold, one of the early theorists of pre-disaster planning, stated that "the primary goal 
of pre-disaster planning may be seen as the prevention and mitigation of disasters."40 Pre-
disaster planning is the term used to illustrate the wide range of efforts made to reduce 
the risk of disasters before they take place. There are three types of pre-disaster planning: 
disaster prevention, disaster mitigation and disaster preparedness.41 This study will only 
be dealing with both disaster prevention and mitigation.  
DISATSER RISK= HAZARD x VULNERABILITY 
            Terms such disaster risk, vulnerabilities, hazards have different meanings and 
interpretations for different people. This section will explore the concepts of hazards, 
vulnerabilities and risks and examine the relation between them. Disasters can essentially 
be viewed as a function of the risk process, i.e. disaster risk result from the interaction of 
hazard, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the 
negative consequences of risk.42 According to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), a 
10-year non-binding global plan to make the world safer from disasters adopted by 168 
Governments at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe-Hyogo, Japan in 
2005,  the starting point for reducing disaster risk and for promoting a culture of disaster 
resilience lie in, first, the knowledge of the hazards, and second the knowledge of the 
physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities to disasters that most 
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societies face.43 That is why the terms hazard and vulnerability will be both examined, 
however more attention will be given to the notion of “vulnerability” since the exact 
same hazard can have different impacts on various communities with varying degrees of 
vulnerability. In addition, there is a general consensus in disaster research that the 
frequency of natural hazards has not increased in recent decades, however there is an 
apparent increase in the number of disasters and their impacts, which led scholars to 
argue that vulnerabilities within societies are increasing44.  
             Hazards are potentially damaging physical events, phenomena or human 
activities that have the potential to cause the loss of life, injury, loss of livelihoods and 
services, property damage, infrastructure damage, agricultural loss, damage to the 
environment, or disrupt economic processes45. They can have different origins: natural 
hazards (e.g. seismic, geological, hydro-meteorological and biological/health related 
hazards), human-made hazards (e.g. technological hazards), and hybrid hazards (e.g. 
epidemics).46 Hazard research has been dominated by the physical hazard agent rather 
than the social outcomes of hazardous events and the underlying social structures which 
create conditions of risks47. Hazard research has been generally criticized for its lack of 
attention to social theory48. According to K. Hewitt (1983), the early hazard work favored 
the concentration of power at the individual unit of analysis and used qualitative 
measurement techniques and hence neglected the political and economic contexts49.   
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This “dominant view” in hazard research that was governed by solely scientific discourse 
was criticized for its over-emphasis of the technical aspects of hazards50. Hewitt’s 
Interpretation of Calamity criticized this “dominant view” by arguing that most of the 
impacts of disasters are “characteristics of the societies” they occur in51. This critique has 
marked a new engagement in hazard research away from technical solutions and towards 
political economy with the "vulnerability approach" as the leading perspective, which 
emphasize the socio-political root causes of hazardous processes52.  
            In the early 1980s, the vulnerability approach to disasters began with a rejection 
of the assumption that disasters are “acts of nature” and the result of external natural 
phenomena that man has no control over.53 The emergence of the “vulnerability 
perspective” marked the shift from “reactive hazard approach” to “proactive risk 
reduction approach”; the vulnerability approach mainly focused on the “social geography 
of harm”54. Quarantelli (1986) argued that disasters are a not a result of “physical 
happenings” but they are “social events”; he continues to say that disasters are the 
“manifestations of the vulnerabilities of a social system.”55 Vulnerability for long time 
was seldom addressed because conventional hazard research dealt with symptoms rather 
than causes; the reason for this bias is because, according to Piers Blaikie et al (1994), 
“vulnerability is deeply rooted, and any fundamental solutions involve political change, 
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radical reform of the international economic system, and the development of public 
policy to protect rather than exploit people.”56  
            The term vulnerability has different meanings and interpretations for different 
people. The most common understanding of vulnerability is that it is “the degree of 
susceptibility to a natural hazard”.57 One of the overriding questions in vulnerability 
studies is whether the concept of vulnerability primarily refers to people and their 
activities or refers to systems.58 Vulnerability is experienced at various levels; it refers to 
both people/communities and to systems. The first type is people’s vulnerability to 
disasters and the extent to which they are at risk; for example having a house unable to 
withstand earthquakes, and the extent to which they can cope with the impacts, through 
such provisions as health care. The case study will examine traditional poultry keepers’ 
vulnerability to AHI. The second is the vulnerability of institutions and public services 
such as the infrastructure59.  
            There are several dimensions of vulnerabilities such as physical, cultural, social, 
economic, political, institutional and environmental vulnerabilities. Buildings at risk, 
unsafe infrastructure, and rapid urbanization, among others are the causes of physical 
vulnerability.60 The social vulnerability originate from occupation of unsafe areas, high-
density occupation of sites and building, lack of mobility, low perceptions of risk, 
vulnerable occupations, vulnerable groups and individuals, and lack of education.61 
Social vulnerability is a crucial dimension in creating the conditions in which disasters 
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can happen.62 Although social circumstances maybe associated with vulnerability to 
disasters, they should not be considered the same thing. Some of the causes behind 
economic vulnerability are mono-crop agriculture, non-diversified economy, subsistence 
economies, and welfare dependency.63 While environmental vulnerability can be 
attributed to deforestation, pollution of ground, water and air, destruction of natural storm 
barriers, and climate change.64 The question is does vulnerability lead to poverty or does 
poverty eventually lead to increased vulnerability?  
            Vulnerability is both a condition and a result of poverty since it cannot be reduced 
to a one-dimensional cause-effect relationship with poverty. Vulnerability can be seen as 
a cause of poverty, as a reason why the poor remain poor, and at the same time an effect 
of poverty. UNDP’s Disaster Risk index (DRI) proves that vulnerability and poverty are 
largely co-dependent. According to empirical evidence, it is especially the poor in 
developing countries who lack the administrative, organizational, institutional, financial, 
and political capacity to effectively cope with disasters and who are particularly 
vulnerable. While only 11% of the people exposed to natural hazards live in countries 
characterized by a low level of human development, they account for more than 53% of 
the total number of recorded deaths.65 The researcher believes that in order to reduce 
disaster risks two separate regimes, the vulnerability approach and the livelihood 
approach, needs to be converged, which will be elaborated upon in the DRR and 
Livelihood section.  The following section will examine the conceptual framework used 
in this study that explains the elements of vulnerability and how they shape disaster risks. 
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The "Pressure" and "Release" Model  
              The Pressure and Release Model (PAR) will be the main conceptual framework 
for this study. The PAR model was first initiated by Piers Blaikie et al in 199466 and then 
republished by Ben Wisner et al in 200467; the model is founded on the premises that a 
disaster is the intersection of two opposing forces, which are the processes generating 
vulnerability on one side and the impact and severity of the natural hazard event on the 
other side. The PAR model “resembles a nutcracker, with increasing pressure on people 
arising from two sides.”68 The PAR model is an organizing framework outlining a 
hierarchy of causal factors that together constitute the pre-conditions for a disaster, as 
shown in figure 2. This pathway is referred to as “progression of vulnerability”; it is a 
sequence of factors and processes that leads us from the disaster event and its immediate 
causes back to ever more distant factors that initially may seem to have little to do with 
causing the disaster69. The “progression of vulnerability” is a result of the interaction of 
three factors, which are “root causes”, “dynamic pressures” and “unsafe conditions” 
resulting in increased vulnerability among affected population.  
             The first set of factors contributing to the “progression of vulnerability” are “root 
causes”, which result from economic, demographic and political processes leading to the 
limited access to power and resources. These “root causes” are the product of economic 
structures, legal definitions of rights, gender relations, and other elements of ideological 
nature that reflects the distribution of power in a society.70 For example, people who are 
economically marginal (such as urban squatters) or live in marginal environments (such 
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as arid or semi arid) tend to hold no economic and political powers which creates sources 
of vulnerability to these groups. Their limited access to livelihoods and resources are 
likely to generate higher levels of vulnerability.   
            The second factor is “dynamic pressures” which are the processes and activities 
that translate the effects of the root causes into vulnerability of unsafe conditions. These 
pressures include macro-forces (rapid population growth, rapid urbanization, debt 
repayment schedules, epidemic diseases and malnutrition) and micro-forces (such as lack 
of local institutions, lack of local investment, and lack of training).  A clear example on 
how the “dynamic pressures” operate to channel root causes into unsafe conditions is 
endemic disease and malnutrition; undernourished and diseased populations suffer the 
most in disasters or when there is disruption to their livelihoods71.  
            The third factor that contributes to a rise in people's vulnerability is “unsafe 
conditions” (such as fragile physical environment, fragile local economy, and fragile 
local institutions), in which for instance people have to live in dangerous locations 
because they are unable to afford living in safe buildings and work in unsafe 
environments. All these "Pressures" in addition to hazardous events will lead to increased 
disaster risks. The “Release” aspect arises from the realization that to release the pressure 
that causes disasters, the entire chain of causation needs to be addressed right back to the 
root causes, and not just the immediate causes or triggers of the hazard itself or the unsafe 
conditions of vulnerability72.  
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Figure 2: “The PAR Model” 
 
Source: Wisner et al. (2004), p.51. 
DRR THEORETICAL LINKAGES  
WITH DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES 
 
            There are three main approaches that directly connect DRR to the development 
discourse, which are the: a) human capability approach; b) governance paradigm; c) 
human rights based approach. These approaches will be addressed consecutively.  
The Human Capability Approach 
            The Human Capability Approach (HCA), which emerged as a result of the 
adoption of Amartya Sen's Capability Approach as a conceptual framework in several 
UNDP Human Development Reports (HDRs) 73. Academic support for the critique of 
"believing that economic growth is the sole goal for development"74 has been gaining 
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weight since the publication of HDRs in 1990 with its Human Development Index (HDI) 
that measures equity, health and education and not just economic activity.  HCA is being 
applied to inform policy choices in many areas, from poverty reduction to sustainable 
development. Sen’s theory of development as capabilities expansion is a starting point for 
HCA75; Sen's approach defined human development as the process of enlarging a 
person’s ‘‘functionings and capabilities to function, the range of things that a person 
could do and be in her life.’’76 The most basic capabilities for human development are to 
lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the resources needed 
for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community.77 
Human development is about removing the obstacles to what a person can do in life, 
obstacles such as illiteracy, ill health, or lack of access to resources. This is the entry 
point for the DRR approach into the capability approach.  
            The negative socioeconomic effects felt by those vulnerable and exposed to 
hazards will impact in numerous ways on the capacity of people to achieve and enjoy 
human development gains. This will also mean that levels of human development will 
shape people’s capacity to be resilient in the face of hazard stress and shock. The authors 
of HDRs recognized the negative correlation between the increase in human vulnerability 
and lack of capabilities, which in turn make these individuals prone to hazards risks that 
easily disturb human development. The publication of the 2007/2008 HDR entitled 
“Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World” had marked a shift in 
the climate change discourse from being a mere environmental issue to a major human 
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development issue. The 2008 HDR asserted that climate change related disasters (floods, 
storms, and droughts) are destroying human development opportunities and increasing 
inequalities among and within developing countries.  The 2008 HDR reveals that climate 
change risks (such as reduced agricultural productivity, higher water insecurity, increased 
droughts, increased flooding, extreme weather events, and increased health risks) would 
ultimately affect the most vulnerable nations and lead to the reversal of human 
development. 
             In addition, the 2001 World Disasters Report prepared by the IFRC, which 
compared the impact of natural events on countries with high, medium and low scores on 
the HDI, revealed that two-thirds of the deaths from 2,557 disasters occurred at countries 
with low HDI.78 UNDP took this analytical work even further in 2002 by commissioning 
the quantitative study of more than 200 possible indicators of disaster risk vulnerability 
and producing a vulnerability index for use in its World Vulnerability Report79. Overall, 
the human capability approach provides a coherent disaster risk sensitive framework. 
Governance Paradigm 
             Good governance has recently been at the forefront of development discourse; 
good governance implies managing public affairs in a democratic, transparent, 
accountable, participatory and equitable manner. Joachim Ahrensn and Patrick M. 
Rudolph argue in their article The Importance of Governance in Risk Reduction and 
Disaster Management that institution building with the aim of improving the quality of 
governance is required to reduce disaster risk; consequently, susceptibility to disaster can 
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be interpreted as a consequence of institutional failure.80 In this sense, there is a strong 
interdependence between good governance and DRR. It can be argued that good 
governance is a prerequisite for DRR. According to Action Aid, good governance is 
regarded as a “corner stone of successful DRR strategies”.81 Some theorists (Ahrens, 
2000, 2002; Fordham, 200382; Warner, 200383) argue that institutional failure resulting in 
bad governance can be regarded as one of the root causes of institutional vulnerability 
resulting in increased disaster risk. Then what constitutes an effective governance 
structure that would foster disaster risk reduction? 
                There are four dimensions of an effective governance structure that fosters 
development and supports risk reduction, which are: accountability, participation, 
predictability and transparency84. The first dimension is “accountability”, which involves 
an agreement on clear roles and responsibilities of organizations as well as policy makers 
that ensures that politicians can be held responsible for their actions and it is reinforced 
through “participation”, which is the second dimension, manifested through formal or 
informal channels for citizens to influence policymakers.85 Governments should 
decentralize and strengthen local governments so decision making and accountability on 
DRR is improved. The third dimension is “predictability”, in which clearly defined laws 
and policies regulate DRR and their consistent implementation complements 
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accountability.86 Transparency, the forth dimension, is the free access of information by 
the public, which is reflected by the publication of reliable DRR information by 
government agencies in a timely manner.87 Transparency should reduce the incidence of 
corrupt behavior, improves the analysis and articulation of public policy choices, and 
enhances their acceptance. For examples, the high level of corruption due to a lack of 
transparency and accountability resulted in high death toll in two major earthquakes in 
Turkey in 1999, mainly due to the non-enforcement of appropriate building codes88. 
Access to information is a crucial element in reducing communities' vulnerability.     
Moreover, the capacity of poor people to cope with hazards depends on their access to 
resources (material ones as well as information), which is in turn determined by the 
institutional and legal frameworks in the country.89 Both the institutional and legal 
structure dealing with disasters in Egypt will be deliberately explored in chapter four 
from a governance perspective.  
Human Rights Approach 
                 There is a wide consensus among disaster scholars on a human rights based 
approach to disaster prevention, mitigation and vulnerability reduction, in which all 
people should have a universal right to be protected from the impacts of disasters. 
According to G. Kent (2001), international human rights laws implicitly address the right 
to protection from disasters90. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 3 
states, ‘‘everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person.’’ In addition, 
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Article 25 states that ‘‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, or old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.’’ Disasters indeed are conditions under which an 
individual may face ‘‘lack of livelihoods in circumstances beyond his control’’. Thus the 
right to an adequate standard of living is not suspended in disasters.  
            G. Kent (2001) suggests that all people have a human right to protection from 
disasters, and consequently governments have an obligation to provide that protection.91  
People are entitled to know how risk-prone they are to disasters and should have access 
to a safe environment as part of their human rights92. Thus, the right to a safe and secure 
environment should become a human rights issue.93 The basis for disaster risk reduction 
efforts should be a rights-based approach, focusing on how to empower vulnerable 
communities to engage in prevention, mitigation and preparedness.  
            In addition, proponents of the human-rights agenda in the disaster-development 
discourse advocate for a modification in international laws. According to Wisner (2001a), 
UN agencies in DRR realm have provided technical knowledge, support for institution 
building, and financial assistance through grants and loans, however there efforts lacked 
the moral obligation that will drive local political will.94 There is an urgent need for 
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globally agreed standards of disaster risk reduction exemplified in treaties, covenants and 
other agreements, which will force nation states to reduce peoples’ vulnerabilities.  
DISASTERS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
              There are three well recognized linkages between disasters and sustainable 
development in the literature. First, one of the predominant debates in the disaster-
development literature is that vulnerabilities continue to increase due to failed 
development; Hewitt (1995) argues that “if there could be such a thing as sustainable 
development, disasters would represent a major threat to it, or a sign of its failure”95.  
There is a wide consensus in the literature that rapid urbanization, the concentration of 
populations in hazard prone areas, and the spread of unsafe buildings reduce the human 
capacity to absorb and recover from the impact of a hazard, and thus lead to increased 
disaster risk96. Blaikie et al (1994) argues that rapid urbanization, one of the “dynamic 
pressures”, is a key factor in the growth of vulnerability. Rapid urbanization is attributed 
to several factors of underdevelopment such as a result of rural disasters and search for 
employment97. These features of “failed development” will be explored in chapter three 
and examined whether they are among the “dynamic pressures” resulting in increased 
vulnerabilities in the Egyptian context or not.  
             A second debate is that disasters would set back sustainable human development 
and increase poverty of an entire region or a nation as a result of the loss of livelihood 
resources, and interruption of development projects.98 There is a wide consensus among 
development scholars that disasters disrupt and can set back sustainable human 
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development through the loss of livelihood resources.99 A study of the impact of the 1998 
Bangladesh floods on micro finance institutions revealed that over 62% of all micro 
finance clients had lost their homes, which meant the loss of the work place for many 
clients as well100. In addition, nearly 50% had lost their everyday household possessions, 
and over 75% had their ability to generate income either destroyed or at least temporarily 
suspended.101 For example, in the 1990s, the Asia region saw losses to infrastructure 
reach US$10 billion per year due to natural disasters.102 In addition, in Ecuador, climatic 
effects of El Nino in 1997-1998 increased the headcount poverty rate from 34 percent in 
1995 to 46 percent in 1998103. In Honduras, where there was widespread loss in 
agricultural output following Hurricane Mitch in October 1998, the poverty rate increased 
from 43 to 46 percent but more so for rural households. In the Dominican Republic, 
headcount poverty increased from 36 to 40 percent after a combination of drought and 
terms-of-trade shocks in 1990104.  
            Moreover, disasters hold back progress toward achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) either directly through the loss of lives, livelihoods and 
infrastructure or indirectly through the diversion of fund from development to emergency 
relief. Many countries are not on course to meet MDG1, the prime goal of halving 
extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. Country progress reports on MDGs frequently note 
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progress on MDG 1 being affected by disasters105. For example, in the MDG reports of 
China, Nepal, Tanzania, and Mozambique various disasters are cited as key pressures and 
causes for continuing levels of rural poverty. Another example which affects achieving 
MDG 2 is that disaster-hit families often fail to send children to school, while schools 
may be closed down by earthquakes or floods106. Moreover, disasters can disrupt 
development by transferring resources from development projects to humanitarian relief 
efforts. Despite the fact that total official development assistance (ODA) fell in real terms 
during the 1990s, emergency funding has risen. OECD estimates for "emergency and 
disasters assistance" from DAC donors have risen from an average of 4.8% of total ODA 
in 1990-94 to 7.2% in 1999-2003, and in 2003 exceeded $ 6 billion or 7.8% of ODA.107  
             Another relation is that disaster risk reduction is developmental since it involves 
the reduction of human, social, economic, political and environmental vulnerabilities. It 
is now widely recognized in the development community that the implementation of 
development projects towards vulnerability and risk reduction is the solution to prevent 
and mitigate disasters. "Disaster risk management" is the new term used by most donors 
to integrate pre and post disaster activities (planning phase, prevention phase, mitigation 
phase, preparedness, warning phase, disaster impact phase, rescue phase, relief phase, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction phase).108 Most international organizations such as WB, 
DFID and UNDP started to integrate disaster risk management into its development 
programming since risk reduction initiatives was proved to protect livelihoods from 
vulnerabilities and boost their capacity to cope with specific hazard impacts, thus helping 
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to make human development sustainable. This is the core rationale for integrating disaster 
risk reduction into development planning. For example, in 2001 the death toll resulting 
from Hurricane Michelle, which hit very densely inhabited areas in Cuba, were limited to 
five people. This success has been attributed to the political commitment to reduce risk 
among vulnerable groups, preparedness training and planning, effective communication 
of early warning that were implemented by professional local personnel with responsive 
communities.109 
             Moreover, a range of case studies and reports testifies to the cost-effectiveness of 
disaster risk reduction activities.  In general, cost-benefit analysis of a wide range of 
initiatives, from local to global levels, shows that every $1 spent on mitigation can 
typically save $4-10 in the cost of recovering from disasters110. In addition, the WB and 
the US Geological Survey calculated that economic losses worldwide from disasters 
during the 1990s could have been reduced by US$ 280 billion worldwide if US$ 40 
billion were invested in mitigation and preparedness111. When dealing with particular 
nations, an example would be that the value of cattle saved on a flood shelter of 4 acres in 
Bangladesh during the 1998 floods was as much as £150,000 against a construction cost 
of only £8,650, according to Oxfam112. Another example, in Darbhanga district in North 
Bihar, India, a cost-benefit analysis of disaster mitigation and preparedness interventions 
suggests that for every Indian rupee spent, 3.76 rupees of benefits were realized. The Net 
Present Value (NPV) of the project was calculated at £46,000113.  
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113 Ibid.  
48 
 
DRR AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS FRAMEWORK 
          The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) explicitly addresses the vulnerability 
context, which provides a strong entry point for integrating it into the disaster risk 
reduction approach. The livelihoods approach provides a framework in which DRR can 
be part of a long-term sustainable development work, in which vulnerabilities should be 
reduced to achieve sustainable livelihood outcomes. The main objective of the SLA is to 
enable people to become more resilient to shocks and trends by supporting people to 
build up their assets and formulate livelihood strategies. The SLA was first initiated by 
Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway  in 1992; afterwards it was also endorsed by 
DFID in Carney (1998) and then by others including Drinkwater and McEwan (1994), 
Leach et al. (1997), Moser (1998), Scoones (1998) and Bellington (1999)114.  
             Chambers and Conway define the concept of sustainable livelihoods as the 
“capabilities, assets, and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is 
sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance 
its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next 
generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods in the long and short 
term.”115 The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) livelihoods team proposed a 
somewhat modified definition, which is that “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, 
assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means 
of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and 
shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural 
                                                 
114 Wisner, Ben  et al., (2004), At Risk, 95, quoting  Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway (1992), Carney 
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resource base”116.  The main difference between this definition and the earlier one by 
Chambers and Conway is that it does not include the requirement that for livelihoods to 
be considered sustainable they should also “contribute net benefits to other livelihoods in 
the long and short term”. In this sense the IDS version is more realistic117.  
Figure 3: “Sustainable Livelihoods Framework” 
 
Source: DFID (1999). “Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets.”Available at: http://www.livelihoods.org 
 
               The basic elements of the framework, as shown in figure 3, are Vulnerability 
Context, Livelihoods Assets, Transforming Structures and Processes, Livelihood 
Strategies and, Livelihood Outcomes. The Vulnerability Context shapes people’s 
livelihoods and determines the availability of their assets, which are affected by trends 
(e.g. population trends, resource trends, and economic trends), shocks (e.g. disasters), and 
seasonality (in prices, production, and employment opportunities)118. These shocks and 
trends can directly destroy people’s assets or can force people to dispose of their assets as 
part of their coping strategies. The Livelihood Assets which can be destroyed or depleted 
are human capital (e.g. skills, knowledge, and health), physical (e.g. transportation, 
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shelter, water supply, and energy supply), social capital (e.g., networks, membership of 
groups, relationships of trust, access to institutions), financial capital (e.g., savings, 
credit,  remittances, and pensions), and natural capital (e.g., land, water, wildlife, and 
environmental resources).119 The Transforming Structures and Processes are the levels of 
governments, institutions, organizations, policies, legislation, culture, and the private 
sector that shape livelihoods. They have a direct effect on access to assets, since the 
structures and processes can affect the creation of assets, determine access to assets, and 
influence rates of asset accumulation.  In general, Transforming Structures and Processes 
are seen as directly determining access to various types of livelihoods strategies. The 
livelihood strategies are the combination of people’s activities and choices (including 
productive activities, investment strategies, reproductive choices, etc.) in attempting to 
achieve their Livelihood Outcomes, which are their objectives120.  
             Originally, the SLA approach was developed specifically for the analysis of a 
wide range of agrarian policies. None the less, it can be of great use in disaster theory 
since the occurrence of a disaster or a “shock” implies non-sustainability of the affected 
livelihoods. The decrease in the vulnerability context depends on people's capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from hazard impacts by formulating coping 
strategies. People’s capacities can be increased through collective action within a 
favorable institutional environment (local, national and international) to establish societal 
resilience121. From the above description, it is evident that the SLA places much 
emphasis on two key DRR terms, which are vulnerability and capacity. SLA provides 
good opportunities for incorporating strong DRR component in development 
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programmes in order to properly assess risk, vulnerabilities and capacities122. A focus on 
livelihoods has broadened the scope of disaster mitigation policy to include questions of 
social structure and social agency. Given the positive attributes of DRR to sustainable 
livelihoods in specific and sustainable human development in general, the question that 
should be raised is: why DRR tend to be overlooked in development planning?                            
           There are several barriers to mainstreaming DRR in development planning.  First 
there is inaccurate assumption that development efforts, which aim to reduce poverty, 
will automatically address vulnerability in a given society. However, several scholars 
argue that development efforts is still not leading to sustainable livelihood outcomes, and 
this limited progress can partly be explained by its failure to take proper account of 
disaster risk, which requires systematic assessment of exposure to “shocks” for different 
groups of people, and explicit attention to options for reducing this vulnerability, to be 
part of the process of designing development interventions.123 The second factor has to do 
with the lack of commitment among policy makers. Ben Wisner points out that there is a 
broad gap between the declarations that accompany disasters about reforming institutions 
and regulatory frameworks and the political will and capacity to implement these 
reforms124.  For politicians, progress on risk reduction is much less visible than 
emergency response125. In addition, policy makers tend to be reluctant to address disaster 
risk reduction due to the limited resources, and they believe that donors will be more 
willing to give emergency aid than prevention/ mitigation aid. The third constrain was the 
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separation of donors' humanitarian assistance and development assistance which 
complicates funding for DRR, since it is a cross-cutting issue between the two sections.  
CRITIQUE OF DISASTER RESEARCH 
            After reviewing the literature on DRR, it is very crucial to address the theoretical 
critiques attributed to disaster theory.  Due to the novelty of the DRR approach, there 
were limited scholarly critiques with respect to the DRR approach since the “risk 
reduction” literature in it of itself emerged as a critique to the “dominant modernist” 
disaster theory. DRR theory surfaced as a response to “disaster imperialism”, in which 
international interventions in the aftermath of a disaster is justified126.  The critiques of 
the disaster paradigm are “distributed along a continuum of epistemological positions”127, 
according to Stallings (1997). 
            At one end of the continuum there is the “dominant modernist approach” that 
regards risk as solely an object of hazard that can be measured independently of social 
and cultural processes. Theories associated with the modernist approach are techno-
scientific, statistical and engineered based. Kenneth Hewitt's Interpretations of Calamity 
(1983) was one of the early critiques of the “dominant disaster paradigm” affiliated with 
the classical modernist view. Hewitt described how societies developed “citadels of 
expertise to quarantine disaster as an archipelago of isolated misfortunes” distinct from 
the lives of ordinary people rather than a consequence of social and economic 
relations128. The modernization theory, which was represented in the “dominant 
paradigm”, was rejected by the Structuralists in favor of reliance of local knowledge in 
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reducing disasters risks and not “imported technology”129. The “modernist approach” to 
disasters, risk and vulnerability is criticized for being a historically constructed “neo-
colonial discourse”, which denigrates large regions of the worlds as tropical, poverty 
stricken and disaster prone130.   
           At the other extreme end of the continuum is the “strong constructionist 
approach”, where nothing is a risk in itself but is a product of historically, and socially 
and politically created “ways of seeing”. Bankoff’s (2001) article “Rendering the World 
Unsafe: Vulnerability as Western Discourse” is an extreme critique of the “dominant 
disaster paradigm”. Bankoff argues that disaster risk and vulnerability are historically 
constructed in “neo-colonial discourses” 131. He continues to state that the concept of 
“natural disasters” is part of a wider historical and cultural geography of risk that depicts 
large parts of the world as “dangerous places” through which the West inflict its control 
over most nations of the globe. Bankoff portrays the notion of “vulnerability” in the late 
20th century like the notion of “tropicality” in the 17th-19th century and the notion of 
“development” in Post WW2, which denigrates large regions of the world as “disaster-
prone”, “poverty-stricken”, and “tropical others” respectively132. In addition, the 
“vulnerability approach” has been under severe criticism since it is regarded to be from 
“a knowledge system formed within a dominant Western liberal consciousness and 
greatly reflects the values of this culture”133.  Modernist proponent’s criticizes the social 
constructionist approach because it does not lead to improvement in disaster prevention 
practice. Moving across the continuum, there are what could be termed the “weak 
                                                 
129 Blaikie et al., (1994).  
130 Bankoff, Gregory, “Rendering the World Unsafe”, 27.                      
131 Ibid, 28.  
132 Ibid, 29.  
133 Ibid, 29.  
54 
 
constructionist” approaches, where disaster risk is an objective hazard but is always 
mediated through social and cultural processes, according to Oliver Smith and Hoffman 
(1999). 
            In the middle of the continuum lies the “Structuralist” critique, also known as the 
“constructionist paradigm”, which is one of the most moderate criticisms of disasters 
theories; it emerged as a result of the slow progress in reducing disaster losses134.  
Structuralists argue that disasters in the developing world are a result of global forces and 
pressures and marginalization of the poor and not solely a direct result of the hazardous 
events135. The structural critique is a radical interpretation of disasters, contrary to the 
behavioral approach to disasters, in which it doesn’t pay much attention to the hazard 
itself and focuses on the limitations imposed by global forces on individual action136. The 
Structuralist critique is based on the notion that disasters stems from Third World 
countries dependency on developed nations137. However, the Structuralist approach is 
criticized for the lack of practical risk reduction measures.  In addition, there is the “Post-
structural critique” that argues that notions such as “disaster management cycle”; i.e. 
prevention, mitigation and preparedness ate “technical constructs” imposed on different 
cultures, economic political and gender realities138. 
            In addition, Allan Lavell introduced several critiques in his article The Impact of 
Disasters on Development Gains: Clarity or Controversy regarding disaster-development 
relationship. He argued that any serious analysis of the disaster-development relation 
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must use a temporal framework that examine the full "life cycle" of a disaster and not just 
the short-term impact after disaster occurs139. He also argued that the focus on the 
impacts of disasters on development divert our attention from a fundamental concern, 
which is the impact of development on disasters. Another criticism of the DRR discourse 
is the use of economic criteria and cost-benefit analysis for attempting to justify risk 
prevention and mitigation. Critics argued that the “attainment of securer living conditions 
for the poor and a substantial reduction in their vulnerability is more a case of ethics, 
equity and social justice, than economic rationale and efficiency.”140  
             Another critique to the field of disaster research was its lack of gender 
dimensions. Feminists  argue  that  a  gender-bias  exists  in  disaster research  and  that 
women's  roles, experiences, and perspectives need to be further investigated and 
affiliated with DRR.   Maureen Fordham’s article "Gender, Disaster and Development" in 
Natural Disasters and Development in a Globalizing World revealed that despite the fact 
the gender is a key dimension of social difference, it has been absent as an analytical 
variable in disaster research141. Disaster research was criticized for being gender-
insensitive since many books on hazards and disasters failed to include gender in their 
indexes and even in the text as a whole due to the dominance of men in the field of 
disaster management.142 A considerable amount of literature published over the past 
decade emphasized the extent to which gender inequalities often result in women bearing 
a disproportionate burden of the costs of disasters (Byrne and Baden 1995; Delaney and 
Shrader 2000; Enarson 2001b; Twigg 2004). An "alternative perspective" was introduced 
                                                 
139 Lavell, Allan, “The Impact of Disasters on Development Gains: Clarity or Controversy”, Paper 
Presented at the IDNDR Programme Forum, Geneva, 5-9th July 1999, 2.  
140 Ibid. 
141 Fordham, Maureen, "Gender, Disaster and Development",  63.   
142 Ibid, 65.  
56 
 
in 1997 by Ariyabandu143, which suggests that the differential impact of disasters on 
women is a manifestation of the failure of disaster mitigation policies to grasp that gender 
power relations in the society is the primary reason for increasing women's vulnerability 
to disasters144.   
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CHAPTER 3 
DISASTERS IN EGYPT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
             The objective of this chapter is to examine whether there is an interconnection 
between disaster risks, vulnerabilities, and livelihoods in the Egyptian context. The 
first section will explore recent disasters that occurred in Egypt in the last two decades 
classified according to the three types of disasters, which are natural, human made 
and hybrid disasters. The scope, consequences and causes of each disaster will be 
examined. This chapter will also explore the ramifications of recent disasters that 
occurred in Egypt on sustainable development by revealing how disasters’ impacts 
pose a challenge towards achieving the MDGs through the disruption of livelihood 
assets, which thus lead to the failure of attaining vulnerable group’s livelihood 
outcomes.  
           The reason why this study devoted an entire section on exploring the recent 
disasters that occurred in Egypt is to examine the overall disaster situation in Egypt, 
to reveal their interrelation with people’s vulnerabilities, to explore the impact of 
different types of disasters on population’s livelihoods, and to reveal the negative 
socio-economic effects of disasters on the development process in the Egyptian 
context.  An observation of all different disasters in Egypt will shed light on various 
trends and patterns in Egypt by, first, identifying certain risk patterns prior to the 
disaster. Second, it gives us an indication of the concentration and distribution of 
vulnerability within the Egyptian society and, third, provides us with patterns of lack 
of government responsiveness before, during and after crisis and explains the major 
drivers of these patterns. 
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OVERVIEW OF RECENT DISASTERS IN EGYPT 
            According to Dr. Samir Riad in a report submitted to the UNDP, “Egypt is a 
country that is relatively free from catastrophic natural disasters… but their socio-
economic impacts are more serious.” 1  The researcher doesn’t agree with this 
statement and finds it somehow misleading since Egypt is not “relatively free from 
natural disasters”. While relative to other countries, Egypt may not be the lowest on 
the list, nevertheless Egypt is susceptible to several natural hazards and is 
characterized by a large number of human-made and hybrid disasters, as will be 
revealed in the following sections. This alleged claim that Egypt is “relatively free 
from disasters” often justify why the GOE is not committed and concerned with DRR 
issues and why government officials lack the political will to reduce disaster risks, a 
claim that will be further investigated in chapter four.  
            This section will explore recent disasters that occurred in Egypt between 1990 
and 2008, classified according to the three types of disasters, which are natural 
(earthquakes and floods), human-made (road, maritime, train, and fire accidents) and 
hybrid disasters (Avian and Human Influenza and Landslides). During the past 
decades, Egypt has experienced a number of major crises which has resulted in many 
economic, social, environmental and human losses. Egypt is among 28 developing 
countries who have suffered direct losses of more than 1 billion USD from only 
“sudden-onset” extreme natural disasters in the past 20 years, according to the Munich 
Re, one of the largest reinsurance companies that compile international statistics on 
disasters2. This figure is just an indication of the situation; the prevalence of “slow 
                                                 
1 Riad, Samir, "Report on Disaster Risk Management in Egypt", Submitted to UNDP, Cairo Office, 
February 2007,  26.  
2 Munich Reinsurance Company (Munich Re), “Annual Review of Natural Disasters 2000”,  (Munich: 
Munich Reinsurance Group, 2001). 
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onset” disasters is even greater in scale and has more damaging effects than the 
“sudden-onset” disasters, as will be revealed in the following sections.  
             It is worth noting that during the research process, specifically for this 
chapter, the researcher has encountered serious obstruction in data collection due to 
the scarcity of primary resources on disasters and potential hazards in Egypt due to 
the sensitivity of the topic. The researcher was denied access to IDSC documents due 
to their confidentiality that would have been of great use to this chapter, which are 
The National Plan to Manage Disasters of Earthquakes in Egypt, The National Plan 
to Manage Disasters of Flash Floods in Egypt, and Emergency Plan to Address Major 
Fires in Egypt. The researcher tried to overcome this by relying on a variety of other 
published primary and secondary sources tackling specific hazards and disasters in 
Egypt.  
Natural Disasters 
            Natural disasters are “catastrophic events resulting from natural hazards, such 
as volcanic eruptions, tornados, earthquakes, floods… etc., over which man has no 
control”.3 In the previous definition of natural disasters, the researcher refutes the 
latter part of the definition since the statement “over which man has no control” 
indirectly advocates for a culture of response rather than a culture of prevention, 
supports humanitarian relief rather than risk-sensitive development agenda, and is not 
gender-sensitive; the researcher prefers to replace it with this phrase “over which 
humans have limited control”.  Despite the fact that the numbers of natural hazards 
events has not increased in recent decades in Egypt, the numbers of natural disasters, 
in terms of losses, have increased rapidly in Egypt. Natural disaster risks is a 
combination of the factors that determine the potential for people to be exposed to 
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particular types of natural hazards; it depends primarily on how social systems and 
their associated power relations impact on different social groups (through their class, 
gender, ethnicity, etc.)4. In other words, to understand disasters we must not only 
examine the natural hazardous events that might affect people, but also explore the 
different levels of vulnerability of different groups of people, which is determined by 
social systems and power and not solely by natural forces5. The question is what are 
the “dynamic pressures” that increase society’s vulnerabilities to natural hazards in 
Egypt?  
            There are a number of pressures that contribute to increased vulnerability to 
natural hazards, one of which is rapid urbanization. There is a wide consensus in the 
literature that rapid urbanization is a major factor in the growth of vulnerability, 
particularly of low-income families living within squatter settlements6. It is argued 
that rapid urbanization has been a major driver for the expansion of megacities and for 
the proliferation of informal housing quarters in hazardous places, which are highly 
vulnerable to disaster.7 This movement of large numbers of people to urban cities is 
particularly critical in the case of mega-cities since the urbanization process results in 
land pressure as migrants from rural areas move into already overcrowded cities and 
these new arrivals have no alternative other than occupying unsafe land, constructing 
unsafe houses, and working in unsafe environments8. According to Blaikie et al. 
(1994), “there is a consensus that urbanization has contributed considerably to the 
severe losses of certain urban earthquakes for recent years.”9  
                                                 
4 Wisner, Ben et al., (2004), 7. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.  
7 World Bank, (2003), “Building Safer Cities: The Future of Disaster Risk”, 152.  
8 Wisner et al. (2004), 70.  
9 Blaikie, Piers et al., (1994),  At Risk, 30.  
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            With regard to Egypt, rapid urbanization might be attributed to the increase in 
population’s vulnerabilities. According to the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs Population Division, Cairo-Giza is a “mega city” and among the twenty 
largest cities in the world located in hazard prone areas with a population of around 
10 million in 1996 and a projected population of around 15 million in 201510.  In 
1950, the urbanization rate in North Africa was the highest in Egypt at 31.9 % and it 
will continue to increase to reach an expected 54.4 % by 203011. Among the 30 
largest urban agglomerations in 1950, the city of Cairo was one of them at number 25 
with 2.410 million. Cairo grew by 5-folds in 2000 and was number 20 with 9.462 
million, and by 2015 Cairo will be number 18 with 11.531 million12. This rapid                       
urbanization increases Cairo’s vulnerability to natural hazards such as earthquakes, 
floods, and storms. Another example is Shubra el Kheima in Egypt, which grew by 
25-fold; it had 0.04 million in 1950, grew to 0.94 million in 2000, and is estimated to 
reach 1.23 million in 201513.  
             The following tables summarize natural disasters that occurred in Egypt in the 
past ten years. Despite the low level natural hazards in Egypt, natural disasters’ 
impacts are tremendously increasing. It should be noted that this study do not classify 
landslides and epidemics as “natural disasters” but as “hybrid disasters” as will be 
shown in subsequent sections. The two main natural disasters in Egypt in the past two 
decades were the 1992 earthquakes and the 1994 flash floods that resulted in severe 
livelihoods losses of the affected populations. The following sections will examine the 
scope, causes and consequences of these two main natural disasters in order to 
identify vulnerability trends and government risk intensifying patterns.  
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Table 1: Top 10 Natural Disasters in Egypt (1999- 2008)  
Disaster Date No Killed 
Mass movement dry 6/9/2008 98 
Epidemic 1/1/2006 15 
Flood 20/12/2002 14 
Storm 22/01/2004 13 
Flood 3/3/2002 4 
Extreme temperature Jan-2000 3 
Source: EM-DAT. Available at: http://www.em-dat.net. Accessed on 15/11/2008  
 
Table 2: Top 10 Natural Disasters in Egypt (1999-2008) by numbers of affected 
people  
Disaster Date Total Affected 
Flood 3/3/2002 800 
Mass movement dry 6/9/2008 697 
Earthquake  24/08/2002 250 
Epidemic 10/6/2004 120 
Extreme temperature Jan-2000 105 
Flood 20/12/2002 70 
Storm 22/01/2004 42 
Epidemic 1/1/2006 23 
Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. Available at: http://www.em-
dat.net. Accessed on 15/11/2008  
 
Table 3: Natural Disasters in Egypt (1975 - 2001) by numbers of affected people 
Total Earthquakes Floods Windstorms 
Killed       Affected Killed    Affected Killed       Affected Killed    Affected 
1,386 280,342 571 34,998 673 229,868 51 15,071 
Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. Available at: http://www.em-
dat.net 
 
a. Earthquakes  
Scope 
             Despite the fact the Egypt is not a highly seismic country; earthquakes are 
potential hazards in Egypt. Earthquakes history extends back to 2800 BC, since Egypt 
is located near a number of major plate tectonic boundaries that generate significant 
seismic activity.14 The most active plates are concentrated in the North of Egypt, 
which makes the vulnerability to earthquake hazard the most at the North-East and the 
                                                 
14 Degg M., “The 1992 ‘Cairo earthquake’: Cause, Effect and Response”,  Disasters, Volume  17, Issue  
3, (1993), 227.  
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least in the South-West.15 An IDSC report revealed an increase in the total number of 
earthquakes over the past years; the report uncovered that the number of earthquakes 
rapidly increased from 240 earthquakes (1900 – 1980) to 2718 earthquakes (1981- 
1997), and again a rapid increase to 8588 earthquakes (1998- 2004)16.  This reveals an 
alarming increase in the frequency of seismic hazard and if magnified by increased 
vulnerabilities, a catastrophe would eventually occur.  The October 1992 earthquake 
at Dahshur, 45 kms to the Southwest of Cairo, has affected Cairo, El Fayoum, Beni 
Suef, Giza and Qalyubiya and was the second biggest17 natural disaster in Egypt.   
Consequences 
            Although the magnitude of the earthquake was relatively weak, there were a 
large number of human losses and damages due to the increase in vulnerability of 
affected populations. With regard to the 1992 earthquake impact, it had resulted in an 
estimated 561 deaths, 9,929 injuries and 40,000 homeless18. The government stated 
that around 5,000 houses collapsed and 11,540 damaged and estimated that total 
damage to be around 500 million LE.19 However, Munich Re, one of the largest 
reinsurance companies that compile international statistics on disasters, estimated that 
the socio-economic damage amounted to US$1,200 billion20. The earthquake had 
severly affected Cairo, Bulaq one of Cairo’s most densely populated districts was 
among the worst part affected by the earthquake, resulting in high number of people 
left homeless21. In addition, the earthquake resulted in the disruption of livelihoods. 
For example, a nationwide survey reveled that 1,087 schools were damaged, 3,569 
                                                 
15 Ibid.  
16IDSC, "Annual Report of Major Disasters in Egypt during 2007", (in Arabic), Crisis and  
 Disaster Management Department, January 2008, 75.  
17 The first being the 1994 flash floods in Upper Egypt, see the following sub-section in page 74.  
18 The Government of Egypt, "National Report and Information on Disaster Reduction",  The World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe-Hyogo, Japan, 18-22 January 2005.  
19 Riad, Samir, "Report on Disaster Risk Management in Egypt", 30.  
20 Munich Reinsurance Company (Munich Re),  “World Map of Natural Hazards”,  (Munich: Munich 
Reinsurance Group, 1998). 
21 Degg, M., “The 1992 ‘Cairo earthquake’: Cause, Effect and Response”, 229.  
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require intensive reconstruction, and 2,301 were in need of restoration. 22  If the 
government had invested in educational infrastructure in the first place, school 
buildings would not have been so vulnerable to earthquakes (i.e. physical 
vulnerability).   
Causes  
             A study formulated, after the 1992 earthquake, revealed that the level of 
seismic hazards is relatively high in densely populated areas in Egypt, which can 
directly affect the socio-economic development of Egypt23. This increase in seismic 
risks is attributed to an increase in people’s vulnerabilities. One of the factors that 
increase the society’s vulnerability to seismic hazards is rapid urbanization. Hewitt 
examined the literature on earthquake impacts and found that urbanization was 
closely related to damage to once-new multi-storey buildings and to the concentrated 
illegal poor housing of squatter settlements. This situation was typified in the 1992 
earthquake in Egypt, in which two high-rise buildings collapsed in Cairo, as well as 
the destruction of Islamic monuments, and entire rural villages in Fayoum 
governorate, near to the damages. In addition, a study compared the 1992 earthquake 
in Egypt with an earthquake in Japan with same magnitude, it was found out that the 
Egyptian earthquake far exceeded the Japanese one in terms of human losses, injuries 
and livelihoods destruction 24 . The Japanese earthquake did not result in any 
casualties, which is mainly attributed to the low level of vulnerability among the 
Japanese population with respect to seismic hazards compared to the high 
vulnerabilities of the affected population in Egypt25. In epicenter of the earthquake, 
suffered severe Egypt, the high costs of the 1992 earthquakes were mainly attributed 
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to rapid urbanization with respect to the damage of  houses in shanty settlements and 
to corruption with respect to the destruction of multi-story buildings.  
            Another factor that increases the physical vulnerabilities to earthquakes is the 
poor land use and inadequate enforcement of planning, design and building 
standards.26For example, according to the Housing Committee at the Parliament, there 
are 850,000 units in Egypt that there life spam has ended, 102,000 unimplemented 
demolition decisions, and 2 million buildings that are likely to fall27. Natural disasters 
are the monitors of development; the 1992 earthquake disaster exposed the 
shortcomings of preceding development failures. What the development process has 
done or failed to achieve in previous decades was exposed in the 1992 disaster 
aftermath as the “debt of development… disasters are the unpaid bills”28, in which the 
affected populations is placed in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment.  
            In addition, cultural factors play a major role in shaping vulnerabilities. A case 
study was carried out by Jacqueline Homan in 2001 to understand the socio-cultural 
contextualization of earthquakes in Egypt by interviewing 136 community members 
close to the earthquake epicenter 29 . The field work was conducted in five 
communities in Gerza, Barnasht, EL Gamaleyya, central Cairo and El Kattamia. The 
survey aim was to come up with a bottom-up mitigation approach that is culturally 
sensitive by reviewing people’s perceptions. The study revealed a science - religion 
interface by detecting people’s concerns toward the 1992 earthquake. The respondents 
were asked to discuss their general experiences, give explanations on the reason 
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behind the occurrence of the earthquake, explain the reason behind high impact of the 
earthquake in terms of damage and disruption, and discuss how scientist can play a 
role in limiting the effects of such disasters 30 .  The dominant perception of 
interviewees, 116 out of 136 respondents, revealed that the 1992 earthquake is an “act 
of God”, “everything comes from God”, and is “due to the anger of God due to the 
behavior of people” 31 .  Another respondent from Kattamia argued that “the 
earthquake was related to God; I heard that it is in the nature of the ground to crack 
and lead to earthquakes in the Fayoum region, but I don’t believe this myself.”32 The 
study attributes the reluctance of vulnerable populations in the Egyptian society to 
accept scientific explanation is that indigenous population are denied access to 
scientific information on the basis that they will violate local culture, which lead to 
their marginalization and disempowerment33. The author argues that the origins of 
cultural vulnerabilities must be studied carefully before attempting to implement any 
mitigation efforts in order to ensure that they are culturally sensitive.   
b. Floods 
Scope 
            According to the Crises and Disaster Department (CMDR) at IDSC34, floods 
are regarded as the only potential natural hazard that can lead to a catastrophe in 
Egypt. Flash floods occur in Egypt every couple of years. The most vulnerable 
governorates to floods risks are the governorates of North and South Sinai and Upper 
Egypt governorates (Beni Suef, Minya, Assiut, Sohag, Qena, Aswan, and City of 
Luxor). Flash floods occurred in Egypt in 1972, 1979, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998 
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and 2008. In addition to the current floods hazards in Egypt, the 2008 UNDP HDR 
entitled Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World revealed that 
six million Egyptians could be affected by flooding as a result of global warming in 
the coming decades.   
Consequences 
              Most of the flash floods that occurred in Egypt had led to massive losses in 
lives, houses, lands, livelihood resources, livestock, and damage in infrastructure.  
The worst natural disaster during the past fifteen years was the November 1994 flash 
floods in Upper Egypt. The 1994 flash floods affected 134 villages35 in Assiut, Sohag, 
Qena and Luxor where 600 killed, 302 injured, 140,00036 became homeless, 11,148 
houses destroyed and 11,085 buildings damaged.37 In Asyut and Sohag, 31 schools 
have been completely destroyed.38 In addition, 24,000 feddans of agricultural land 
were destroyed and thousands of livestock were dead, which severely affected the 
livelihoods of affected population. It was estimated that 160,000 persons were 
affected from the 1994 floods, and the total economic losses were estimated to be 
140,000 US$39. Most of the deaths were not a direct result of the floods but the 
consequence of an electrical fire that ignited a fuel depot (eight fuel tanks) in Drunka 
in Assiut governorate, in which ignited fuel swept through Drunka on the flood 
waters. The flood situation was compounded at Drunka by leakage of fuel as a result 
of explosion in depot tanks; the burning oil gushed through the village on top of the 
floodwaters igniting timber houses along its path. A lot of people were trapped inside 
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their burning houses while others ran out into a burning river. This incidence alone 
results in 475 deaths40, 200 injuries41, and around 20,00042 became homeless. 
Causes 
               There are several risks that increase vulnerability to floods in Egypt. The 
primary factor is that the GoE still perceives floods risks from a “physical hazard 
agent” perspective, in which they are “natural” hazardous events that are dealt with 
through “structural technical” solutions such as early warning systems and the 
construction of drainage basins. According to the IDSC "Annual Report of Major 
Disasters in Egypt during 2008", the primary cause of flash floods in Egypt is heavy 
rain, which result in the assembly of huge amounts of rain waters in small valleys that 
gather force  and momentum during its journey to the main valley43.  
             The GoE does not tackle the underlying socio-economic processes which 
create conditions of risks when dealing with the causation of flash floods since, for 
example, vulnerable communities in Upper Egypt settle in illegal flash flood prone 
areas without government intervention. Dr. Mahmoud Abu Zeid, revealed in Al 
Dostour news paper that governorates North of Assiut in Upper Egypt is at very high 
risk of flood disasters due to the increase in the rain levels on one side and the 
prevalence of high vulnerabilities on the other side; he adds that most of the flood 
drainage basins were transformed to agriculture land and were inhabited by large 
populations in shanty settlements 44 . The CMDR stated in the “Interim National 
Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action that “one 
of the lessons learnt from the 1994 flash floods was to prevent construction of 
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settlements in hazard prone areas most affected by flash floods”45. However, this did 
not take place 15 years after the devastating 1994 floods. 
            The issue of flash floods in normally high on the political agenda shortly after 
the disaster takes place and then gradually its importance fade away and the issue is 
ignored until the same disaster occurs after couple of years, which put it again on the 
government’s agenda46. Moreover, the government often redistributes the allocated 
funds for floods prevention to perform engineering structural measures (such as the 
construction of drainage basins, sand dunes, and dams) and non-structural measures 
(such as raising awareness among vulnerable populations) to other overriding 
development priorities since floods are not perceived by decision makers as a priority 
issue except when the disaster takes place47. Another factor is the lack of flood 
experts at the local level; most of flood expertise and technical knowledge are 
concentrated at the central level48. An IDSC report acknowledged the failure of the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to engage the local communities in their 
efforts  to disseminate important technical information on for example underground 
water  to local communities49. In addition, the lack of coordination between weather 
monitoring agencies, early warning authorities and vulnerable populations is also 
lacking50. All these factors contribute to the high costs of floods and the increased 
disruption of livelihoods. This increased vulnerability to floods have affected the 
development process in Egypt, however there is no official data available on this 
regard. The researcher will attempt to link these impacts with attaining the MDGs in 
the following sections.  
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Human-made Disasters 
                Human made hazards, also known as technological hazards, are the negative 
consequence of human innovation that can result in harm or the destruction of life, 
property, and the environment51. Technological hazards differ from natural hazards in 
the sense that societies have chosen to assume technology’s associated risks in 
exchange for some realized benefits52.  Egypt has witnessed an increase in the number 
of human-made disasters such as transportation accidents (Traffic accidents, Maritime 
accidents and Trains), and fire disasters as a result of human-induced practices during 
the past fifteen years. This section will examine transportation accidents due to its 
intensity and huge losses as well as fire accidents due its socio-economic impacts.  
a. Road Accidents 
Scope 
           With regard to traffic accidents, according to the IDSC Annual Report of Major 
Disasters in Egypt, road accidents are ranked the first in the list of human-made 
disasters that occurred in 2008 in terms of human losses.53  There is an alarming 
increase in the number of people killed, number of injured and number of accidents 
from 1990 till 2007. IDSC affirms the seriousness and intensity of traffic accidents in 
Egypt since it result in enormous human losses as well as material damages. 
According to an IDSC report entitled Road Accidents in Egypt, there were around 
22,000 road accidents in Egypt in 2007 compared to 19,000 accidents in Egypt in 
2006, which amounts to an increase of 16.7% 54 . According to the IDSC 2008 
Disasters Report, it estimate the number of traffic accidents to be 18,701 in 2008, 
however this decrease in the numbers of traffic accidents might not reflect an accurate 
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picture since these figures only reflect the numbers of accidents IDSC received from 
the different operation rooms at the governorate level.  
Consequences 
           According to official figures, the number of people killed in road accidents in 
2008 and 2007 are 4,651 and 4,244 respectively.55 What is even more alarming is that 
the percentage of people killed increased by 36.7% from 1990 till 200756. According 
to the IDSC, the number of injuries from traffic accidents is 43,616 in 2008 alone57; 
this figure might be a modest estimate since it only reflects the reports received from 
the governorates’ operation rooms. Moreover, it is also interesting to notice that some 
of the government official figures are not consistent with each other, which is an 
indicator of lack of transparency, which downplays an important dimension of good 
governance. Ironically, the same entity, which is the IDSC, published two reports in 
2008 with different figures of the number of injured in road accidents in 2007.  One 
report revealed that there was a 13.2% increase in injured people in 2007 (around 
30,000 in 2007 compared with 26,000 in 2006).58 While the other report stated that 
the number of injured people was 43,382 in 200759, which means that there is an 
alarming 66.8 % increase and not a mere 13.2%. With regard to the loss in assets, 
around 20,000 cars had fatal damages in 2007 compared with 9,000 cars in 1990, 
which is an increase of 106%.60 These official figures are just an indicator to reveal 
the intensity of the situation and are not accurate figures. The IDSC in its Annual 
Report of Major Disasters in Egypt in 2007 acknowledged that number are not the 
exact figures since the IDSC publishes these figures based on the notifications it 
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receives at the central emergency room at IDSC; IDSC continues to declare that 
figures might be higher since there is no binding mechanism the oblige emergency 
rooms at the governorates to report the accidents to the IDSC emergency room61.   
Causes 
              The GoE is also dealing with traffic accidents as “events beyond its control”. 
Road accidents are still considered by government officials as a matter of “fate”, “act 
of God”, “unavoidable consequence of modern life”, and/or “unavoidable-cost-of 
development”.  The primary cause behind the increase in road accidents can be 
attributed to the physical vulnerability of transportation infrastructure in Egypt caused 
by rapid increase in the number of vehicles that is not matched by adequate 
transportation infrastructure (roads, high ways, bridges…etc). According to the IDSC 
Annual Disasters Report for 2008, the “indirect causes of road accidents can be 
attributed to the rapid increase in the number of vehicles and the lack of development 
of the road infrastructures that have the enough capacity to match this increase”62. In 
addition, the report revealed that most of the roads do not abide by international safety 
regulations and standards63. Poor urban planning and poorly maintained roads lead to 
congestion, speeding, and dangerous “black spots” that are characterized by frequent 
accidents. In addition, the physical vulnerability of transportation infrastructure can be 
attributed to failure of good governance manifested in the prevalence of corruption. 
For example, a license can be bought with bribes without undergoing a driving test; 
what is even more alarming is that when a license is ceased it is easily returned for a 
bribe. In addition, many vehicles are not functional and not properly maintained and 
still get licensed.  Moreover, there is overcrowding on public transportation and 
especially on minibuses, which are often packed to the brim with passengers 
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(sometimes coming out of windows and doors) and driven by young inexperienced 
drivers without driver’s license. All these conditions increase the risks for road 
accidents, and can be attributed to “failed development”.  
b. Maritime Accidents  
Scope 
           With regard to maritime accidents, the sinking of Al-Salam Ferry in the Red 
Sea in February 2006 during a tip from Saudi Arabia to the Egyptian port of Safaga 
was one of the most catastrophic crises in the past decade in Egypt. According to a 
study conducted by Swiss Re, the world’s second largest reinsurance company that 
publish reports on disasters , the sinking of the Egyptian ferry “Al-Salam 98” off the 
coast is ranked the fifth worst catastrophe around the world in 2006 in terms of the 
number of victims64. The ship had 1,312 passengers on board and 96 crew members.  
Consequences 
             According to the IFRC, around 400 people were rescued and around 1,069 
lost their lives.65 Most of those killed were poor seasonal workers and peasants who 
were returning from Saudi Arabia where they were employed as “guest workers,” 
mostly in the low-paid service and construction industries66. With an unemployment 
rate of more than 20 percent, large numbers of Egyptians are forced to support their 
families by working in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The passengers on the 
ferry were mostly Egyptian migrant workers, “some of whom were bringing months', 
if not years', worth of savings to their families back home”67. This can reveal the 
extent of losses in human capital as well as the livelihood disruption of hundreds of 
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Egyptian families as well as the psychological stress endured by families and 
children, who lost their loved ones.  
Causes 
             According to the IFRC, shortly after the ship’s departure, an electrical fire 
broke out which the crew tried to extinguish with water68.  The crew used pipes to 
spray water on the fire; however the fire spread and the crew sprayed more and more 
water to put the fire out69.  Gradually the water collected inside Al Salam and flooded 
the ship 70 . According to the Egyptian special parliamentary commission 
investigations, the ferry’s drains were blocked, causing an accumulation of water 
which led to the sinking of the ferry; they found out that the ferry’s drains had not 
been inspected by the Maritime Safety Board, the fire extinguisher was not working, 
and that there was shortage in lifejackets and safety rafts.71 The 36-year-old vessel 
was routinely overloaded with passengers and despite being originally licensed in 
Italy to carry 1,187 people, was permitted to carry up to 2,890 passengers by Egyptian 
authorities.72 The overloading of Al Salam ferry, to maximize financial returns, was 
one of the primary causes of the disasters since it accelerated the tipping of the ferry 
when passengers panicked and ran to one side of the boat. In addition, the failure of 
maritime authorities to carry out routine inspections and the inadequate security 
procedures is an indication of high level of corruption within maritime authorities. 
This was also verified when the owner of Al Salam, a former member of parliament's 
upper house,  was sentenced in March 2009 to seven years in jail over the sinking of 
the ferry back in 2006.  
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c. Train Accidents 
Scope 
             In the 1990s and early 2000s, Egypt has witnessed a large number of train 
accidents that lead to significant number of people killed and injured. According to an 
IDSC report, Egypt witnessed 1,203 train accidents only in the year 200073. The 
report also stated that the numbers of train accidents have decreased by 19% in the 
year 2004 with 975 accidents compared with 2000, and then increased again to reach 
1,231 accidents in 2007 with an increase of 26.3% compared to 200474. The most 
recent train accident was the July 2008 train accident when a train from Marsa Matruh 
to Alexandria ran into three vehicles at a rail junction. This is not the first accident of 
its kind; as shown below train accidents are common phenomena in Egypt rail road 
accidents. The following is a time line of major train disasters that occurred in Egypt 
from 1992 till 2008, according to an IDSC Information report75: 
• July 2008: A train from Marsa Matruh to Alexandria smashed into three vehicles 
at an intersection, killing at least 44 people and injuring 50. 
• August 2006: Two trains collided (a commuter train with a freight train) in 
Qalyoub Governorate, where 58 passengers were killed and 140 were injured76.  
• February 2002: A train from Cairo to Upper Egypt was set on fire from a 
passenger stove, killing 373. 
 
• November 1999: Train between Cairo and Alexandria hits truck and runs off 
track, killing 10 and injuring 7.  
• April 1999: At least 10 people die and nearly 50 are injured in northern Egypt 
after collision between trains.  
• October 1998: About 50 people are killed and more than 80 injured when train 
failed to stop at buffers and ran into a busy market square. Reports suggested that 
passengers travelling on the roof of the train may have tampered with an air pipe, 
disabling the brakes.  
• February 1997: At least 11 people die and 75 wounded after two trains collided. 
• February 1996: Train hits truck at an intersection killing 11 people. 
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• December 1995: In thick fog a train rams into the back of another, 75 people die. 
Driver was blamed after findings that the train was travelling well above the speed 
limit  
• May 1995: Nine die after train hits a barrier just north of Cairo and derails.  
• April 1995: A train and a bus collide on a level crossing in Nile Delta, killing 49.  
• December 1993: At least 12 people die and 60 are injured when two trains 
collided. 
• February 1992: Two trains crashed, killing 43 people.  
         Analysis of major train disasters in Egypt from the above timeline revealed that 
around 755 passengers have been dead and around 500 have been injured. These 
figures are a modest indication since they are a rough estimate that only covers the 
above major train accidents. Train accidents entail a lot of causalities due to the high 
numbers of passengers as well as the huge magnitude of train accidents, which differ 
completely from road accidents. Most of the accidents occur as a result of two trains 
colliding or as a result of a collision of a train and buses and/or cars at intersections. 
The exact causes behind these collisions will be addressed in following sections.  
Consequences 
           One of the worst train accidents in the history of Egypt was the 2002 Upper 
Egypt train accident, in which a fire caught up in the train near Al Ayat district.  This 
resulted in 386 deaths and 136 injuries in the year 2002.  Moreover, in 2006, there 
were 278 injuries as a result of the collision of two trains near Qaliub North of Cairo. 
There are no published data on the accumulated costs in terms of human and financial 
losses for all train accidents in Egypt in the past decades.  
Causes 
            The previous timeline reveals that many train accidents occur due to collisions 
at intersections. The Qatar Raya news paper published an article entitled Fifty-Nine 
Train Accidents in Six Years Killing and Injuring more than 6,000 Egyptians in 
August 2006 which states that, according to surveys, road/rail junctions is the primary 
reason behind 40% of train accidents in Egypt, to the extent that it is named “death 
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intersections”77. Surveys revealed that there are 1,264 road/rail intersections in Egypt 
with very poor conditions, which constantly lead to disasters. This article was 
published after the 2006 train accident, when a commuter train collided with a freight 
train at an intersection. The 2008 train accident also occurred in an intersection, which 
reflects the lack of preventive measures at the central level, specifically within the 
concerned sectoral ministry, which is the Ministry of Transportation. In a parliament 
session after the 2008 train accident, the Minister of Transportation pointed out that 
“replacing Egypt's 1,261 road/rail junctions with bridges and flyovers would cost at 
least LE36 billion, far beyond the ministry's budget”78. This reflects the lack of 
financial resources allocated for disaster prevention, which will be explored in depth 
in chapter 4.  
            Another reason behind train accidents is the outbreak of fire on board the 
trains, which gets out of control due to the speeding train that ignites the fire; poor 
passengers packed into cramped compartments in old crumbling trains on long 
journeys to Upper Egypt often carry large amounts of baggage, take small animals 
and prepare their own meals on board the trains using portable gas cookers. This 
creates conditions of high risk on board trains, which was exactly the case in the 2002 
train disaster to Upper Egypt that lead to 373 deaths.  
d. Fire Accidents  
Scope 
            Fire accidents are regarded as one of the common and recurrent human-made 
disasters in Egypt. In March 2009, several large fires swept across the entire nation 
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leaving a lot of destruction and damages in El Salalmlek Hotel in Alexandria, Ezbet 
Bilal in Al-Sharabeya area, Gaziret El-Ward Hotel in Mansoura, the Tunsi Bridge in 
the Khalifa area in Cairo, in Helwan  in Al Tawheed and Nour store, and the Tama 
Elementary school in Sohag also caught fire. The total number of fires that occurred 
in Egypt in 2008 is an alarming 8,298, according to official figures, compared to only 
374 fires in 200779. Some independent sources estimate the number of fires to be 
30,000 annually in Egypt. A study conducted by the Centre for Nuclear Security 
showed that Egypt suffers around 20,000 fires every year if not more. Among the 
popular fires that occurred in 2008 are the Upper House of Parliament fire and the 
Balloon Theater fire. Previous years have also witnessed several devastating fires 
such as the Beni Sweif Theatre fire that left more than 30 dead and more than 35 
injured80. 
Consequences  
              The 2008 fires led to 136 deaths and 1,459 injuries, according to official 
estimates81. The costs of these fires are estimated to reach 400 million Egyptian 
pounds in 2008, according to a report published by the Nuclear Security 
Department82. The socio-economic impact of disasters is immense since it disrupts 
population livelihoods since fires can destroy one’s shelter or work place. In addition, 
fires destroy public buildings, government entities, historic buildings, hotels and 
factories have a direct effect on the national economy due to the huge human and 
financial losses. Among the fires that took place in 2008, one of them stands out due 
to its socio-economic, cultural and political significance. The fire of the Upper House 
of Parliament occurred on the 22nd of August 2008, which lasted for 16 hours. This 
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disaster not only has a socio-economic dimension, but also has political and cultural 
dimensions. This disaster resulted in one death, 6 injuries, and the destruction of a 19th 
century palace, in which the estimated damages are worth 6 million and 800 thousand 
pounds83. With respect to the cultural dimension, this 150 years old building is a loss 
to Cairo’s architectural heritage.   
Causes  
            There is a very dramatic increase in the numbers of fires and their devastating 
effects; the question is to what these fires can be attributed. The Parliament fire has 
revealed the lack of the GOE to prevent and reduce the risk of fires in its own 
strategic premises. The lack of a culture of prevention is one of the primary factors 
that increase the numbers and the impacts of fires in Egypt, which was clearly 
revealed during the course of the Upper House of Parliament crisis. "God protect 
us!” stated Fathi Sorour, the Chair of the People’s Assembly, commenting on the 
reduced number of losses in lives, said in a live interview on Nile News television84. 
The reason why the parliament fire did not result in looses in lives is because it took 
place in the afternoon after employees have left the buildings. Moreover, due to 
increased corruption among government officials, opposition groups claimed that 
this fire was carried out deliberately by state security officials to destroy critical 
documents at the parliament library, where documents for several corruption cases 
were kept. A former high-ranking state security official, General Fouad Alam, has 
“suggested that only arson could have been the cause of this fire”85. A member of the 
parliament affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhoods stated “arson is a safe way in 
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85 Shenker, Jack, “Conspiracy Claims after Egypt Parliament Fire”, Times Online, (August 2008) 
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Egypt for corrupt officials to get rid of important documents and files”86. Headlines 
of the banned El Badeel edition said the fire had destroyed files on recent 
controversial cases, such as “Al-Salam ferry, contaminated blood case, cancerous 
pesticides issue and Upper Egypt train accident”87. It is interesting to realize that all 
the documents claimed to be destroyed were all related to recent disasters in Egypt, 
which reveals that the prevalence of corruption is among disasters-related trends and 
patterns in Egypt. 
           With regard to reducing disaster risks, the Parliament fire revealed that the 
GOE did not carry out structural preventive measures and also failed to implement 
non-structural measures to prevent and mitigate the impacts of fires. With regard to 
the structural measures, the daily newspaper el-Badeel claimed that the building had 
no adequate fire-protection systems88. In addition, the IDSC argues in a report that 
the disaster management policies were not adhered to during the course of the crisis. 
For example, according to the General Procedures for Crises and Disaster 
Management Guide, an inter-ministerial steering committee chaired by the Ministry 
of Interior was supposed to be formulated in theory , which did not take place89. In 
addition, the National Plan for Fires Preparedness and Response, formulated by 
IDSC and endorsed by the Cabinet on the 7th of February 2008, was not implemented 
in practice90.  Also, there was lack of communication; for example, a government 
spokesman should have been appointed to disseminate necessary information to the 
public, which lead to the spread of inaccurate information and rumors.   
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89 IDSC, "Annual Report of Major Disasters in Egypt during 2008", 13. 
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Hybrid Disasters 
             A hybrid disaster is a combination of a natural hazard, human decisions and 
human-made actions91. This category of disasters is somehow subjective since for 
example some experts regard Avian and Human Influenza as a natural hazard while 
others perceive it as a human induced hazard. The researcher will argue that AHI is a 
hybrid disaster, since the origin of the H5N1 virus is natural but improper human 
practices and behavior is what causes the disaster. In addition, a landslide is 
categorized by many disaster experts as a natural phenomenon. Despite the fact that 
the fall of the rock is a natural phenomena, this study will regard it as a hybrid disaster 
since this natural hazard was magnified by human practices such as the spread of 
illegal urban settlements in high risks zones close to hazardous places, high 
population density and crowded living conditions, and the construction of illegal 
drainage system that affects the soil.   
             Some specialists argue that almost all of the natural disasters have a human-
made causal element in them, however the researcher believes that the primary 
difference lies in the “rapid onset” character of natural disasters versus the “slow 
onset” frequent nature of hybrid disasters. Small scale and frequent hazards create 
conditions of vulnerability, which lead to larger disasters92 . Hybrid disasters are 
characterized by a “slow onset nature”; i.e. they start off as small frequent incidents 
that pass unnoticed and then transform to fully fledged disasters. The recurrence of 
small scale frequent events known as “slow-onset” disasters is caused by rising 
vulnerability of affected populations as a result of “failed development”,  and at the 
same time these small scale disasters dramatically increases society’s vulnerabilities, 
which result in a vicious cycle that eventually halt sustainable development. 
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Attending to frequent slow onset disasters is a preventive strategy for reducing 
disaster risks and their impacts. 
a. Avian and Human Influenza 
Scope 
            The GOE confirmed its first H5N1 outbreak in domestic poultry on 17 
February 2006. The first case of the H5N1 human infection was discovered on 15 
March 2006.93 Egypt was the ninth country to report laboratory-confirmed human 
cases in the current outbreak.94 According to the WHO, from 15 March 2006 till 20 
May 2009, 74 cases were confirmed positive and there have been 27 fatalities.95 It is 
interesting to note that out-side Asia, Egypt has had the highest number of human 
infections and deaths due to the H5N1 virus.96  More alarming is that between January 
2009 and May 2009, Egypt had 23 confirmed cases of H5N1 virus, 4 of which died, 
which makes Egypt the first on the world in terms of confirmed cases in 2009.97    
Consequences 
           According to several reports and studies, it was found out that the socio-
economic impact of the Avian and Human Influenza disaster is immense. The 
following is a brief overview of the AHI impacts that will be deeply examined in my 
case study. It is estimated that Egypt's total losses due to the deadly strain of H5N1 
to be at LE862 million since the disease appeared in Egypt until February 2008 due 
to the slaughtering 36.8 million birds98. Since the first outbreak of bird flu in Egypt 
                                                 
93 Ministry of Health, Government of Egypt, "Comprehensive Approach to Addressing Avian and 
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in 2006 until the end of 2007, the Ministry of Health and Population has spent LE238 
million to provide vaccines for the Avian Influenza virus and launch various types of 
campaigns to increase people's awareness of the dangers of the deadly strain99. The 
Health Ministry will further allocate an extra LE300 million to combat bird flu in the 
coming period100.   
Causes 
               It is worth noting that most positive cases occurred due to direct contact 
with dead or infected household birds. This reveals that cultural factors play a crucial 
role in people’s vulnerabilities to AHI as a hazard. According to the Supreme 
National Committee to Combat Avian Flu, the primary factor behind the continuous 
spread of AI is the traditional poultry keeping, i.e. poultry keeping in a household 
setting, in backyards, or in rooftops.   According to a poll conducted by IDSC, in 
which a sample of 1,102 was surveyed, it revealed that 28% of Egyptians surveyed 
still raised birds at home101. In addition, three-quarters of respondents reported to eat 
freshly slaughtered poultry.102 Moreover, 47% of respondents have relatives who 
raise poultry at home103 . This reveals that cultural habits can increase people’s 
vulnerability and put them at increased risk of AHI.  This cultural issue will be 
addressed in depth in the case study.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid.  
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102 Ibid.  
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b. Landslides/Rockslides  
Scope 
          Landslides involve the movement of material (such as rock, mud, soil and 
sometimes even rubbish) that may vary considerably in its nature104. On the 6th of 
September 2008, a rock slide had took place when at least eight massive rocks fell 
onto the impoverished Manshiyet Nasser shantytown on the outskirts of Cairo, which 
lead to 107 deaths105 , 72 injuries106, and 100 to150 families lost their houses107. This 
disaster is not the first of its kind; there were two similar events in 1993 and 1994 in 
the same area, which led to 30 and 70 deaths respectively108. In 1993 a 4,000-ton 
block of limestone rock slide fell on 14 workshops in a slum area of Al-Moqattam, 
North Cairo 109 . This shows that landslides disasters are recurrent events. Many 
residents of Manshiyet Nasser revealed that they have reported small rocks falling to 
the authorities several weeks before the disasters but no one responded. This shows 
how landslides are “slow onset” hazards that if ignored would turn into a full blown 
catastrophe.  
Consequences 
            The reoccurrence of such types of frequent slow onset disasters over the years 
reveals that the culture of prevention is totally lacking within the government.   The 
idea of blaming “nature” and “fate” is still prevailing within decision makers in 
Egypt. The Minister of Housing responded to numerous acquisitions at the people’s 
assembly by wondering why people do not believe in fate.  He stated that these 
                                                 
104 Blaikie et al., 182.  
105 IDSC, "Annual Report of Major Disasters in Egypt during 2007", 77.  
106 IFRC, “Egypt: Cairo Rockslides”, ReliefWeb, (25 September 2008). 
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108 IDSC , "Annual Report of Major Disasters in Egypt during 2007", 77.  
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families whom their houses were destroyed were supposed to move to Suzane 
Mubarak housing project in a week times but “fate did not give them the chance”.  
Causes  
             When trying to examine the vulnerabilities associated with landslides, we 
need to move beyond the immediate physical hazard and inquire about human 
activities that act as triggers for the physical event110. The spread of slums that are 
characterized by high disasters risks are primarily a result of rapid urbanization 
associated with the rapid influx of poor rural migrant looking for jobs111. It is widely 
recognized in the literature that slum residents often incur greater risks from hazards, 
especially landslides or mudslides, as a result of having to live in very closely-built 
structures, which can disturb natural land drainage patterns and watercourses 112 . 
Manshiyet Nasser is described as "the largest squatter area" in Cairo, in which 
350,000 people live in the area on about 850 acres, a density of more than 400 persons 
per acre, according to a survey carried out by UN Habitat. The 2008 rockslide in the 
case of Egypt was the result of human induced practices, which is the spread of illegal 
urban settlements characterized by increased vulnerabilities such as poverty, high 
population density, and crowded living conditions close to hazardous industry or in 
places exposed to natural hazards.113 The UN Habitat report stated that "the area is 
suffering from poor living qualities, inadequate services, and lack of infrastructure 
and deteriorated environmental conditions".  
             To conclude, it is apparent how deep rooted vulnerabilities in the Egyptian 
society magnify hazardous events and lead to increased disasters; it is also evident 
that poor policy initiatives such as allowing high density population concentrations in 
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flood plains and in landslide hazardous zones, having unenforced earthquakes 
building codes, providing inadequate floods warnings, having poor transportation 
infrastructure, and not addressing the vulnerabilities associated with poultry raising in 
household settings are far more important than dealing with the hazard agent itself. 
The following section will deal with the relation between the prevalence of disasters 
and livelihoods sustainability.   
DISASTERS AND LIVELIHOODS IN EGYPT 
 
           This section will provide an analysis of the impact of disasters on 
communities’ livelihoods. However, this goal was met with several challenges given 
the scarcity of data and resources on the impact of disasters on the development 
process in Egypt. First, there is a lack of primary data that link the socio-economic 
impacts of disasters to the stagnation of the development process in Egypt. Another 
constraint was the limited secondary studies and reports on the relation between 
disasters and livelihoods in Egypt. This section is a modest attempt to examine the 
impact of recent disasters on vulnerable communities’ livelihoods and on sustainable 
human development in Egypt, based on the available resources. 
           In Egypt, disasters can disrupt the functioning of a community causing 
extensive human, social, material, economic and environmental losses which exceed 
the capacity of the affected people to cope using their own resources. Disasters in 
Egypt destroy livelihood assets and thus lead to the failure of attainment of livelihood 
outcomes. For example, all sorts of disasters examined earlier can destroy or disrupt 
livelihood assets such as homes, land, crops, live stocks …etc. Disasters interrupt the 
income of poor people by affecting their daily food production, which is self-
consumed and/or sold for income. This was the case with the AHI crisis, in which the 
crisis drastically affected the food production of poor households that rely on 
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domestic poultry as a source for cheap protein, as will be shown in my case study.  
Also, disasters can affect the micro-income generating projects of the poor as with the 
case of CRS project discussed later in chapter 5. Moreover, public facilitates and 
services are also vulnerable to the damaging effects of natural disasters. This often 
affects vulnerable populations since the destruction of essential infrastructure such as 
roads, schools and heath facilities (physical capital) result in poor human capabilities 
on the long term. After the 1992 earthquake, the education process was disrupted in 
Egypt due to the destruction of schools; this disruption lasted for years.  
            Disasters exert an enormous challenge on achieving sustainable livelihoods 
and thus would pose a significant threat to the prospects of achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The UNDP emphasized in 2004 in its report entitled 
Reducing Disaster Risk: a Challenge for Development that: “Meeting the MDGs is 
extremely challenged in many communities and countries by losses from disasters 
triggered by natural hazards.”114 Not only do disasters affect MDG1, disasters hinder 
achieving all other MDG targets. The two MDGs Midpoint Assessment Reports (2004 
and 2008) formulated by the Ministry of Economic Development did not refer to 
disaster risk in the reports. The two reports failed to address any disaster impact that 
occurred in Egypt and link it to sustainable livelihoods; the reports did not even 
recognize the risk of disasters as one of the challenges faced by government in its 
progress towards achieving the MDGs. The question is: can disasters set back the 
progress towards achieving the eight Millennium Development Goals in Egypt? 
            With respect to MDG1 (eradicating extreme poverty and hunger), the direct 
impact of disaster would be income and capability deprivation. According to an IDSC 
report, flash floods, the most serious natural hazard in Egypt, affects mainly Upper 
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Egypt and Red Sea governorates almost every year with varying scale and 
intensity115, which raise questions about the linkage between the recurrence of floods 
disasters and the human development status of these governorates. It is also 
interesting to link this to a report published by the World Bank and formulated by the 
Ministry of Economic Development, which reveals that poverty is concentrated in 
Upper Egypt Governorates; there is a particular concentration of poor in the rural 
Upper Egypt region, which accounts for 66 % of the extreme poor in the country, 51 
% of its poor, and for 31 % of the near poor, far exceeding its 25 % population 
share116.  The direct correlation between the huge impacts and devastation of floods 
and the increased incidence of poverty in Upper Egyptian governorates should be 
further investigated. 
            With regard to MDG2 (achieve universal primary education), the direct impact 
of disasters would be that educational infrastructure will be damaged and destroyed, 
and thus the indirect impact would be the disruption of the education process for 
students. L. Herrera argues that natural disasters have contributed to the problem of 
deterioration of school facilities, in which a number of schools suffered structural 
damage in Greater Cairo in the wake of the 1992 earthquake117. She also adds that 
flooding in Upper Egypt in recent years has also taken its toll on schools118. A 
nationwide survey reveled that 1,087 schools were damaged, 3,569 require intensive 
reconstruction, and 2,301 were in need of restoration.119 After the 1992 earthquake, 
the total destruction and damage of schools have lead to a shortage in safe school 
buildings, in which many of them are used for multiple shifts up till now resulting in 
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further reduction of the daily school schedule. This disruption of the education 
process and the overcrowding of students in classes will jeopardize the quality of 
education, which will directly affect the human capital of future generations.  
            With regard to empowering women (MDG3), women are one of the most 
vulnerable groups in the Egyptian society with respect to disasters risks. More women 
have died and have been injured than men in the 1992 earthquake120. In addition, most 
of the AHI fatalities are among women. It is interesting to note that among the 74 
confirmed cases of AHI, there are around 20 positive female cases (above 18 years 
old), 16 of which died. In addition, AHI is a major challenge that would hinder 
Egypt’s efforts to meet MDG4 (reducing child mortality) since 50 out of 74 cases are 
children (under 18 years old); this is attributed this to their unawareness of the danger 
of playing with infected birds at their back yards. In addition, AHI increased the 
financial burden of the Ministry of Health by providing stocks of tummy flu 
vaccination, which will affect its capacity when combating HIV/AIDS and other 
diseases (MDG 6). With regard to MDG 7(ensuring environmental sustainability), the 
unsustainable land-use patterns such as settlement in hazardous areas, the over-
exploitation of natural resources, and deforestation can trigger disasters like landslides 
or floods, which was the case in landslide that took place in Manshiyet Nasser.  
               To conclude, the exploration of all these diverse disasters in Egypt reveals 
that there are certain patterns that take place during and after disasters. In almost all 
disasters, the poor are the ones who are mostly affected by disasters.  Moreover, 
another pattern observed was the lack of government responsiveness before, during 
and after crisis. The following chapter will be examining the ineffective institutional 
arrangements and legal framework that deal with disasters in Egypt.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DISASTER ARRANGMENTS IN EGYPT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
             This chapter will examine the legal framework and the institutional arrangements 
within the GOE at the strategic, central, and local levels that deal with disasters in order 
to examine whether these mechanisms are capable of reducing disaster risks, by 
managing hazards risks and addressing related vulnerabilities. This chapter will tackle the 
following questions: what are the current laws dealing with disaster management in 
Egypt? How do they relate to DRR? What are the governmental bodies that are mandated 
to deal with pre-disaster planning? What are their functions? Are they efficient? This 
chapter will particularly examine the mandate of the Crisis and Disaster Management 
Department (CMDR) at the Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center 
(IDSC), since it is the focal point for DRR in Egypt on the national level. The main 
postulation, for this chapter, is that institutional vulnerability is prevailing within the 
GOE since there is no entity in the national government legally responsible for 
orchestrating DRR policies and programmes and integrating it into development planning 
in Egypt. The lack of adequate legislation and institutions, mechanisms, and processes for 
DRR in the GoE is an indicator for the lack of political will.  
            According to a Preliminary Regional Stocktaking of Natural Hazard Risk and 
Disaster Management Capacity in the Middle East and North Africa by the World Bank 
and UN/ISDR, it was observed that “arrangements within most MENA countries exist for 
emergency management and are organized and coordinated at a national level, either 
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through a specially constituted agency or through the office of the Prime Minister or 
President”1. The report added that “these are typically arrangements for dealing with 
response activities, that is actions directed at containing and controlling the hazard event, 
immediate protecting life and critical property and with the short term aftermath of 
humanitarian aid, and maintaining public safety.”2 This observation totally corresponds to 
the Egyptian case since all the current laws, policies and processes only deal with the 
“physical hazard” creating disasters risks and neglect the causal vulnerabilities that 
magnify these hazardous events.  
             The governmental entities dealing with disasters in Egypt only perform 
unsystematic short-term post disaster emergency management. In practice, the way in 
which the GoE is presently managing a crisis is to assign a Supreme Inter-Ministerial 
Disaster Committee headed by the Minister of the directly involved ministry and number 
of relevant ministries as members to handle the disaster after it takes place. This approach 
was applied in the case of Avian and Human Influenza crisis, Al Salam Ferry disaster, 
Train accidents, and recently in the Swine Flu disaster (Influenza A/H1N1). However, in 
Magles El Shaab (Parliament) Fire, this committee was not even formulated, which 
reveals the lack of consistency and that the government deals with disasters on an ad-hoc 
basis without conforming to the guidelines laid out in the IDSC’s Manuel entitled 
General Procedures for Crisis and Disaster Management. This Manuel explains that the 
Prime Minister should be notified when a disaster reaches the “red/very high level”, 
which means that there are more than 20 deaths and 50 injures, more than 5 million LE in 
losses and/or the occurrence of extraordinary disasters that are not frequent in strategic or 
                                                 
1 Buckle, Philip, “Building Partnerships for Disaster Risk Reduction and Natural Hazard Risk 
Management”, 15.  
2Ibid. 
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public locations and the PM would then form the Supreme Inter-Ministerial Disaster 
Committee to handle the situation.3 The following section will examine all the relevant 
regulations with respect to disasters, and whether they lay the foundation for a DRR 
strategy or not.  
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
           Legislation provides the framework around which DRR strategies can be 
incorporated into the design of development projects and activities. The Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA), a 10-year global blue print for DRR, identified legislation 
as an essential component in moving towards a comprehensive and mainstreamed DRR 
approach. Unfortunately, the legal framework that currently exists in Egypt deals with 
post-disaster arrangements (disaster response and relief). These laws and decrees have 
been inaccurately affiliated with disaster risk reduction due to the novelty of the term 
among policy makers in Egypt. The following are laws and decrees that regulate disasters 
in Egypt, according to a report submitted to the UN World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction(WCDR) in Hyogo in 20054:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 IDSC, “Manuel: General Procedures for Crisis and Disaster Management”,  (in Arabic), Crisis and 
Disaster Management Department, (August 2006): 15-16.  
4 The Government of Egypt, "National Report and Information on Disaster Reduction".   
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Table 4: Current Crisis and Disaster Management Laws in Egypt 
Laws Main objective  
Law 148/1959 
• Defined the mandates of the Civil Defense Administration 
(CDA) 
• CDA is the implementing agency for laws dealing with 
crisis management (Article 3). 
• Set the measures to be taken for early warning system, fire 
brigades, and carrying out evacuation plans, and search and 
rescue operations as well.  
• Freed all financial transactions in times of disaster from all 
fiscal regulations (Article 9).  
Presidential Decree 
No. 1651/1971 
• Established the Supreme Council of Civil defense (SCCD).  
Law 30/1977 
• Regulated the civil defense procedures inside industrial 
establishments to minimize human-induced risks and protect 
workers. 
Ministerial Decree 
No. 11/1966 
• Formulated the Civil Defense Committees in the 
Governorates.  
Ministerial Decree 
No. 382/1970 
• Detailed the membership of these committees, chaired by 
the Governor. 
Ministerial Decree 
No. 1182/1981 
• Established Civil Defense Units in different sectors  
Ministerial Decree 
No. 107/1982:  
• Amended Law 148/1959 by adding the protection of civilian 
population from both human-induced and natural disasters 
in peace and wartime to the mandates of CDA.  
Joint Ministerial 
Decree No. 63/1983  
• Organized the co-operation between the CDA (Ministry of 
Interior) and the Armed Forces (Ministry of Defense) in 
specific cases such as relief work in natural disasters. 
Ministerial Decree 
No. 349/1986:  
• Regulated voluntary work in civil defense 
Presidential Decree 
No. 132/1992 
• Re-formulated the SCCD to be chaired by the Prime 
Minister to lay down the general policy for Civil Defense.  
Prime Ministerial 
Decree No. 746/2000 
• Established the Crisis and Emergency Management Affairs 
(CEMA) to be the centralized structure that will receives 
information, make decisions and mobilize the response 
resources appropriate to any form of wide scale disaster.  
• Planed and developed strategies and policies that strengthen 
the protection of Egyptian society from potential disasters.  
Prime Ministerial 
Decree No.746/2006 
• Issued for the establishment of the National Committee for 
Crisis and Disaster Management (NCCDM). 
 
            These laws and decrees spelled out by the GOE in a report submitted to the UN 
WCDR, Hyogo, 2005, only deals with post-crisis emergency management. Thus, there is 
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no legal framework for reducing disaster risks. The main legislation that revolves around 
it all others laws and decrees is the 1959 law that was developed in the outdated 1950s 
political and war-time context, which is irrelevant to the natural, human-made and hybrid 
disasters of the 21st century. It should not be assumed that an obsolete national legislation 
for crisis management should necessarily include a disaster risk reduction component. 
The above mentioned laws only dealt with the post-disaster management (rescue, relief 
and recovery) and did not deal with pre-disaster planning (prevention and mitigation) 
aspect of crisis and disaster management in Egypt. The current laws for disasters are not 
clearly defined and the roles of different entities are not clear. This reveals that 
“predictability”, a dimension of good governance, which is concerned with clearly 
defined laws and policies regulating DRR and their consistent implementation, is not 
reflected in the current disaster legislation. Moreover, until recently the primary body 
authorized to deal with disasters, according to the laws, is the CDA. Egyptian legislation 
dealing with disasters was not amended to reflect the shift from the civil defense 
approach to the crisis management approach in the 1990s.  
         The Egyptian Civil Defense Administration (CDA) was founded in 1953, within the 
Ministry of the Interior. The CDA is the implementing body for laws dealing with crisis 
and disaster management as set out in Law No. 148/ 1959 and amendments by 
Ministerial Decrees No. 10 (1965), 175 (1981) and 107 (1982). According to Law 
148/1959, the Civil Defense Authority (CDA) is the primary body responsible for 
disaster prevention and the protection of civilians, protection of the infrastructure (such 
as the safeguarding of transportation, communications and the functions of the public 
utilities), and the protection of the cultural and historical heritage and public 
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establishments (such as national museums). Initially, the main role of the CDA was the 
protection of civilians during external military assaults. After the signing of peace 
accords, the 1982 Ministerial Decree introduced protection of the civilian population 
from both human-made and natural disasters in peace and wartime into the CDA’s 
objectives.  The CDA was renamed Civil Protection Authority (CPA) and its mission, in 
theory, is to mitigate the consequences of disasters on people and properties, undertake 
preventive action by ensuring the necessary measures for a better handling of 
emergencies, sensitize the population so that they are less vulnerable when catastrophes 
occur, train executives and provide the necessary practice opportunities for civil defense 
staff, administrate available resources (national or foreign) and coordinate their best 
possible use. “Civil protection systems already play an essential role in coordinating 
rescue and relief aid, but they can play a bigger role in proactively addressing the root 
causes of disasters to reduce disaster impact”, stated the Director of the UN/ISDR 
secretariat5. Thus, the CPA in Egypt should undergo a genuine shift from crisis 
management towards disaster risk reduction. 
              There is wide-spread government rhetoric about reducing disaster impacts, 
however the most genuine indicator of the GoE political commitment for DRR is the 
launching of a reform process that formulate legislation on risk reduction. In order for the 
GOE to be committed to DRR, it should initiate a national process for legislative reform 
to be the foundation of a national strategy for DRR. According to the HFA, countries 
should "adopt, or modify where necessary, legislation to support disaster risk reduction, 
including regulations and mechanisms that encourage compliance and that promote 
                                                 
5 UN/ISDR, “Civil Protection Must Play Bigger Role in Preventing Disasters”, Press Release, 24 June 
2008, Available at: http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/news/v.php?id=284 
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incentives for undertaking risk reduction and mitigation activities"6. Legislation for DRR 
is a first step in mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development.7 A Presidential 
Decree must be formulated, as a proof of political will, to set up a National Council or 
Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in Egypt, with accordance to the UN/ISDR 
guidelines8. This platform needs to be established by a Presidential Decree to give it 
executive power and political weight and should be established within either the Prime 
Minister’s Office or the Office of the Presidency to ensure its implementation.  This 
decree should clearly state the role, structure, and responsibilities of this new entity and 
its legal parameters in order to ensure accountability and transparency. In addition, this 
decree must be accompanied by a law to set the chain of command between this 
platform/council, ministries and governorates.  Despite the fact that Egypt does not have 
DRR legislation, it can build on the positive current sectoral legislation dealing with 
disasters since any reform process must take account of the existing sectoral legislation. 
The failure to acknowledge pre-existing sectoral policies with a DRR component can lead 
to further alienation of these sectors, resulting in resource competition that can hinder 
progress. 
           Moreover, during this reform process, the Egyptian Government should look at 
international experiences and best practices in legislative reform with regard to DRR. For 
example, South Africa’s Disaster Management Act passed in 2003 was applauded 
internationally as a path-breaking example of national legislation that promotes disaster 
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risk reduction.9 In the South African (SA) experience, there was a shift from civil defense 
to civil protection in 1970s then a shift to disaster management in 1994 and finally a shift 
to disaster risk reduction in 2003. Up until 1994, civil protection was the norm in SA 
until the government realized its shortcomings after the inadequate government response 
in the 1994 Cape Flats floods10. The occurrence of the devastating Cape Flats floods and 
the emergence of a new democracy were both the catalysts for SA move from civil 
protection to disaster management, which culminated in the publication of the Green 
Paper on Disaster Management in 199811. The Green Paper was soon flowed by a White 
Paper on Disaster Management in 1999, which indicated that “priority is given in this 
new approach to prevention. Preparedness measures for more efficient rescue operations 
will remain necessary but much greater attention must be directed to the introduction of 
preventive strategies aimed at saving lives and protecting assets before they are lost.”12 
           On 15 January 2003, the Disaster Management Act was promulgated that ensured 
a disaster risk management comprehensive approach to development, which marked a 
new era in the way in which South African government perceived disaster risk, hazards 
and vulnerability13. In 2005, a National Disaster Risk Management Framework 
(NDRMF), the legal instrument specified by the Act that provides “a coherent, 
transparent and inclusive policy on disaster risk management”, was finalized14. The South 
                                                 
9 Pelling, Mark and Ailsa Holloway, "Legislation for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction", 4. 
10 Van Niekerk, Dewald, “A Comprehensive Framework for Multi-sphere Disaster Risk Reduction in South 
Africa”,  A Doctoral Thesis, School of Social and Government Sciences, NorthWest University, May 2005, 
109.  
11 Ibid,110.  
12 Van Niekerk, Dewald, “A Comprehensive Framework for Multi-sphere Disaster Risk Reduction in South 
Africa”, 116.  
13 Ibid, 110.  
14 Republic of South Africa, Department: Provincial and Local Government, “Introduction: A policy 
framework for disaster risk management in South Africa”: 1, in  National Disaster Management 
Framework, Available at: http://sandmc.pwv.gov.za/comp/Framework.htm 
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African NDRMF recognizes a diversity of risks and disasters that occur in SA, and gives 
priority to developmental measures that reduce the vulnerability of disaster-prone areas, 
communities and households15.  
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
             This section will explore the institutional arrangements within the GOE that deal 
with pre-disaster planning, which is to manage hazards, vulnerability, and disaster risks 
by focusing on the capacity of the government both at the central and local levels to 
perform risk analysis. The development of disaster management bodies, the structure 
and functions of different entities at each level of government both in theory and 
practice will be examined. In addition, this section will look at existing instruments, 
processes, and policies, on all government spheres and the politics around there 
formulation.  
             The GOE submitted a report to the WCDR in 2005 to report on their current 
progress in the area of disaster risk reduction16. The report showed that DRR concepts is 
not even understood by government officials since all the responses where dealing with 
crisis management and not risk reduction, which revealed the lack of culture of 
prevention. The GOE asserts in the report that “all institutions are committed to elevating 
disaster risk reduction as a policy priority”17, a claim that is completely incorrect. The 
GoE is by no means “committed" to DRR with respect to the existence of adequate 
legislation in line with DRR international standards. All bodies working on disaster 
management in Egypt deal with it on an ad hoc basis in their own capacity without legal 
grounds. The report continued to argue that “public agencies, both central and local, 
                                                 
15 Ibid.  
16 The Government of Egypt, "National Report and Information on Disaster Reduction".   
17 Ibid, ii.  
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allocate necessary resources for preparedness”18. This claim to an extent is valid, but the 
GOE is not aware that preparedness is only one component of disaster risk management 
and does not equate with disaster risk reduction. There is no formal funding mechanism 
for prevention and mitigation initiatives, the two components of DRR, at the national and 
local levels, as will be revealed in the upcoming sections. 
            In addition, during field interviews at IDSC whenever the researcher interviewed 
a government official to discuss disasters prevention and mitigation initiatives, they 
diverted the researcher’s discussions to post-disaster efforts; i.e. they only refer to 
preparedness and emergency responses since these are the current areas the government 
is engaged in. This revealed that new DRR concepts, terminologies, policies and 
processes discussed in depth in the literature review are not yet understood by policy 
makers in the Egyptian government.  
            The Institutional Structure of DRR in Egypt19, as shown in figure 4, divides the 
institutional structure into three levels. The following section will examine the roles and 
responsibilities, functions, activities of the three levels. The strategic level, which is 
highly political, is represented by the Supreme Ministerial Committee for Crisis and 
Disaster Management. In addition, the second tactical level will be examined, which 
consist of the National Inter-Ministerial Committee, the Crisis and Disaster Management 
Department, and sectoral Ministries. The third level that will be explored is the local 
operational arm, which is responsible on implementing disaster strategies and policies. 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, 10.  
 
100 
 
Figure 4: Institutional Structure of Crisis and Disaster Management in Egypt  
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THE SRATEGIC LEVEL 
                The Supreme Ministerial Committee for Crises and Disaster Management 
(SMCDM) is the highest political executive authority  dealing with disasters, in which it 
is headed by the Prime Minister and consist of the following members: the Minister of 
Defense and Military Production, the Minister of Interior Affairs, the Minister of 
Information, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Health and Population, 
concerned Minister / Governor (according to the type of the Crisis/Disaster), 
representative of National Security Council, and Specialized Experts (according to the 
need). The SMCDM functions, according to the IDSC “Manuel on General Procedures 
for Crisis and Disaster Management” are to20:  
1) manage a disaster when the danger level reaches “very high”;  
2) delegate responsibilities to different entities to manage the disaster;  
3) adopt a plan to deal with the disaster;  
4) initiate necessary recommendations and decisions on how to deal with the disaster 
on the executive level, how to control it, and how to mitigate the negative impacts 
of disasters;  
5) coordinate between all stakeholders to unit all efforts to control the disaster and 
mitigate its impact;  
6) decide on the media mechanisms that will deal with the disaster and the public 
spokesman for the disaster;  
7) dissolve obstacles that would challenge the quick and efficient implementation of 
policies;  
8) formulate a political report for the highest executive level on the nature of the 
disaster, giving a general evaluation of the situation and explaining the initiated  
policies to deal with the disaster.    
 
            The analysis of the above mentioned functions reveals that the SMCDM is 
involved in the disaster after it has taken place, which contradicts with the basic 
foundations of DRR. The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks is achieved 
through the “systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters 
                                                 
20 IDSC, “Manuel: General Procedures for Crisis and Disaster Management”,  23.  
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through reduced exposure to hazards and lessened vulnerability of people and 
property”21. The mandate of the SMCDM does not include laying down any strategies for 
analyzing and managing the causes of disasters.   
           In addition, there are no legal grounds for this strategic committee per say; it is 
most likely that the SMCDM is the evolution of the Supreme Council of Civil Defense 
(SCCD) formulated by a Presidential Decree in 1971 since both entities have the same 
objectives and strategic framework. The researcher believes that when the government 
decided to shift from civil defense to crisis management in the early 1990s, in conformity 
with international trends, they just changed the names of all bodies from “civil defense” 
to “crisis management” without really changing its roles and functions.  Thus, the 
Supreme Council of Civil Defense was renamed the Supreme Committee for Crisis 
Management. This means that the 1992 Presidential Decree No. 132, which reformulated 
the SCCD to be chaired by the Prime Minister, might be regarded as the legal basis that 
regulates SMCDM. The vague procedures and mechanisms associated with these 
committees and the unclear functions, roles, and responsibilities reveal that still notions 
of predictability are still not adhered to in practice. Moreover, when the SMCDM legal 
basis and mandates with regard to DRR are not clear, this means that members of this 
committee cannot be held accountable if failed to achieve their goals.  
              The issue of disaster management started to gain weight in the Egyptian arena 
after the WCDR in Japan in 2005. In April 2006, the Prime Minster, as the head of the 
SMCDM, has issued a decree to form the National Committee for Crisis and Disaster 
Management. Also, the IDSC was also instructed by the PM to establish crisis 
                                                 
21 UN/ISDR, “UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009)”.  
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management units at all ministries and governorates, providing them with necessary 
support and capacity in terms of knowledge, training and technical expertise22. In 
addition, the Prime Minister issued instructions to several ministries, including the IDSC 
to finalize the preparation of National Plan for Disaster and Crisis Management with 
identification of the role of all ministries, governorates, and other stakeholders, and to 
prepare a National Training Plan for Disaster and Crisis Management to build the 
capacity of personnel at all levels. It is worth noting that all these instructions have no 
legal basis since they are not based on any legislation nor decrees, thus there 
implementation cannot be ensured. Moreover, the failure of the government to put the 
SMCDM , its strategies and recommendations in a legal framework reveals the lack of 
political commitment with respect to DRR.  
THE CENTRAL LEVEL 
               This section will examine the central level, where all disaster plans are initiated 
and disaster related policies formulated and where coordination takes place. During the 
field work, the researcher found out that in practice the GOE does not have an entity that 
carry out risk analysis on the national level. In theory, the central government should 
assume the main responsibility to ensure that hazard and vulnerability reduction policies 
are cross-sectoral and integrated in development planning, policies and programming23. 
However, in the Egyptian experience, hazard mapping is carried out on a sectoral basis in 
a limited scale and the government does not perform vulnerability assessment in practice. 
The following section will provide an in-depth discussion on the functions and 
responsibilities of the National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management, the 
                                                 
22 Riad, Samir, "Report on Disaster Risk Management in Egypt", 19.  
23 Lewis, Dan, and Jaana Mioch, “Urban Vulnerability and Good Governance”,  Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management, Volume 13 Number 2, (June 2005):51.   
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Crisis and Disaster Management Department, and the sectoral ministries, which will 
reveal their degree of political commitment to reducing disaster risks.  
The National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management  
               In 2006, the Prime Minster has issued a Decree, No.746/2006, to formulate The 
National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management (NCCDM); the PM has 
instructed the IDSC in cooperation with the Department for Crisis Management at the 
Military Forces to chair the NCCDM, which consists of representatives of the 31 
Ministries, representatives of 26 Governorates, and some specialized governments 
agencies such as the Suez Canal Authority, EEAA and Security Agencies at the Ministry 
of Interior in addition to the IDSC, and specialized experts. The politics behind the 
formulation of the NCCDM was increased criticisms in the wake of the sinking of the Al-
Salam Ferry disaster in the Red Sea in February 2006. According to Blaikie et al. (1994), 
it is highly common that political will is most likely to originate from a major failure to 
deal with a disaster.24The formulation of the NCCDM was a reactionary decision as a 
result of the failure of the government to manage Al Salam Ferry disaster, in which there 
was heightened political will in the wake of the ferry catastrophe which resulted in the 
establishment of the NCCDM within a legal framework.  
                Despite the fact that the NCCDM was established by a Prime Ministerial Decree, 
there is no clearly defined institutional and legal framework that governs it roles, 
responsibilities and mandates and its relation with other entities on the strategic and 
tactical levels. It is unclear whether the NCCDM, according to the decree, has executive 
                                                 
24 Blaikie, Piers et al., 232. 
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functions or if it is only a coordination mechanism. With respect to the mandate of the 
NCCDM in theory in the pre-disaster phase, it should25:  
1) transform the decisions and recommendations of the SMCDM on the strategic 
level to executive procedures and supervise their implementation;  
2)  follow up on all decisions and procedures initiated to control the disaster and 
mitigate its negative impact;  
3) supervise all search, rescue and evacuation operations and follow up on them;  
4) coordinate between involved sectoral and local entities;  
5) ensure media follow up of the event;  
6) formulate a comprehensive evaluation of the situation at hand, decide on the 
needed procedures and suggest solutions and recommendations in order to control 
the disaster and mitigate its negative impact;  
7) formulate necessary reports to be submitted to the SMCDM. 
            These mandates are typical of disaster and crisis management techniques and do 
not tackle any DRR components since they are only covering preparedness efforts, 
rescue, and relief efforts. This problem exists due to the prevalence of older militaristic 
disaster response arrangements (“command and control” based civil defence) since only 
rescue and relief operations are the ones understand and is the ordinary mode of 
activity26. The only attempt that was made to try and give the illusion that these 
objectives are in line with DRR principals is by adding the phrase “mitigate its negative 
impact” in the second and sixth objective; this phrase does not fit in the overall rationale 
of these objectives. What further proof this point is that a high level key informant 
interviewed revealed that the National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management 
was renamed to National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management and Reducing 
its Risks in the wake of international DRR trends and increased UN/ISDR pressure to 
“obtain commitment from public authorities to implement disaster reduction policies and 
                                                 
25 IDSC, “Manuel: General Procedures for Crisis and Disaster Management”,  27.  
26 Wisner, Ben, “Vulnerability in Disaster Theory and Practice: From Soup to Taxonomy, then to Analysis 
and finally Tool”, International Work-Conference, Disaster Studies of Wageningen University and 
Research Centre,  29-30 June, 2001.  
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actions”27 and that this modification  in the name of the committee did not result in any 
substantive amendments in its mandates. This reveals that there is still not enough 
political will to make a genuine move from disaster management to disaster risk 
reduction, and the government is trying to give a false impression that they are adopting 
DRR mechanisms by merely amending the names of different committees.  
The Crisis and Disaster Management Department at IDSC 
                The Crisis and Disaster Management Department (CMDR) at IDSC is the 
operational arm of the NCCDM and is the main body responsible for, supposedly, 
mainstreaming DRR in development planning in Egypt. The CMDR has been assigned, 
in April 2008, to be the official HFA Focal Point in Egypt28. The CMDR was established 
in 2000 under the umbrella of IDSC by a Prime Ministerial recommendation, which is an 
informal decision, and not with the same legal power as a decree.  Thus, there is no legal 
basis for the establishment of CMDR and governs the relationship between the CMDR, 
different ministries and governorates, which makes it a weak department with no legal 
executive powers. Thus in practice, the CMDR’s instructions and recommendations are 
not binding and might not be implemented by relevant ministries and governorates. With 
regard to the CMDR’s mandates in the pre-disaster phase in theory is the following29:  
1) to develop contingency plans;  
2) review national strategies and policies for crisis and disaster management on the 
national level;  
3) review and evaluate plans of ministries and governorates for crisis and disaster 
management, evaluate them and provide recommendations for further 
improvement;  
                                                 
27 UN/ISDR WANA, “International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, West Asia and North Africa 
Objective”,  Available at: http://www.unisdr-wana.org/eng/about-wana/mission.html     
28 Dr. Mostafa Mohaghegh, Head of Regional Office for West Asia and North Africa (WANA), United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR), interview by author, 15 May 2008.  
29 CMDR, Available at: http://www.crisismanagement.idsc.gov.eg/Crisis/default.aspx 
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4) supervise different ministries, governorates and other agencies while performing 
simulation exercises in the realm of disaster management;  
5) coordinate between all stakeholders and provide support in formulating disaster 
plans before the disaster takes place by taking into account international best 
practices;  
6) revise and evaluate crisis management training plans for ministries and 
governorates;  
7) spread cultural awareness on disaster management;  
8) conduct training workshops for ministries’ and governorates’ officials to upgrade 
their capacity in the disaster management field;  
9) develop early warning systems for disaster management.  
However, most of these mandates are not implemented in practice. During an interview 
with a CMDR official, it was mentioned that most of the mandates of the department are 
still not implemented. Despite the fact that risk analysis is the core of disaster risk 
reduction and entails the analysis of both hazards and vulnerabilities, the CMDR revealed 
in the HFA interim progress report that “there is no detailed or integrated studies, reports, 
nor atlases on multi-hazard analysis exist in the country for the national and local 
levels.”30 Although that the basis for reducing disaster risk “lies in the knowledge of the 
hazards and the physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities to 
disasters”, according to the HFA31, it was evident during the field interviews at CMDR 
that the department is not engaged in systematic hazard mapping and  vulnerability 
assessment. In a nutshell, hazard and vulnerability analysis are simply not carried out by 
CMDR although they are among its mandates. The CMDR has undergone some random 
initiatives in the field of hazard mapping for some hazards such as floods and 
earthquakes.  
                                                 
30 The Government of Egypt, “Interim National Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action”, Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center, (November 2008): 19.  
31 “Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015 ), Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to 
Disasters”.  
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            The lack of systematic risk analysis is attributed to first budget constraints and 
second to the lack of technical capacity, each will be discussed consecutively. “We do not 
have the necessary financial resources nor the human resources to carry out hazard, 
vulnerability, and cost-benefit analysis”, stated a CMDR official. The CMDR lack 
financial resources to enable it to conduct pre-disaster planning, coordinate, and build the 
capacity of other ministerial units. In addition, Ms. Heba Ibrahim, Senior Researcher at 
CMDR stated “IDSC distributes its financial resources among its departments equally; 
i.e. the CMDR has a set budget like its sister departments at IDSC regardless of its 
objectives and activities”. With regard to the technical capacity, “the IDSC's department 
should be upgraded to be able to deal with the chain of hazard assessment, risk reduction, 
intervention and recovery”, according to Dr. Samir Riad.32 The IDSC revealed in the 
HFA interim national progress report that the CMDR lack the human capacity in order to 
manage disaster risks33. Moreover, a key informant at CMDR mentioned to the researcher 
that the CMDR is facing challenges with respect to the limited resources; she revealed 
that “both financial and human resources are not adequate at national and local levels.” 
She continued to say that “although human capital is widely available at all levels but not 
well trained to implement disaster risk reduction initiatives.” Unlike hazard mapping, 
which can be computerized using geographic information systems (GIS) or even satellite 
images, vulnerability cannot be seen from above. CMDR ignored vulnerability analysis 
since they lack the needed human resources and financial capacity to constantly engage 
in a bottom-up analysis of the prevailing social, economic, cultural and political 
circumstances for every hazard in different communities.     
                                                 
32 Riad, Samir, "Report on Disaster Risk Management in Egypt".  
33 The Government of Egypt, “Interim National Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action”, 4.  
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             Not only there is lack of resources and technical capacities that hinder the 
systematic implementation of risk analysis, but also there is no political will to perform 
such uniform hazard and vulnerability analysis. It was apparent through observation 
during field interviews that there is an embedded lack of political will. The researcher 
believes that the GoE does not have the political will to prevent disasters because they 
can have political benefits from disasters. Disasters divert attention from the underlying 
development failures and weakness of development strategies34. Even if the opposition 
criticizes the GoE on handling of disaster relief and recovery, the government has the 
advantage of implementing “emergency law” at a time of political instability. In addition, 
in Egypt shortly after the disaster occurs and after heightened criticisms from the 
opposition, they quickly tend to forget about it. Disasters also mean the channeling of 
foreign humanitarian aid to the government in millions of pounds. Several scholars argue 
that “aid-dependent and corrupt state can, in fact, actually welcome disasters”35. 
Moreover, the GoE will adopt DRR since this issue is highly politicized. Although, 
hazard analysis is an important step in communities’ resilience, it can turn extremely 
political when for example it is accompanied by calls to relocate people from hazardous 
places. Moreover, vulnerability analysis can reveal the deep rooted development failures 
of the GoE, as reveled in chapter 3. The question is does the CMDR adhere to measures 
of good governance if they are not performing risk analysis, supposedly one of its main 
mandates?  
                                                 
34 Wisner, Ben, "Sustainable Suffering? Reflections on Development and Disaster Vulnerability in the Post-
Johannesburg World", Regional Development Dialogue , Vol. 24 Issue 1, (2003): 4.  
35 Ibid.  
110 
 
            Accountability, participation, predictability and transparency are identified as the 
key features of good governance that supports risk reduction36. “Transparency”, one of 
the dimensions of effective governance structure, is a crucial element for reducing 
disaster risks since it reduces opportunities for corrupt behavior by informing the public 
especially vulnerable population of its policies37. “Transparency”, which is the 
dissemination of information through the publication of reliable information to other 
actors in a timely manner, is not adequately carried out by the CMDR. As mentioned 
before, the CMDR does not have the essential technical capacity to formulate hazards 
databases and GIS maps due to their lack of human capital, financial resources and 
political will. In addition, the CMDR claims that the crisis management website “will 
enable the accessibility on relevant information on disasters at all levels, to all 
stakeholders”, however this claim is inaccurate in practice38. Despite the fact the CMDR 
has its own website for awareness raising through the dissemination of information, most 
of the documents are not accessible and require a password to access them. Most of the 
essential disaster management documents are “classified” since these documents “involve 
the role and responsibilities of sensitive agencies and entities within the government”, 
stated a CMDR official who refused to disclose his name, which reveals that the “culture 
of possession” is still prevailing within the CMDR. For example, the CMDR “National 
Plan for Floods”, “National Plan for Earthquakes” and “National Plan for Fires”, are not 
published on the CMDR website and even when the researcher requested to obtain a copy 
                                                 
36 Ahrens, Joachim and Rudolph, Patrick M., "The Importance of Governance in Risk Reduction and 
Disaster Management", Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management , Vol. 14 No. 4, December 2006: 
207. 
37 Riad, Samir, "Report on Disaster Risk Management in Egypt".  
38 The Government of Egypt, “Interim National Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action”.  
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of them from the department but they refused explaining that they are “top secret” since 
these documents uncover the capacities of such “sensitive entities”, such as the Ministry 
of Interior and Ministry of Defense, in times of disasters.  The researcher attributes the 
unwillingness of officials to publish these documents is to avoid being held 
“accountable” by the public and legislative authorities if they failed to carry out the laid 
out plan. In addition, disaster figures that are published by IDSC on several disasters are 
not accurate and inconsistent with other reports also published by IDSC on the same 
disaster, as reveled in the conflicting figures on road accidents in chapter 3. The 
researcher is not quite sure whether the CMDR does not have the accurate figures due to 
lack of resources and statistical capacity or due to their unwillingness to disseminate the 
“real and accurate” information.  
Central Ministries  
               This section will critically examine the role of several ministries in prevention 
and mitigation efforts. The reason why the researcher is examining the general role of 
several sectoral ministries is that some form of hazard mapping and analysis is carried out 
in some sectors. During field work, it was found out that each Ministry has its own crisis 
and disaster unit and its own budget line for it. Disaster units in ministries do not have a 
uniform structure and functions; each ministry has its own unit based on its capacity. For 
example, both the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Tourism have 
sophisticated disaster centers with huge budgets, while other ministries have weak centers 
with very limited budgets. Some ministries do not even have crisis centers; they created 
virtual centers with one official as the disaster and crisis focal point.  For example, the 
Ministry of Local Development does not have a center but appointed an official from its 
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information center to be the crisis and disaster focal point. The variation in Ministries’ 
capacities with respect to disasters resulted in huge inconsistencies between ministries 
and is reflected in their DRR efforts. This can also be attributed to the lack of a national 
DRR legal framework that would unify all DRR-related structures in all ministries and 
create parallel uniform structures in all ministries. Despite the fact that CMDR is the 
government entity that is mandated to coordinate between all ministries in theory, 
however the CMDR in practice does not even have records of the structure and 
composition of the disaster units at each ministry, their work nor their capacities, as 
reveled during the field work at CMDR.   
             In practice, each sectoral ministry is responsible for mapping its own related 
hazards depending on its capacities. Some ministries take hazard mapping seriously while 
other ministries have other contesting priorities on their agendas. For example, The 
Ministry of Health (MoH) conducts vulnerability and capacity assessments for various 
epidemics according to studies of “black points of recurrent disasters and red spots of 
prone disaster all over Egypt”39. While the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation 
(MWRI) prepared mapping system for the possible locations of flash floods and their 
spillways for all governorates. In addition, MWRI is trying to carry out structural 
measures such as the removal of buildings from flash floods spillways to reduce the 
impacts of these hazards. The Academy for Scientific Research ad Technology (ASRT) 
has developed two hazard maps, one for the seismic risk and the other for flash floods 
risk. The Egyptian Environmental affairs Agency (EEAA) carry out hazard mapping and 
assessment for environmental risks and hazards. The GOE also claim in the report 
submitted to the WCDR in Kobe- Hyogo, Japan 2005 that the Ministry of Planning has 
                                                 
39 The Government of Egypt, "National Report and Information on Disaster Reduction", 16.  
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“established an integrated hazard mapping system to project all the possible hazards, 
according to their type”. However, this claim is not based on any solid evidence. 
According to a key informant, “until now, there is no hazard mapping system or hazard 
guide for Egypt”.40 This reveals that there are no systematic hazard mapping, which 
result in giving attention to a certain hazards while totally ignoring others.  
              With regard to the budget, each ministry allocates a budget for its crisis center; 
the allocation severely varies from one ministry to the other. Some ministries dedicate 
limited resources for disaster management. For example, the Environmental Protection 
Fund (EPF) allocated for the Egyptian Environmental affairs Agency (EEAA) to 
enhance, among other activities, strategies for environmental disaster management and 
risk reduction41. While others do not have certain funds for DRR;  the GOE explains in 
the report submitted to the WCDR that although there should be specific line budget in 
every government agency for DRR, other pressing development priorities often compete 
for the limited funds available to these agencies. 42 This reflects the politics surrounding 
the channeling of funds, in which politicians want to focus on development priorities that 
will lead to quick and visible gains to their constituents rather than invest in long-term 
risk reduction initiatives.  
THE LOCAL LEVELS 
            This section will examine the role of the local government in managing disasters 
in the pre-disaster phase in Egypt. The study will examine how the lack of legal 
                                                 
40 ---------, IDSC,  interview by author, personal interview, 14 January 2009.  
41 The Government of Egypt, “Interim National Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action”, 18.  
42 The Government of Egypt, "National Report and Information on Disaster Reduction".  
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framework, the limited available financial and human resources hinders the application of 
DRR initiatives on the local levels. While the researcher did not engage in governorate 
level field research, the researcher relied on the interviews conducted with officials at the 
central level and the field work carried out in Fayoum governorate; further research at the 
local levels can be carried out in future studies.  For the purpose of this study, the 
researcher wants to clarify that the term “local government” refers to the governorate 
level.  
            According to figure 4, in theory each governorate should have a Governorate 
Higher Committee for Crisis Management, which consists of the governor, heads of 
Directorates, head of Security Department, and representatives of districts, cities, towns, 
and villages. The General Procedures for Crises and Disaster Management Manuel 
spells out the role and responsibilities of the governorates in the pre-disaster phase, which 
is to43:  
1) forecast disaster related hazards;  
2) establish an operation room in the governorate;  
3) review the existing resources in the governorate for disaster management;  
4) formulate action plans for emergency situations (sectoral plans for electricity, 
water and irrigation, transportation, communication, and health);  
5) organize coordination plans with other nearby governorates;  
6) coordinate volunteer efforts and formulate teams of volunteers on the city level;  
7) select a spokesman on behalf of the disaster management team;  
8) train rescue and search staff;  
9) relocate populations from risk areas;  
10)  develop different scenarios for hazards and conduct simulation exercises;  
11)  store food and medical supplies as a preparedness measure;  
12)  conduct awareness raising and formulate a communication strategy.  
           During interviews with government officials, it was revealed that most of these 
roles and responsibilities are not implemented in practice. For example, each governorate 
does not perform its systematic hazard analysis, detect disaster risks, and analyze 
                                                 
43 IDSC, “Manuel: General Procedures for Crisis and Disaster Management” , 74.  
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vulnerabilities generating these risks since some governorates does not even have a 
functional disaster committee. Formulating a Governorate Higher Committee for Crisis 
Management has not yet been enforced on the governorate level in practice. According to 
the GoE HFA interim progress report, “there are crisis management entities established in 
all governorates at the local level”44, however this claim is not true. During the field work 
conducted at Fayoum governorate, there was no sub-committee for disaster and crisis 
management at the governorate level. The researcher attributes the failure to formulate 
this committee on the local level to the lack of a legal framework that clearly spells out 
the role of this entity, its functions, and objectives. In addition, another impediment for 
the formulation of this committee is that governorates do not have the financial and the 
technical capacity to carry out delegated mandates. This process is referred to in the 
literature as the “de-politicization of vulnerability”45 by “placing much of the 
responsibility for local vulnerability reduction to local officials who lack the jurisdiction 
or political power to address wider factor and processes that contribute to 
vulnerability”.46  
             The GoE claims that “training is offered to the institutions at local level; 
however, research, data collection and dissemination activities remain at central level.”47 
However even these trainings that the government is referring to is not disaster risk 
reduction training. Despite the fact that the Civil Protection Authority (CPA) and the 
Centre for Crisis Management of the Military Forces have training centers in 
                                                 
44 The Government of Egypt, “Interim National Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action”, 23.  
45 Allen, K., “Vulnerability Reduction and the Community-based Approach: A Philippines Study”, in Mark 
Pelling (ed.),  Natural Disasters and Development in a Globalizing World, (New York: Routledge, 2003): 
180. 
46 Allen, Katrina M., “Community-based Disaster Preparedness and Climate Adaptation: Local Capacity-
Building in the Philippines”, Disasters, Vol. 30 No. 1, (2006): 97.  
47 Ibid.  
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governorates48, the training they provide is on disaster management and not disaster risk 
reduction.  
            In practice, these mandates can be implemented if there is a genuine political will. 
For example, one of the above mentioned objectives was partially carried out in practice, 
which is the “development of scenarios for hazards and conduct simulation exercises”. In 
the wake of mounting international pressure on the GoE with regard the Avian and 
Human Influenza crisis and the calls for the formulation of vital preparedness measures, 
the IDSC assisted the Menofiyah governorate to develop Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response Plan. This plan was verified by Simulation Training 
Exercises in Menofiyah in order to test and revise the procedures placed to encounter the 
Pandemic Influenza, test the reporting track, check the soundness of the procedures, test 
different roles of the directorates, and ensure comprehensiveness of the plan. This success 
story was a unique case of Menofiyah and at no point there was uniform formualtion of 
pandemic preparedness plans and application of simulation exercises among all 
governorates. The government replicated this success story in a three additional 
governorates which are Al Sharqeya, Al Garbeya and Al Qalubiya; each governorate 
formulated their “Plan for Pandemic Influenza”, however simulation exercises are still 
not performed. Moreover, the formulation of preparedness plans for each potential 
disaster and the execution of simulation exercises is not a systematic approach that is 
carried out by each governorate. These initiatives are haphazard and are based on the 
availability of funding matched with political will.  
             
                                                 
48 Ibid, 4.  
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            Despite the fact that the central government in Egypt plays the primary role in 
formulating disasters-related plans and policies, disaster risks are first and foremost the 
result of dynamic local processes that affect individuals, households, communities and 
local governments, as will be closely revealed in the case study, and thus pre-disaster risk 
analysis and planning must take place at the local levels. The GoE claim that “the 
decentralization of authority is ensured through the representation of all governorates in 
the NCCDM”49.  However, it was apparent from the field work that the government is not 
implementing decentralization, which is “a transfer of decision-making authority from 
central to local governments”50, but is carrying out “de-concentration”, which is the 
“transfer of authority within central administrative structures (e.g., from the central 
ministry to its directorates offices)51. Moreover, the government failed to the build the 
technical and human resource capacity at the directorates and units at the local levels with 
respect to reducing disaster risks and concentrated all technical expertise at the central 
level, as will be revealed in the case study chapter.   
             Moreover, some officials claim that the government’s reluctance to decentralize 
risk reduction efforts and delegate responsibilities to the local levels is due to the fact that 
the local levels do not have necessary financial resources, skills, legal and political 
powers to carry out preparedness and mitigation activities. This claim is true to a certain 
extent since currently all financial and human resources are still decentralized at the 
central level but the question is: what are the politics that are hindering the channeling of 
funds and human resources from central to local levels with respect to disaster risk 
                                                 
49 The Government of Egypt,“Interim National Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action”, 7.  
50 Ahrens, Joachim and Rudolph, Patrick M., "The Importance of Governance in Risk Reduction and 
Disaster Management”, 215. 
51 Ibid, pp. 215.  
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reduction? The GoE is currently not committed to put in place a legal framework that 
would politically and financially empower the local levels.  
            Although it was revealed during interviews that officials at the CMDR are 
convinced that there should be legally decentralizing responsibilities and financial 
resources to governorates, the IDSC revealed that “although the government is 
implementing decentralization in order to implement a bottom-up approach to ensure the 
community participation, funding for DRR will remain centralized since authorities at the 
local level have long lived dependant on the central government”52, according to the HFA 
report. This contradictory statement reveals that the lack of political will among decision 
makers at the central level to undergo financial decentralization due to their 
unwillingness to let go of their financial powers. Decentralization of financial resources 
to governorates in practice means that the funds will be channeled from sectoral 
ministries and their directorates at the local levels to the governorates, districts, cities and 
villages. For example, currently foreign in-kind contributions in the aftermath of a 
disaster are channeled though the Ministry of Local Development, its directorates and its 
units to the affected populations, while the Ministry of Social Solidarity receives all 
financial contributions from within Egypt and from abroad for disaster relief and 
administers the distribution of funds to local levels53. This reveals that financial 
decentralization in Egypt is a highly political matter that could be opposed by the central 
government. 
                                                 
52 Ibid, 7.  
53 The Government of Egypt, "National Report and Information on Disaster Reduction", 15.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CASE STUDY: THE IMPACT OF AVIAN AND HUMAN INFLUENZA  
CRISIS ON TRADITIONAL POLUTRY KEEPERS’ LIVELIHOODS 
 IN FAYOUM 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
           This chapter will examine the Avian and Human Influenza (AHI) crisis from 
February 2006 until April 2009 in Egypt, as an example of a hybrid hazard. This case 
study will utilize the basic elements of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, 
previously examined in the literature review, in order to closely examine the outbreak 
of the AHI in Fayoum governorate and explore how the AHI crisis affected traditional 
poultry keepers in Fayoum from a livelihoods lens. The first section will examine the 
most vulnerable groups to AHI in Fayoum. Second, the cultural dimensions, 
traditional practices and behavioral patterns that played a vital role in increasing the 
vulnerability of traditional poultry keepers, their children and their poultry to AHI 
will also be examined. Third, this study will assess the impact of the AHI crisis on 
traditional poultry keepers’ Livelihood Assets in Fayoum through the destruction of 
physical, financial, human, and social assets, and how it affected  women’s Livelihood 
Strategies and examining their coping mechanisms employed to resist the AHI crisis.  
            The final section of the case study will deal with the government policies in 
reducing the risk of AHI from the perception of poultry keepers.  The questions that 
will be raised are the following: what are the mechanisms mandated to deal with the 
AHI crisis on the three levels of government? How did the local arm of the 
government deal with the AHI crisis in Fayoum in particular? Not only it is crucial to 
examine the government’s Transforming Structures and Processes in the AHI crisis, 
but also it is vital to observe poultry keepers’ experiences with NGOs in the wake of 
the AHI crisis. That is why the following section will deal with the Catholic Relief 
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Services (CRS) Avian Influenza mitigation project. The following questions will be 
raised: Did the CRS employ bottom-up approaches in its design and implementation 
of business development services? Did the CRS project alter the behavioral pattern of 
the poultry keepers? How did the project help women cope with the AHI crisis?  
OVERVIEW OF THE AHI OUTBREAK 
              One of the recent and ongoing disasters that occurred in Egypt is the 
outbreak of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, type A virus strain, subtype 
H5N1 (HPAI H5N1), commonly known as Avian Influenza or Bird Flu. Avian 
influenza is an infectious disease; while all birds are thought to be susceptible to 
infection with avian influenza viruses; many wild bird species carry these viruses with 
no apparent signs of harm. However, domestic poultry when infected with HPAI 
H5N1 develops sudden onset symptoms of severe disease, rapid infection, and its 
mortality rate can approach 100% within 48 hours since the HPAI virus affects the 
respiratory tract and also invades multiple organs and tissues1. The GOE confirmed its 
first HPAI H5N1 outbreak in domestic poultry on 17 February 2006. A report 
conducted by the IDSC estimated Egypt's total losses due to the deadly strain of 
H5N1 to be around 863 million EGP since the disease appeared in Egypt until 
February 2008 due to the slaughtering 36.8 million birds2.  
            With regard to H5N1 human cases in Egypt, the first case in humans was 
discovered on 15 March 2006.3 Egypt was the ninth country to report laboratory-
confirmed human cases to the WHO.4 Egypt is in WHO phase 3, which means that 
infection occur from animal-to-animal with a new influenza virus subtype is causing 
                                                 
1 WHO, “Avian Influenza Bird Flu Fact Sheets”, Available at: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/ 
2IDSC, "Annual Report of Major Disasters in Egypt during 2007", 5.  
3 Ministry of Health, Government of Egypt, "Comprehensive Approach to Addressing Avian and 
Human Influenza in Egypt", 4.  
4 Ibid.  
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disease in humans, but is not yet spreading from human-to-human.  According to the 
WHO, between 15 March 2006 and 20 May 2009, 74 cases were confirmed positive 
and there have been 27 fatalities, ranking the third on the world in terms of confirmed 
human cases (after Indonesia and Vietnam) since the beginning of the crisis5. Out-side 
Asia, Egypt has had the highest number of human infections and deaths due to the 
H5N1 virus.6 What is even more alarming is that since 1st of January 2008 till May 
2009, Egypt had 23 confirmed cases of H5N1 virus, 4 of which died, which makes 
Egypt the first on the world in terms of confirmed cases in 20097. Then the question 
is: what are the Egyptian governorates most vulnerable to AHI? 
AHI VULNERABILITY CONTEXT 
              According to the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, a range of assets is 
required to achieve positive Livelihood Outcomes; access to assets and the strategies 
people employ are influenced by the Vulnerability Context. This section will attempt 
to examine the vulnerability of governorates with respect to AHI, according to 
confirmed human cases. Afterwards, the most vulnerable groups in these 
governorates to AHI will also be explored.  
            With regard to geographic vulnerability, there is no official data with regard to 
the governorates most vulnerable to AHI. Although the government is taking a more 
transparent stance in the AHI crisis compared with previous disasters, it still should 
inform the public with up to date information with regard to the most affected 
governorates by the AHI crisis. During an interview with a key informant at the 
                                                 
5 WHO, Accessed February 10, 2009,  Available at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_02_09/en/index.html and Global Health Facts,  Available at 
http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/topic.jsp?i=27  
6 FAO, Ellen Geerlings (ed.), “Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Rapid Assessment of the Socio-
Economic Impact on Vulnerable Households in Egypt”, A Joint Study by the FAO and the WFP, Cairo, 
Egypt, 23. 
7 WHO, “Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/H5N1 Reported to 
WHO”, Updated  22 May 2009, Available at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2009_05_22/en/index.html 
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CMDR, the researcher inquired about the most vulnerable governorates to AHI, 
however the informant refused to give a clear cut answer. When the researcher further 
questioned the reason behind the execution of pandemic preparedness simulation 
exercises in Al Monofeya, Al Sharqeya, Al Garbeya and Al Qalubiya as pilot 
governorates to verify each governorate “Plan for Pandemic Influenza”, the 
respondent responded with a mysterious smile. That is why the researcher in the 
coming section will attempt to identify the most vulnerable governorates.  
               With regard to the vulnerability to AHI according to governorate, it is very 
difficult to detect the numbers of poultry dead and/or culled according to governorates, 
especially in the traditional poultry sector. In the current situation it is almost 
impossible for the government or any other civil society organization to accurately 
estimate the real numbers of H5N1 infected household poultry per governorate.  
During the field work in Fayoum, the researcher discovered that almost all women 
interviewed tend to get rid of dead or sick birds by throwing them in Ter’a, i.e. water 
canals, burying them, or burning them and then throwing them in garbage areas in 
streets as will be revealed in the following sections. According to table 5 that is 
compiled by the researcher, the governorate with highest number of positive cases is 
Monofeya with 8 confirmed human cases followed, in the second place, by Fayoum 
and Gharbiya each with 7 confirmed cases. In the third place is Qena with 6 positive 
cases.  
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TABLE 5: H5N1 HPAI Confirmed Human Cases by Governorates (15 March 2006 – 22 May 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009* Total  Governorates Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths 
1) Alexandria --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 --- 1 --- 
2) Assiut --- --- --- --- 1 1 1 --- 2 1 
3) Aswan  --- --- 3 --- --- --- --- --- 3 --- 
4) Behera --- --- --- --- 1 1 2 --- 3 1 
5) Beni-Suef --- --- 2 2 --- --- --- --- 2 2 
6) Cairo --- --- 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 
7) Dakahleya --- --- 3 1 --- --- 2 1 5 2 
8) Damyetta --- --- 2 1 --- --- --- --- 2 1 
9) Fayoum 2 --- 2 2 2 1 1 --- 7 3 
10) Kafr EL Shiekh 3 --- --- --- --- --- 2 1 5 1 
11) Gharbiya 5 4 --- --- --- --- 2 --- 7 4 
12) Menya 1 1 2 --- 1 --- 1 --- 5 1 
13) Monofeya 3 3 2 1 1 --- 2 --- 8 4 
14) Qalubiya 3 2 1 --- --- --- 1 1 5 3 
15) Qena --- --- 5 1 --- --- 1 --- 6 1 
16) Sharqeya --- --- 1 --- 1 --- 1 --- 3 --- 
17) Sohag 1 --- 1 --- --- --- 3 --- 5 --- 
18) Suez --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 --- 1 --- 
19) 6th of October --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 --- 1 --- 
Total 18 10 25  9 8  4 23 4 74 27 
Source: Compiled by the author from WHO Situation Updates for Egypt. Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/egy/
 * Data for 2009 only covers between January and May 2009. 
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        With respect to the most vulnerable group, there are no official data that spells 
out the most vulnerable groups in these governorates. That is why the researcher has 
compiled table 6, which classify confirmed human cases according to gender. A 
disproportionate number of H5N1 confirmed cases have been poultry keepers and 
their families; 72 out of the 74 confirmed cases had direct contact with domestic 
poultry with the exception of two farm workers. According to table 6, children and 
women respectively are the most vulnerable groups with regards to AHI since they 
are in close contact with backyard and rooftop poultry. Among the 74 confirmed 
human cases, 50 cases were children under the age of 18 years old, which accounts 
for 67.5% from the total number of positive human cases.  In addition, among the 27 
fatalities, 16 women died, which accounts for around 60% from total number of 
deaths. Thus, the most vulnerable groups are women who keep poultry in household 
settings and their children, whom are at very high risk of contracting the H5N1 virus 
as a result of being unaware of the dangers associated with being in close proximity to 
the birds. Children often play with household poultry which can be sick or even dead. 
In just five months, between January 2009 and May 2009, 19 children around the age 
of two years old were confirmed H5N1 positive in Egypt.  
TABLE 6: H5N1 Confirmed Cases by Gender (March 2006 – May 2009) 
WOMEN 
(>18 years) 
CHILDREN 
(up to 18 years ) 
MEN 
(>18 years) 
TOTAL 
DATE 
CASES DEATH CASES DEATH CASES DEATH CASES DEATH 
2006 6 6 9 3 3 1 18 10 
2007 8 6 17 3 --- --- 25 9 
2008 2 2 5 1 1 1 8 4 
2009* 4 2 19** 2 --- --- 23 4 
TOTAL 20 16 50 9 4 2 74 27 
Source: Compiled by author from WHO Situation Updates for Egypt.  
* Data for 2009 only covers until 22 May 2009.  
** All 19 cases are children around 2-4 years old.  
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VULNERABILITY OF TRADITIONAL POLUTRY KEEPERS 
 IN FAYOUM 
 
            Egypt is located along the main wild birds’ migratory route between Asia and 
Europe; millions of birds migrate all year round searching for warm weather and 
foods. Scientists are increasingly convinced that at least some migratory water birds 
are now carrying the HPAI H5N1 virus, sometimes over long distances, and 
introducing the virus to poultry flocks in areas that lie along their migratory routes8. 
Fayoum is located at the western desert 90 kms south west of Cairo. It is surrounded 
by desert from three sides and by Beni Suef governorate from its south east. The 
Fayoum population is 2,575,740 million, according to 2007 census, divided among 6 
districts and 163 villages.  Fayoum is a hot spot for AHI in Egypt since it is 
characterized by moderate weather all year round and has two important natural 
attractions for migratory water birds, which are Qarun Lake and Wadi El Rayan Lake. 
The location of Fayoum, with its natural attractions, is an important factor that 
increases its vulnerability to HPAI.  
               "Egypt remains at high risk of continuing outbreaks of Avian Influenza, 
despite the recent contraction of the poultry industry and reduction in the density of 
poultry farms."9, according to the MoH. This is primarily due to the prevalence of 
domestic poultry in most of rural households in Egypt, in which the government has 
almost no control on this traditional poultry sector. Poultry is a very important source 
of income and an important livelihood strategy for many rural households in Egypt. 
Official figures estimate that around 30% of the population own poultry in Egypt.  
                                                 
8 WHO, “Avian Influenza Bird Flu Fact Sheets”.  
9 Ministry of Health, Government of Egypt, "Comprehensive Approach to Addressing Avian and 
Human Influenza in Egypt", 4.  
126 
 
 
 
According to the government, 4-5million households currently keep poultry 10 . 
According to Mrs. Manal Ibrahim, officer at Business Enterprise Support Tools 
Foundation (BEST) in Fayoum, “before the AHI outbreak almost every household in 
Fayoum raised poultry.” The reason why women, in many rural households, are 
typically the main owners of backyard and rooftop poultry is because poultry 
production is one of the most suitable livelihood strategies for poor women since their 
mobility, income earning opportunities and access to formal markets are restricted. 
Poultry keepers’ duties include: feeding; watering; cleaning; detecting sickness; 
seeking veterinary care; buying feed and medicine; making decisions about selling; 
and managing poultry-derived income11.  
            Traditional poultry keeping, which is the upbringing of poultry within a house-
hold setting, i.e. in backyards and/or rooftops, with flocks of less than 50 birds is the 
primary factor behind the continuous spread of AHI in Egypt since most positive 
cases occurred due to direct contact with sick and/or dead household birds. The 
proximity observed between poultry and humans in traditional rearing systems present 
a high risk of virus dissemination12. Traditional poultry keepers are one of the most 
vulnerable communities in the Egyptian society. Among the 74 confirmed human 
cases in Egypt, seven of which are traditional poultry keepers and their children from 
Fayoum, whom got infected as a result of direct contact with domestic poultry. An 
informant in Fayoum even believes that real figures are much higher in Fayoum. She 
continues to argue that, “I know a woman who used to raise poultry her household 
and was hospitalized for flu-like symptoms and shortage of breath and died; the 
hospital attributed her death to a respiratory attack.” Children under two years old are 
                                                 
10  The Government of Egypt, “Integrated National Plan for Avian and Human Influenza 2007 – 2008” , 
Final Draft,  May 2007,  5.  
11 Miers, H., “Poverty, Livelihoods and HPAI- A Review”, Mekong Team Working Paper No.1, Rome, 
June 2008.  
12 Ibid.  
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also a highly vulnerable group in Fayoum. During the field work, it was common to 
observe children playing in front of their houses with live poultry, which make them 
at high risk of catching H5N1 virus. On the 2nd of March 2009, the MoH has reported 
a new two-year old boy confirmed case of avian influenza from Yousef el seddik 
district of Fayoum Governorate whose symptoms began on 25 February due to direct 
contact with sick poultry13. 
POLUTRY KEEPING CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 
 IN FAYOUM 
 
              Cultural factors have been a crucial element in the way people assess, 
respond and cope with hazard risk differently. The primary reason behind the spread 
of AHI is wrong traditional practices associated with poultry bearing at home14. 
Cultural and traditional factors played a crucial role in increasing the vulnerability of 
poultry keepers’ to HPAI as a hazard in Fayoum. This section will examine the 
cultural dimensions that played a vital role in increasing the vulnerability context of 
women, their children and their poultry to contract the HPAI H5N1 virus. This section 
will focus on women poultry keepers’ practices and behavioral patterns associated 
with poultry raising in a household setting in several villages in Fayoum. In addition, 
traditional slaughtering practices will also be explored. The question is: how can 
cultural norms and traditional customs of poultry keepers in Fayoum increase the risk 
of HAPI in poultry and humans?  
             During my field work in Fayoum, it was observed that poultry bearing at 
home is a traditional norm among rural households. Almost all the women 
interviewed raised poultry inside their households even after the AHI outbreaks, with 
a flock size of 50 birds on average. Having poultry run in front of households and on 
                                                 
13 WHO, “Avian Influenza Situation in Egypt- Update 5”, Available at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_03_02/en/index.html 
14 IDSC, “Poll on Citizen's Awareness about Bird Flu in Egypt”.   
128 
 
 
 
the streets without being caged is a traditional habit in Fayoum, which is based on 
certain cultural beliefs. “Poultry keepers have several places to put their poultry in; 
women can restrict their poultry to rooftops or backyards but they don’t, and this is a 
traditional habit”, said Mrs. Iman Mohamed, extension officer at Zawyet Al Karatsa 
CDA in Fayoum district. Leaving poultry in streets and on water banks is a cultural 
practice in Fayoum villages and has nothing to do with the limited household space. 
Many women in Fayoum believe that caging their birds will make them lose weight, 
become unhealthy, and get sick. “Women in Fayoum believe that ducks should swim 
in canals to be healthy”, stated Mr. Ahmed Mahmoud Abdel Alim, AHI Project 
Coordinator. During the field research, several women also confirmed this during 
personal interviews. “Ducks, specifically Bikini Ducks, must swim in the canal”, 
stated Soad Ragab at Zawyet Al Karatsa village in Fayoum district. In addition, Mrs. 
Iman Mohamed affirmed that there is a wide spread misconception among women in 
Fayoum that poultry should not be kept in coops for its well-being. She said that 
“traditional poultry keepers believe that the more the chicken runs here and there, the 
bigger its size and the better its health.”  
               Some women claimed that after the AHI outbreak, they altered their 
practices and confined their birds to rooftops and backyards.  However, during 
transect walks with extension officers, it was apparent that the majority of poultry 
keepers still did not change their embedded practices of keeping their poultry loose. It 
was very common to observe chicken in front of the houses in the streets and to view 
ducks running on stream banks and swimming in canals. Upon entering different 
households, the researcher smelled poultry all over the place although women claimed 
that poultry are restricted to rooftops and backyards, and in some instances the 
researcher even saw feathers lying on the floor. When questioned the reason why 
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some women still release their poultry in households and on the streets after the AHI 
outbreaks, the researcher was informed that this was a cultural habit that women are 
accustomed to. In addition, during one of my focus group discussions at Al Mandara 
Village in Fayoum District, ironically, a pigeon flew inside the discussion room, and 
the researcher was told that it belonged to one of the neighbors. The women 
participating in the discussions were familiar to this incident since they believe that 
pigeons specifically should not be locked up for its wellbeing. “Pigeons fly anyways; 
we do not put pigeons in coops because they will die if we cage them”, confessed 
Manal Attiya. The problem with this practice is that it increases the risk of poultry 
getting infected with HPAI since there is a high probability that poultry left on streets 
and on water banks would infect each other. Also, this custom increases the 
vulnerability of local communities from become infected with H5N1, especially 
children playing in the streets. 
              Even the women that confine their poultry to rooftops or backyards 
confessed to release all kind of poultry from their coops for the entire day. “During 
the day, I get all of my poultry out of the cages and put them in the sun on the rooftop 
to eat and run so they can get bigger”, stated Magda Ibrahim in Al Zawyat in Fayoum 
District. Having the poultry stay for the entire day loose on rooftops or backyards 
make it at high risk of  getting infected from other H5N1 infected wild and migratory 
birds, which land on rooftops to eat and drink with them and hence can infect 
domestic poultry. What is even more alarming is that some women revealed that they 
spend their spare time sitting with their poultry on rooftops. “I go up to the roof and 
sit with my poultry; I enjoy their company”, stated Doniya Ramdan.  
         The prevalence of domestic poultry keeping in rural households in Fayoum is 
widely prevailing due to cultural preference for eating freshly slaughtered Balady 
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birds. All of the women interviewed in Fayoum confessed to like the taste of Balady 
chickens and dislike frozen poultry, what poultry keepers refer to as “white” chicken. 
"I continue to raise poultry because we like the taste of Balady meat that are freshly 
slaughtered”, according to Sabah Rabie’ in the Fayoum district. She continued to 
reveal that the “soup that is made out of the Balady chicken has a beautiful taste 
unlike the frozen chicken”. While other women confessed that they dislike the taste 
and smell of frozen chicken. “Frozen poultry stinks; I get disgusted from the frozen 
poultry”, stated Sokareya Abdullah.  Women in Fayoum argued that they don’t even 
trust frozen poultry, especially after the AHI outbreaks. “I do not trust the frozen 
chicken since it might have been sick before slaughtering and freezing it. I would not 
even know but I am sure that my freshly slaughtered poultry is healthy and that the 
feed is of good quality”, stated Hayam Aly. From the previous discussions, it is 
apparent that one of women’s traditional practices is to keep poultry loose all day in 
streets, rooftops and open yards, which put their domestic poultry at very high risks of 
getting infected with the H5N1 virus. Thus, women cannot be sure that even there 
domestic poultry that are fed “home-made feed” are healthy and are not infected with 
H5N1 until they develop bird flu related symptoms.  
              Not only do women raise their poultry in household settings, but also several 
traditional poultry feeding and slaughtering practices are not biosecure. “Bio” refers 
to “life” and “secure” means “protection”; what the researcher means by biosecurity 
with regard to traditional poultry keeping is that they adopt clean and hygienic 
measures. During one of the focus groups, it came to my knowledge that women still 
feed ducks with their bare hands, commonly known as tazgeet. Another alarming 
practice is mouth-to-mouth feeding of baby pigeons in Fayoum. “I put water in my 
mouth and spit it inside the pigeons’ mouth so I make sure that they drink after they 
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are fed since baby pigeons cannot drink alone;”, stated Sharbat Mohamed in Al 
Mandara Village in Fayoum District. Moreover, most women stated that before the 
appearance of bird flu, they used to slaughter their birds with their bare hands without 
following any biosecure measures such as wearing gloves, masks, and using 
disinfectants. “I slaughter my poultry like I am used to by just using my hands and a 
knife”, stated  Kawkab Abdel Mawgood.  
            While other women claimed that after the AHI outbreak they changed their 
poultry feeding practices and slaughtering methods. In the beginning of any focus 
group discussion, women alleged that they wear something plastic bags in their hands, 
put a scarf on their face, wear old clothes, and put on a specific slipper when dealing 
with poultry; i.e. they claim that they abide by the hygienic procedures advertised on 
national television. “I have an old gallabiya and an old flip-flop specifically for 
feeding and cleaning under my poultry”, stated Karima Abdo. However, usually at the 
end of the discussions they confess that most of the time they “leave it to God” and 
feed and clean for their poultry without any preventive measures since they are sure 
that it is not sick. “Some women claim that they wear a scarf on their face and plastic 
bags in their hands when slaughtering chicken, but the majority of my family and 
neighbors do not wear anything in reality”, revealed Manal Attiya. The only thing that 
all women interviewed agreed on doing, in the wake of the AI crisis, was using a big 
bucket to slaughter the poultry in so that the blood and the feather do not spread on 
the floor in the house. “I slaughter my chicken in a bucket , then clean the chicken 
from the feathers inside the bucket, then throw chlor, i.e. detergent, on the chicken 
remainings, and then dispose of it in a plastic bag”, said Gamal Eid Ahmed.  This 
procedure was not traditionally followed by the women before the AHI crisis. The 
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reason behind the alteration in some of the women’s behavior and attitudes will be 
further elaborated in subsequent sections. 
              Traditional believes affect women’s perception to risk and how they will 
respond to it, thus affecting their vulnerability. Due to certain cultural beliefs, 
traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum short after the AHI outbreak started restocking 
without taking adequate preventive measures since they didn’t believe that the bird flu 
is a new event that would threaten their lives. There was a frequent argument brought 
forward by several women in Fayoum, which is that women believed that the bird flu 
phenomena is not something new in rural communities; poultry keepers revealed that 
for ages long before the appearance of avian influenza in Egypt, it was ordinary 
among poultry keepers to wake up and find their poultry dead. Women didn’t have an 
explanation for it; most women refer to this event as Al hool, while some call it Al 
hafa; whereas few women call it Al fira. “Our grandparents and parents used to wake 
up in the morning and find all their poultry dead; we refer to this incident as Al hool”, 
stated Mona Nasr El Dine. This statement was repeated eight times during my field 
work. Mona adds that “nowadays they discovered that it is influenza”. Other women 
stated that “Al hafa used to come and take our poultry”. This reveals that some 
cultural beliefs dominate women’s perception of avian influenza as a hazard; women 
attribute the death of their poultry to a cultural construct.  These beliefs provide 
women with a false sense of security and a feeling of resilience against AHI, since “Al 
hool is not something new; we are accustomed to such events”, according to one of 
the women.  
              In addition, traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum are reluctant to undergo 
surveillance to their poultry due to certain embedded cultural and religious beliefs. 
Most of the women interviewed would not even allow a veterinary to servile their 
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poultry, regardless of being a government employee or a private doctor. The main 
factor behind their refusal is there fear from evil eyes, commonly known as hasad. In 
addition, during one of the focus groups at Al Mandara Village, women confessed 
that in the case they were approached by government veterinaries to servile their 
poultry they will not allow the doctor to see all their flock because they are afraid of 
hasad. During a focus group discussion, women agreed that strangers are not allowed 
to inspect their poultry since “hasad is mentioned in Quran”.  Karima Abdo stated, “I 
don’t let veterinaries in my 3’esha because I don’t want them to see my poultry as not 
harm them with his eyes (hasad); especially el roomy chicken, it can easily get 
harmed from a stranger’s eyes.” She continued to say, “If I have a sick chicken I will 
only show it to the doctor or take it to the veterinary unit to have a medication for it.”  
Moreover, during the field work, it was very obvious that women in Fayoum tend 
either to lie about their flock size or refuse to give a precise number of their poultry 
all together because they are afraid of hasad. During home visits, women did not 
allow the researcher to check out the poultry on the rooftops and backyards; the 
researcher would only observe poultry by coincidence.  
AHI IMPACT ON LIVELIHOODS ASSETS OF 
 TRADITIONALPOULTRY KEEPERS IN FAYOUM 
 
            Raising poultry at home represents an essential livelihood strategy for poor 
rural women in Fayoum since it is a domestic low-cost activity that contributes 
towards household protein consumption and provides a quick source of income. HPAI 
had a strong negative socio-economic impact on the livelihoods of rural female 
headed households since poultry “contributed to the economic, nutritional, social and 
cultural well-being of households”15, according to a FAO/ WFP rapid socio-economic 
                                                 
15 FAO, “Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Rapid Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impact on 
Vulnerable Households in Egypt”, 3.  
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impact assessment of four governorates in Egypt, one of which is Fayoum. In Egypt, 
the estimated share of income from poultry is 114 EGP, which is around 45% of 
household income16. Vulnerable households that depends the most on poultry have 
moved from the “poor” to the “very poor” socio-economic classification and from the 
“medium” to the “poor” classification17. The spread of HPAI have led to massive 
culling of birds which resulted in decrease in flock sizes. During my field work, it was 
almost impossible to quantify the numbers of poultry dead as a result of the AHI 
outbreaks per household since women did not reveal exact numbers. Out of 25 women 
interviewed, 21 revealed that “most of my poultry got sick and died” while the rest of 
the women said “some of them died”. The FAO/WFP study gives us a quantification 
of mortality rates among domestic poultry. The “very poor” suffered the most in the 
AHI crisis since they witnessed a reduction of 92% in absolute bird numbers, while 
the “poor” and “medium” suffered a reduction of 82% and 72% respectively18.  The 
following section will examine the impact of AHI on traditional poultry keepers’ 
assets.  
a. Financial Capital        
            Amongst very poor producers in Egypt, especially female headed households, 
poultry-derived income from the sale of poultry and eggs as a share of overall income 
could be as high as 100%, although on average amongst the poor and very poor it was 
44%19. According an interview with a key informant at BEST, “almost all rural 
households in Fayoum totally rely on poultry as a livelihood asset”. The culling of 
domestic poultry, in Fayoum, had negative financial consequences since traditional 
                                                 
16 Ibid, 40.  
17 Ibid, 26.  
18 FAO, “Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Rapid Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impact on 
Vulnerable Households in Egypt”, 32.  
19 Miers, H., “Poverty, Livelihoods and HPAI- A Review”, 8.  
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poultry keepers relied on their polutry for quick cash. “I used to sell the eggs to feed 
my children and my poultry; when most my poultry was culled, I had no money to 
feed my children”, stated Madiha Ragab. In addition, some women also had 
difficulties repaying their loans since all poultry was dead or culled. “As a result of 
the AHI crisis, I could not repay the loan I took and I was indebted”, stated Sabah 
Rabea. Moreover, a common element that was mentioned a lot during the focus group 
discussions and personal interviews is that some women slaughtered all their healthy 
poultry when they heard about the outbreak in the news due their fear of getting 
infected, which badly affected their income levels. This meant that one of the coping 
strategies of poultry keepers in Fayoum was to destroy one of their vital livelihood 
assets as a result of the AHI shock.  
               Consumer fear to eat poultry and eggs had devastating effects on women 
micro-entrepreneurs in Fayoum. Despite the fragility of the H5N1 virus, destroyed at 
75°C, most consumers halted their intake of poultry and eggs leading to a sharp 
decrease in poultry consumption, which badly affected poultry keepers. As a result, 
women micro-entrepreneurs in Fayoum were forced to sell their poultry for very low 
prices to get rid of them, which did not even cover their initial expenses. All poultry 
was sold with a fraction of their original costs with huge losses; the Balady chicken 
that used to be sold with 15 LE was sold for 1 LE and the deek roomy (a rooster), 
which was originally sold for 200 LE was sold for 20 LE. “The chicken that was 
usually sold for 15 LE was hardly sold for 5 LE during the initial months of the 
crisis”, stated Sabah Rabeea owner of a small farm on her rooftop in Zawyet El 
Karatsa Village in Fayoum District. She continued to add that “I used to buy the one 
day old chick for 5 LE, which means that during the crisis I did not even cover the 
initial costs of these chicks such as the feed, water, worker salary…etc”. This abrupt 
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66 % drop in chicken prices coupled with a prolonged period of consumer fear 
severely devastated the livelihoods of women micro-entrepreneurs, who relied on 
poultry and/or eggs for income. Fear from the H5N1 virus was so intense in Fayoum 
to the extent that an owner of a small roomy farm in Fayoum district had released all 
his flocks in the streets because of fear from the H5N1 virus, according to Mrs. Iman 
Mohamed, an extension officer. This meant that traditional poultry keepers’ primary 
source of income had disappeared over night.  
            One of the extension officers in Fayoum district revealed that “during the 
course of my work with the CRS project, I experienced psychological problems as a 
result of my close interaction with the women on a daily basis. I was engaged with 
their livelihoods problems and their inability to repay loans and debts as a result of the 
AHI outbreaks and the death of their poultry.”  She explained that “in some instances 
due to emotional pressure and the knowledge of the inability of some poultry keepers 
to pay the fines on their loans, I would pay it for them.” This stressful work 
environment drove the extension officer to quit her job at the CDA and her primary 
source of income; the officer choose to stay at home and resigned from her 
community job to avoid engaging with women and hearing their sad and stressful 
stories on a daily basis.  She continued to reveal that “I once went home and kept 
crying after I saw one of the project’s clients sit in the sun for hours trying to sell her 
poultry to be able to repay her debt until she got sun-burned, and when my husband 
saw me depressed and how my work with poultry keepers affected my psychological 
status he asked me to quit my job and I instantly did.” 
            During the field work, it was stated that two types of coping strategies were 
employed by women in Fayoum to resist the AHI shock. First, some women were 
unable to give up their main source of income and continued raising poultry secretly, 
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as a coping strategy and took the risk of being infected. However, several women 
voiced that restocking of poultry just after the AHI outbreaks was very difficult due to 
several factors. The primary reason behind their inability to restock was the decrease 
in demand for poultry. Another factor was the lack of initial capital to buy chicks; 
women were unable to pay even a small deposit to purchase chicks and feed.20 To 
overcome these challenges, women would utilize several coping strategies such as 
borrowing money from their relatives and marketing their products to their neighbors 
since altering their business was impossible for several women. “My family could not 
take the risk of entering into other business; we also did not have any money; we were 
indebt”, revealed Sabah Rabea. The second coping strategy was that some women 
started diversifying their household income due to the high financial and health risks 
associated with poultry raising. A huge portion of the women interviewed who altered 
their income-generating activities changed from poultry to cattle since these two 
businesses have somewhat similar conditions. Both of them can take place inside the 
household without having women leave her house and both of them generates 
products that can be sold for quick cash (such as eggs in poultry and milk in cattle). “I 
do no raise poultry any more in my household; I shifted to raising sheep, goats and 
cows, which is a much safer buisness”, stated Rida Ramadan.  
b. Human Capital  
           Human capital is a livelihood asset, which is a mean of achieving livelihood 
outcomes. Human capital represents the skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good 
health that together enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve 
their livelihood objectives21. Its accumulation can also be an end in itself. Many 
people regard ill-health or lack of education as core dimensions of poverty and thus 
                                                 
20 Catholic Relief Services, "Business Development Services to mitigate the AI Risks of Women 
Micro-entrepreneurs in Egypt", Project Proposal Submitted to UNDP, (July 2006),  2.  
21 DFID, “Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets”.  
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overcoming these conditions may be one of their primary livelihood objectives. In the 
wake of the AHI outbreaks, the premature reduction in the numbers of domestic 
poultry and sometimes the lack of poultry all together had lead to the reduction in 
animal protein consumption (poultry meat and eggs) per household, which affected 
the health of the entire family in general and specifically had a direct impact on 
children’s nutritional value.  In Fayoum, most of the women interviewed reveled that 
they eliminated poultry from their diets for around 4-5 months after the 2006 
outbreaks. Most women interviewed (23 out of 25 women) revealed that they reduced 
their consumption of animal proteins (eggs and poultry meat) and shifted to cheaper 
sources of protein such as beans, lentils, and chick peas, as a coping strategy. Only 
one woman stated that her family switched from poultry consumption to occasional 
meat consumption, which did not affect her families’ protein intake. “We did not eat 
poultry and bought meat, when the outbreak occurred”, stated Hayat Abdel Maboud 
Zayed.  In addition, during a focus group discussion one of the participants stated that 
“we used to boil eggs to put in our children’s sandwiches to take to school but there 
are no eggs anymore.”22 This meant that children’s diet was affected on a daily basis 
as well.   
             Another manifestation of ill-health was the increased stress and depression 
among poultry keepers as a result of the AHI outbreaks. Women had experienced 
severe stress because they started to feel bored and restless since they used to spend 
plenty of their time in taking care of their birds, feeding, cleaning, preparing feed and 
selling eggs.  “My old mum underwent psychological depression when her poultry 
died since she was used to their company; they filled the house on her”, stated Karima 
Abdo. That is why the loss of these chicks has generated feelings of worthlessness 
                                                 
22 Catholic Relief Services, "Business Development Services to mitigate the AI Risks of Women 
Micro-entrepreneurs in Egypt", 16.  
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and tediousness. During my field work, one of the things the researcher detected was 
that poultry keepers regarded their poultry as their babies; it was mentioned several 
times during personal interviews that “chicks are like babies that should be taken care 
of”.  Sokarya Abdallah revealed that “when I see that my chicks have grown up, I feel 
thrilled and delighted.” Moreover, some women regarded poultry as a domestic pet 
and like having them around their house. During one of my personal interviews at a 
poultry keeper household, the poultry were running and jumping everywhere, the old 
women was throwing pieces of bread to the chicken while talking with me; she treated 
here poultry as a house pet. Many women revealed that they missed the company of 
their poultry during the AHI outbreaks. Another reason behind women’s feeling of 
anxiety and stress was the fear that they and/or their children get infected with HPAI; 
women mentioned that they panic when ever their children show any flu like 
symptoms.  
             Moreover, children’s education was also affected since income from poultry 
was used to pay school tuition, private lessons, and school books and materials. 
“Raising poultry enabled me to secure money for private lessons for my son and 
daughter”, stated Howayda Mohamed from Snoras district. However after the AHI 
outbreaks, Howayda stopped giving private lessons to her children in all subjects, as a 
livelihood coping strategy. Private lessons is an integral element in primary, 
secondary, and university education in Egypt since failing to take private lessons with 
school professors might put the children at risk of failing in their examinations. This 
reveals that the AHI outbreaks had indirect effects on educational achievements.  
c. Social Capital  
            Social capital does not exist in isolation from other livelihood assets; it is 
regarded as a cross-cutting asset, in which the lack of financial capital and human 
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capital would definitely affect the livelihood status of individuals thus acting as a 
barrier to involvement in social activities outside the household23. As a household’s 
resources declines (including savings), it becomes harder to spend time and resources 
on social obligations. “Last week, my cousin got married but I did not go to the 
wedding because now with no poultry business I cannot afford getting her a gift”, 
stated Nagah Mohamed at Kafr Mahfouz at Tamia District. Even simple neighborly 
ties based on reciprocity can become difficult to sustain. Most women stated that they 
no longer invite their neighbors over for lunch or dinner because there is no longer 
poultry. “I used to invite my neighbor to come and have a breakfast with me after the 
children goes to school but now I am embarrassed to do so because there are no eggs 
to serve her”, stated Noha Ramadan at Tamia district.  When there is a lack of poultry, 
gifts cannot be bought and even common hospitality may be a burden, leading to 
increased social isolation for poor women, who are already depressed from the death 
of their poultry.  One of AHI dimension on women’s social capital is that poultry 
keepers in Fayoum revealed that they no longer can make gam’ia, i.e. rotating saving 
schemes, which they were accustomed to as a form of mutual support and assistance. 
“One of my friends wanted me to make a gam’ia with her to buy stuff for her 
daughter for her wedding (gehaz), but I could not afford it”, revealed um Ahmed.  
        
 
 
 
         
  
                                                 
23 Pelling, Mark, The Vulnerability of Cities: Natural Disaster and Social Resilience, (London: 
Earthscan Publications, 2003):165.  
 
141 
 
 
 
  BOX 1: HOWAYDA CASE STUDY 
    26 February 2008. Fayoum Governorate, Snoras District, Al Adel Village.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Howayda’s family is composed of three sons and a daughter, attending university, 
primary and preparatory schools. Her husband is unemployed and Howayda does not 
have a degree; she dropped out of school in the preparatory stage. Howayda’s work is 
the main source of income to the household. Her Husband asks her to buy him 
cigarettes without even worrying about the money. The family can be regarded as 
“very poor”. Howayda’s household can be considered an extremely vulnerable 
household since four children and one husband depend entirely on her income. 
 
Howayda went through very tough times in her life, where she didn’t have any 
income. Howayda only had 10 chicks in her house for home consumption. A lot of 
people encouraged her to raise poultry for a living but she was afraid they would die. 
After being convinced to raise poultry, she started buying poultry on behalf of 
women in her village. Since she didn’t have enough capital to start her poultry 
business, she made a gam’ia (rotating saving scheme) and collected the initial capital 
from a group of ten women in order to buy chicks (initially 500 chick)  and their feed. 
She then raised the chicks for 30 days in a room inside her household and sold them. 
Howayda’s business flourished and enlarged immensely from 2000 till 2006. She 
used to buy and sell thousands of chicks per month. Poultry was the main source of 
livelihood without any other alternative source; her monthly income was 400 EGP on 
average.  
 
One day, before the AI was officially announced in Egypt, Howayda discovered that 
her chicken look sick and that their color turned blue. She went to the village 
veterinary unit and told them about the symptoms of her poultry but they didn’t take 
her comment seriously. While she didn’t know what to do with her dead poultry, she 
buried them.  
 
As a result of the AI crisis, Howayda lost almost all of her flock. In the beginning, it 
was very difficult to restock since there was no demand for poultry and she was also 
afraid to buy chicks and they die. Howayda was forced to close her business for two 
years (February 2006- February 2008). Just before the AI outbreak, she used to cook 
three times per week but again she returned to cook only once per week.  In addition, 
she stopped giving private lessons to her children in several subjects because she could 
not afford them due to the lack of money. She also felt very depressed and sad because 
suddenly her household was empty from poultry. She used to be very busy feeding, 
cleaning and managing her small business, and after they have gone she would cry 
herself to sleep every day.  
 
Howayda could not shift to other business since poultry raising is regarded as a 
“family friendly” and “quick business”; only after 15 days she can sell her chicks and 
get quick cash. Any other business will take a long time to generate income. After two 
years, Howayda started restocking. Howayda’s behavior has changed drastically after 
the AI outbreak; she got a coop on her rooftop for the poultry and keeps every species 
in a separate coop. She also wears plastic bags in her hands and put on her neqab (veil) 
when dealing with her poultry. She also buy her chicks from a secure source, which is 
the Integrated Project for Poultry Production, known as Al Azab project that produces 
different hybrids of vaccinated and properly raised chicks.  She taught herself how to 
vaccinate her chicks from her regular visits to the IPPP and how to prepare hygienic 
feed. She also checks on her chicks regularly and if they get sick she buys for them 
medicine from private veterinary pharmacies that can cost her up to 10 EGP per chick 
because she cannot afford losing them again. Nowadays Howayda’s poultry are in 
good health and her micro business started improving once again due to the increase in 
demand for poultry and eggs.   
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AHI TRANSFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 
        
          Access to Livelihood Assets and the formulation of Livelihood Strategies are 
influenced by the prevailing institutional structures and processes 24 . The 
Transforming Structures and Processes are the levels of governments, institutions, 
organizations, policies, and legislation, and the civil society that shape livelihoods, 
which can affect the creation of assets, determine access to assets, and influence rates 
of asset accumulation.  Women’s access to livelihood assets is affected by the  
Transforming Structures and Processes determining access to various types of 
livelihoods strategies. This section will, first, examine the government institutional 
structure and processes that are mandated to deal with AHI at the strategic, central 
and local levels in theory. Afterwards, the impact of the government’s preventive and 
mitigation measures on the livelihoods of vulnerable groups in Fayoum will be 
explored in practice from the perception of traditional poultry keepers.  In addition, 
the role of various local government entities such us veterinary directorate, 
department and units, will be examined in theory and in practice, also from the 
perception of traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum that raise poultry as a livelihoods 
strategy. The final section will deal with the Catholic Relief Services AHI mitigation 
project and how did it affect the livelihoods strategies of traditional poultry keepers in 
Fayoum. 
GOVERNMENT ROLE IN AHI CRISIS  
 
                The GoE, in theory, should play a major role in the AHI crisis by 
controlling HPAI in poultry through preventive and mitigation measures and reducing 
the risks of human infections. The institutional structure that is employed to deal with 
the AHI disaster is formulated along the same there institutional levels of the overall 
                                                 
24 DFID, “Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets” . 
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disaster management framework in Egypt, examined in chapter four, but are made 
specific to AHI. The; the first level is the strategic level, which is the Higher 
Ministerial Committee for Avian Influenza. This committee is headed by the Prime 
Minister and involved ministers. The second level consist of the Supreme National 
Committee to Combat Avian Flu, which was convened after the discovery of the first 
H5N1 virus in birds under the chairmanship of the Minister of Health (MoH) with the 
participation of the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Environment, 
representatives from the Ministries of Interior, the Army and the Police, concerned 
governors, and representatives of WHO, FAO and NAMRU-3, in order to monitor 
and review HPAI development. Ironically, the CMDR is not a member of this 
committee nor acting as an observer nor giving it any technical support25.  
               A lot of the politics take place on the level of these committees.  During 
2006 and 2007, the MoH has spent 238 million EGP to provide vaccines for human 
cases and launch various types of campaigns to increase people's awareness of the 
dangers of HPAI, according to the IDSC 26 .  However, after the Minister of 
Agriculture became the chair of the Supreme National Committee, Dr. Talaat Khatib, 
a professor of food hygiene at Assiut University claimed that there was slowdown in 
the vaccination of poultry and awareness campaigns during the summer months of 
2007, which leading to the spread and growth of the deadly virus in the following 
winter,27. That is why a more ad hoc AHI Communication Committee has been also 
formed to coordinate media and social communication interventions. The chair of the 
committee is MoH with the membership of USAID, WHO, WB and UNICEF. Dr. 
Nasr El Sayyed, the spokes person of the Supreme Committee to Combat Avian 
                                                 
25 Dr. Mohamed Fawzy, Head, Department of Crises and Disaster Management (CMDR) at IDSC, 
Interview by author, 22 June 2008, Cairo, Egypt.   
26 IDSC, "Annual Report of Major Disasters in Egypt during 2007".   
27 Leila, Reem, “Fowl Reaction”, Al Ahram Weekly Online, 3 - 9 January 2008, Issue No. 878.  
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Influenza, announced during a round table discussion at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on 6 June 2007 with UN agencies and the donor community that AHI in Egypt 
has a large negative impact on the household poultry sector. He continued to say that 
one of the main challenges facing the government is the communication and 
awareness raising component that is supposed to promote behavioural change and 
address habits which have been existing for thousands of years.      
Prevention: Theory vs. Practice  
            The third local level is the operational arm, which is responsible on 
implementing central AHI policies and strategies. The primary responsibility for the 
progressive control of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry lies in the General 
Organization for Veterinary Services at the central level, an entity affiliated to the 
MoALR. The Veterinary Directorates, Veterinary Departments, and Veterinary Units 
are its operational braches at the three local levels.  In theory, each governorate should 
have a Governorate Higher Committee for Crisis Management headed by the 
governor and the secretary general of the governorate to combat AHI with 
representatives from the veterinary and health directorates. In practice this committee 
does not exist in Fayoum governorate. According to a key informant, “there is no 
committee to combat AI in Al Faoyum.” In addition, according to Dr. Nasr El Sayyed, 
the spokes person of the Supreme Committee to Combat Avian Influenza, “in theory 
the Integrated National Plan for Avian and Human Influenza should be implemented 
at the village level; however this did not take place in practice”28. In theory, the 
objectives of the National Plan for Avian and Human Influenza is to, first, increase 
resistance of poultry to HPAI, limit the spread of the virus in poultry through early 
detection and implement measures to contain the spread of the virus through 
                                                 
28 “Government of Egypt Technical Round Table on Avian and Human Influenza”,  Minutes of 
Meeting,  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2007.  
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vaccinations, and second  minimize the likelihood of human exposure to infected 
poultry. However, since the 2006 outbreaks until May 2009, the government fell short 
of containing HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry and preventing new outbreaks. During 
the initial outbreaks in poultry, it was noted that the GOE tends to react rather than act 
by focusing on short-term emergency response rather than long-term risk reduction. 
The GoE is facing substantial challenges in achieving effective control of HPAI in 
poultry. After an eight month interval (from April 2008 till December 2008), positive 
cases have started to reappear in Egypt since mid December 2008 with very short 
intervals all had direct contact with domestic poultry. Reducing the vulnerability to 
HPAI will not be possible unless the incidence of H5N1 virus infection in poultry is 
reduced.  After almost three years of the initial outbreak in poultry, the GoE fell short 
of being able to prevent future outbreaks in poultry. The case study will first explore 
the governorate of Fayoum preventive measures in theory and in practice. What are 
the roles of the various government entities in Fayoum (veterinary directorates, health 
directorates, agriculture directorates …etc) to decrease the incidence of H5N1 
infections in poultry and prevent future outbreaks?  
            The AHI prevention measures that the veterinary directorate in Fayoum should 
carry out include ongoing surveillance, sustainable vaccination campaigns, movement 
control, slaughtering restrictions, import bans, and imposition of biosecure measures. 
According to a key informant at BEST in Fayoum, “government response to AHI is 
very weak”; the informant continues to explain, “some women when first discovered 
their dead poultry, they went to report the cases to the veterinary units in their 
villages, however they did not get any adequate response.” In Fayoum, during an 
interview with a doctor at the directorate of veterinary services in Fayoum, it was 
revealed that there is no clear vertical chain of command between the directorate of 
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veterinary services at the governorate level, the veterinary departments at the district 
level, and the veterinary units at the village level. There is no follow up to ensure that 
the AHI instructions received from the veterinary directorate had reached the poultry 
keepers. “We are sure that AHI instructions reach the veterinary departments at the 
district level but we do not know whether it reach the veterinary units at the village 
level or not”, stated Dr. Soraya Ramadan at Veterinary Directorate in Fayoum 
Governorate. She continues to say that “there is no monitoring procedure that we 
follow to make sure that AHI required information reached the units at the villages, 
except in the case of a confirmed human case.” There are no formal communication 
channels between the veterinary units in the villages in Fayoum and the poultry 
keepers. 
            It was also revealed during interviews that in practice the doctor at the 
veterinary unit at the village level does not report back to the veterinary department 
on the district level nor the veterinary directorate at the governorate level in case of 
outbreak in poultry. In theory, when poultry keepers inform the veterinary of an 
outbreak in poultry, he should report to the veterinary unit that in turn should inform 
the veterinary department at the district level, which reports directly to the Directorate 
of Veterinary Services at the governorate level. In addition, the veterinary at the 
village level should take samples from infected poultry and send it directly to the 
veterinary directorate, which will send the sample to the NAMRU labs in Abbasiya, 
Cairo that would report the results in three days. In the case of confirmed infection, 
sick poultry should be culled, the household should be disinfected, and the poultry 
with 500 meters in proximity should be vaccinated. However, a veterinary revealed 
that, in practice, they don’t report suspected poultry infection o the veterinary 
department but handle it on the village level. “We do not report sick and dead poultry 
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to the veterinary department; we show women how to burn their infected poultry”, 
stated  Mr. Abdel Wanees Attiya Gibriel, Me’awen at Ezbet Gibriel Rashwan 
veterinary unit at Mansha’et Bany Etman Village in Snoras District. This action is 
justified on the ground that the veterinaries “are afraid that women would release their 
sick poultry in the streets as result of being fearful of government culling 
committees.”  This reveals that poultry keepers believe that one of the government 
policies to combat AHI is to cull all suspected poultry.  
            The initial reaction of local governmental bodies in the wake of the 2006 
outbreak was top-down aggressive policies. This created a lack of trust between 
veterinaries and traditional poultry keepers, which forced women not to report their 
infected poultry to government officials; they tended to burn, bury, or threw them in 
waterways. There was a general fear among women from the government since there 
were rumors that the government is culling all the poultry whether her poultry are sick 
or not. “We heard that in other villages the culling committee would go into the 
houses and take all the poultry despite of the poultry keepers’ pleas that they are not 
sick.” In addition, the government did not employ any incentive mechanism to 
encourage poultry keepers to examine their poultry against H5N1 virus. When the 
researcher discussed, during focus groups the reason behind the reluctance of women 
to report the death of their poultry, it was evident that there is no incentive for women 
to report suspicious cases of Avian Influenza. On the contrary, they are extremely 
fearful of the government to cull their remaining poultry. Furthermore, none reported 
given any compensation as a result of the losses in their backyard poultry in Fayoum. 
            Another factor is the lack of trust between traditional poultry keeper from one 
side and the government from the other side. “We heard that veterinaries go into 
houses and cull all birds whether infected or not, which is immoral”, stated a female 
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headed household in El Zawyat district.  The initial emergency mass culling of birds 
in Fayoum have scared poultry keepers from dealing with government officials in any 
way. “Poultry keepers do not trust the government anymore because they told poor 
people that it is illegal to raise poultry in a household setting and ordered them not to 
raise poultry in their houses”, revealed Mr. Mohamed Ashraf. He continued to reveal 
that “whenever there is a surveillance campaign in the area, women hide the birds and 
pretend that they have no birds out of fear they would be taken or slaughtered without 
appropriate compensation.”  
This lack of trust among poultry keepers and their unresponsiveness to the 
government vaccination campaigns was mainly due to the wrong practices employed 
by government veterinaries. In the beginning of the crisis, “the veterinary unit 
announces in the microphones of the mosque that there will be vaccination in a 
specified day, and asks the poultry keepers who are willing to vaccinate their poultry 
to bring them in front of the unit at a certain time”, stated Dr. Ashraf Lutfy EL Sayed, 
veterinary unit at Mansha’et Bany Etman Village in Snoras District. The veterinary 
department would send the vaccines and one of the workers at the veterinary unit 
would vaccinate the poultry. These vaccination campaigns are not obligatory; “only 
the poultry keepers who wanted to vaccinate would show up”, revealed Dr. Rabeea El 
Sayed El Araby, Veterinary Unit, Mansha’et Snoras in Snoras District. According to 
the women, in the beginning of the outbreak, the vaccination campaign took place in a 
public street, where women had to physically take their poultry to this place to get 
vaccinated.  This was unhygienic procedure and in the same time unpractical for 
many women. “I will have to catch my poultry then put them in coops and afterwards 
I have to physically take them to the veterinary unit; this is impossible”, stated a 
women from Al Mandra village.  Moreover, the workers who vaccinated the poultry 
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used the same needle to vaccinate all chickens, stated an informant, which might 
cause the spread of the virus from sick poultry to healthy ones. This means that in the 
early days of the outbreak the government could have been increasing infections in 
poultry and spreading the disease by using the same needle for hundreds of poultry 
and vaccinating all poultry in one place thus increasing the risks of infection. These 
wrong practices resulted in the death of a lot of domestic poultry just after they were 
vaccinated, according to the women. As a direct result, women started refusing to 
vaccinate their poultry because they were made to believe that the government wants 
to kill their birds. This led to a wide spread misconception from AHI vaccination 
among traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum.  
                Another factor behind the governments’ failure to prevent AHI outbreaks in 
poultry is the weakness of veterinary services at the village/district level attributed to 
the low numbers of veterinarians, limited personnel trained in surveillance, and 
limited financial and logistical capabilities to carry out comprehensive vaccination 
campaigns 29 , matters still not resolved three years after the initial out breaks. 
According to poultry keepers in Fayoum, the veterinary authorities do not carry out 
any surveillance of backyard poultry and regular vaccination campaigns. According to 
an informant, who refused to publish his name, “veterinaries do not carry out 
surveillance campaign in Fayoum since they do not have such capacity.” In addition, 
almost all women interviewed stated that there was no surveillance carried out by 
veterinaries to their backyard poultry.  During a focus group discussion in Mansha2et 
Baghdad village, E’tbar Abdel Azim revealed that “there is no government 
surveillance at all; if veterinaries come to the village they give us quick awareness 
raising instructions or carry out very limited vaccination campaigns.” Moreover, the 
                                                 
29 The Government of Egypt, “Integrated National Plan for Avian and Human Influenza” . 
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lack of ongoing comprehensive vaccination campaigns is another reason behind the 
prevalence of HPAI H5N1 virus among backyard poultry. Three years after the AHI 
outbreaks, vaccination campaigns are still not enough. Howayda in Ezbet El Adel in 
Snoras district stated, “veterinary units conduct vaccination campaigns only twice per 
year for backyard poultry and they should be carried out every three months.” In 
addition, most of the women interviewed revealed that in the beginning of the crisis, 
for almost two years, they were not regularly approached by veterinaries to vaccinate 
their poultry. In addition, a key informant stated that “veterinaries are government 
employees at the end of the day; they only show up for two hours for vaccination 
campaigns and then disappear.” However some women stated that, during the last 
year, there was a slight improvement in the vaccination campaigns. The veterinary 
units introduced a card system, in which every poultry keeper is given a vaccination 
card upon vaccinating her poultry by government authorities with the number of 
poultry vaccinated and date.  
          Another reason behind the failure of government bodies to limit the spread of 
the virus in poultry is the poor enforcement of legislation dealing with AHI. With 
respect to live bird shops and markets, it was evident that all live markets and small 
poultry shops have reopened in Fayoum after ceasing to function for couple of months 
after the initial outbreaks. During my individual interviews, several women confessed 
to buy their chicks from Tuesdays and Fridays live bird markets. “I buy my chicken 
from the Friday weekly market”, stated Sabah Mohamed. That is why the existence of 
Tuesdays and Fridays live bird markets is an integral element in rural villages in 
Fayoum since there is a high demand for live poultry. To the extent that two of the 
extension officers at the CDA at AL Zawyet confessed to buy their chicks from 
Friday markets. “Live bird markets only stopped for 5 months after the initial 
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outbreaks but have reopened in Fayoum because merchants and workers complained 
since their livelihoods depend on poultry without any supervision from local 
authorities”, stated Mrs. Mona, one of the extension officers.  In addition, some 
women claimed that there are restrictions on transportation of live poultry to other 
governorates. “Trading live poultry is restricted within Fayoum governorate and these 
live poultry cannot be transported to other governorate”, stated Iman Mohamed. 
However, one of the things that the researcher observed during the field work is that 
there were several street vendors selling live poultry on the Fayoum-Cairo high way, 
which reveals that movement of live birds between governorates is still prevailing.   
Mitigation: Theory vs. Practice  
               The government, in theory, should be responsible for mitigating the negative 
socio-economic impact of AHI and supporting the livelihoods of poor communities 
heavily dependent on poultry for income and food security. Key mitigation measures 
include compensation, re-stocking schemes, and low interest micro-credit schemes. 
However, in practice traditional poultry keepers were not compensated by the 
government for a variety of reasons. Women in Fayoum stated that poultry keepers 
were not compensated for the loss of their poultry. “No one approached me for 
compensation”, stated a female headed house hold in Tamiah district. The GoE 
declared that they do not have the necessary funds to compensate the millions of 
traditional poultry keepers. That is why women do not have any incentive to report 
sick poultry. On the contrary they are afraid to report any sick poultry and put their 
entire flock and their neighbors’ poultry at risk of being culled by government 
authorities. According to a doctor at the veterinary unit in Mansha’et Bany Etman in 
Snoras District, “we cull all poultry within 500 meters diameters around the infected 
house.” Women suggested that the government should encourage poultry keepers to 
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report sick poultry by giving them a motivation. For example, Howayda in Snoras 
district suggested that “the government can offer poultry keepers to disinfect polutry 
coops free of charge if they report sick poultry and assure them that they will not cull 
healthy poultry.” In addition, the government should develop restocking packages, 
compensation schemes and/or micro-credit schemes for poultry keepers as an 
incentive to report infected poultry.  
             The veterinary units in the Fayoum governorate did not provide traditional 
poultry keepers with restocking guidelines in practice. Poultry keepers started 
restocking without taking adequate preventive measures since their livelihoods 
depended on raising poultry for income and consumption,. This was due to the lack of 
veterinary units to disseminate necessary information, undergo effective surveillance 
and vaccination. During one of my home visits at Al Fayoum District, the women 
explained, “I had stopped raising poultry for about 5 months but when I felt that the 
danger disappeared and when I got sufficient information about Avian Influenza from 
the television, I started restocking once more.” However, when I asked her about the 
exact symptoms of H5N1 in poultry and in humans, ironically she could not answer. 
This tendency of restocking without having basic information on preventive measures 
was revealed in several personal interviews. Another woman claimed that she taught 
herself all preventive measures from the television awareness raising advertisements 
but she only mentioned that “I put my legs in a bucket of water when exiting from the 
rooftop.” When the researcher asked her whether she uses any gloves, masks or even 
wear plastic bags in her hands when slaughtering poultry, she stated “I leave it to 
God.”  
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CRS PROJECT: BDS TO MITIGATE AHI IMPACTS 
 ON WOMEN IN FAYOUM 
 
                Mitigation is considered one of the most effective medium to long term 
DRR approaches which incorporates risk reduction measures into regular investment 
projects30. That is why the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) designed a project to 
mitigate the AHI impacts through BDS and micro-finance components. Since there is 
little information in the literature reviewed relating to the effectiveness of mitigation 
schemes on women’s livelihoods, the researcher will dedicate this section to 
examining the CRS two years mitigation project funded by UNDP entitled The 
Application of Business Development Services to Mitigate the Risks of AHI to Women 
Micro-entrepreneurs in Fayoum and Minya Governorates in Egypt from September 
2006 to September 2008 and later extended to February 2009. This section will 
examine the impact of the CRS mitigation project on the livelihoods of women 
poultry keepers in Fayoum.  
            This project is very interesting since CRS/Egypt partnered with Business 
Enterprise Support Tools Foundation (BEST) in Fayoum as an implementing partner, 
which is the umbrella organization that facilitates project outreach and the selection of 
CDAs, assisted by two Community Development Associations (CDA’s) in two 
districts in Fayoum to implement the project. This multi-stakeholder cooperation 
reveals a lot of the dynamics of project implementation at the grassroots level as will 
be revealed in the following sections. The overarching goal of the CRS project is 
“women micro-entrepreneurs operating in the Egyptian traditional poultry industry 
have minimized their vulnerability to Avian Influenza epidemic.” There are two 
strategic objectives for the project; first, micro-entrepreneurs operating in the 
                                                 
30UNDP- DHA, “Disasters and Development”,  Disaster Management Training Programme, Second 
Edition,  Prepared by R.S. Stephenson, (New York: UNDP, 1994), 8.  
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backyard sector are resilient to epidemics such as Avian Influenza, and second to 
enable women micro-entrepreneurs diversify their livelihoods. According to Mr. 
Mohamed Ashraf, CRS AHI Project Manager, the project will improve the 
livelihoods of women and mitigate the impact of AHI on traditional poultry keepers 
through two components, which are fostering Business Development Services (BDS) 
and providing micro-finance loans. For the purpose of this study, the researcher will 
only examine and access the effectiveness of the first component, which is the BDS.  
With regard to BDS activities, they are the following: (1) educational and awareness 
raising sessions; (2) joint home visits; (3) inter-firm cooperation (horizontal linkages); 
and (4) coordination of vaccination campaigns.  
          With regard to educational awareness sessions, BEST and the CDAs organized 
Avian Influenza related awareness sessions for women poultry keepers. They are 
intended to educate the women on biosecure methods of raising their poultry and 
stimulate the demand of traditional poultry keepers in the areas of veterinary services. 
These sessions were facilitated by technical experts in the field of veterinary services 
that would educate women on good and biosecure practices in poultry raising, feeding 
and slaughtering.  However, in practice, these awareness sessions at Zawyet Al 
Karatsa were not participatory nor targeted the entire community at Al Zawyat. The 
awareness sessions were attended by limited number of women. The low level of 
attendance jeopardized other project activities since during awareness sessions the 
project staff would identify, first, women that are willing to vaccinate their poultry; 
second, identify potential women who want to participate in business-to-business 
visits; and third, identify women willing to take loans from the project. After realizing 
that the failure to secure adequate attendance will risk the success of the entire project, 
the project the staff used to serve women juice and biscuits as an incentive to attend 
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the awareness raising sessions. After a while the project manager thought of linking 
this incentive measure with the project itself and started giving women related in kind 
hand-outs such as detergents, medical masks, and gloves free of charge to be of direct 
relevance to the project goals and objectives. This approach eventually worked but 
with limited success. During an interview with an extended family consisting of four 
sister-in-laws living next door to the Al Zawyet CDA, the researcher discovered that 
although they claim that Zawyet Al Karatsa CDA provides extensive awareness 
raising sessions to the community, they do not know basic information on the 
symptoms of HPAI in humans. Moreover, this family revealed that male members of 
the household servile their poultry; they act as their private veterinaries. “When we 
feel there is something wrong with the chicken, we show it to my husband and he will 
tell me if it is sick or not.” When the researcher asked them whether they attended any 
of the AHI awareness sessions conducted by Zawyet Al Karatsa CDA, they said that 
their husbands do not allow them to go.  This reveals that gender-power relations play 
a huge role in households in Fayoum. This reveals that the project staff failed to carry 
out an elaborate needs assessment that would identify such challenges and work on it 
by designing other activities that overcome these gender power relations. For example, 
the CDAs could have carried out house-to-house awareness raising briefings to 
overcome this problem, which took place in a late stage during the project cycle. 
            The success of the educational sessions carried out in Zawyet El Karatsa is in 
question. During observatory walks, the researcher discovered that the house just in 
front of the CDA still had poultry inside the house. What is even more ironically, just 
a few meters in front of the CDA door, there was poultry running in the alley. In 
addition, during the personal interviews with BDS beneficiaries, a small proportion 
stated that they wore something in their hand when dealing with poultry and put a 
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scarf on the mouth and nose when dealing with their poultry. Also, very few women 
reported to wear specific clothes for dealing with the poultry. “We got used to dealing 
with our poultry with our bare hands.” Most of the women interviewed mentioned that 
they don’t wear anything when slaughtering their birds because they are sure that 
there are healthy. “We will not slaughter a chicken that we are hesitant that it is not 
good”. Nonetheless, one of the positive alterations in attitudes and behavior is poultry 
keepers’ awareness that children should be kept away from rooftops and backyards 
where chicken are kept. In addition, some project beneficiaries stopped keeping ducks 
and chicken together to avoid inter-species infection. However, most of women 
interviewed do not use coops to isolate their poultry.  
            With regard to the vaccination campaigns, the project relied on the awareness 
sessions to collect lists of women who are willing to vaccinate their poultry. 
Afterwards, the project staff linked these women with the veterinary units at the 
district level by coordinating vaccination campaigns to make sure that the project 
beneficiaries made use of these campaigns free of charge. This would not have been 
possible without the political support and back up of the project steering committee 
headed by the Secretary General of the Fayoum governorate. One of the challenges 
that faced the implementation of vaccination campaigns was the unwillingness of 
traditional poultry keepers to vaccinate their poultry. Despite efforts to persuade 
women clients in Fayoum to adhere to the project initiative to vaccinate most of the 
households and backyard poultry prior to autumn when the new flu season starts, 
Fayoum project staff only carried out two vaccination campaigns. The reasons cited 
include mistrust as the local residents appear not to have confidence in the 
government's abilities to control AHI and believed that through these vaccination 
campaigns, they would be likely targeted for future culling campaigns.  Some other 
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poultry keepers believed that vaccinations would kill their birds since in several 
instances some vaccinated poultry died immediately after they get vaccinated and the 
project staff was to be blamed for it. Mr. Mohamed Ahsraf, CRS Project Manager 
attribute this phenomena to the fact that some birds, especially ducks, are carrier to 
the virus and do not show any symptoms and die as a result of being vaccinated, since 
the vaccine is a portion of the virus itself.  However, this can also be attributed to 
wrong unhygienic practices like vaccinating all poultry with only one needle, 
discussed earlier in the government section, which resulted in the deaths of a lot of 
poultry after being vaccinated. These incident resulted is the spread of wrong 
misconceptions among poultry keepers that made women refuse to vaccinate their 
poultry, which further complicates the vaccination campaigns that introduced mistrust 
between the women and the project staff.  
             Moreover, Mr. Mohamed Ashraf stated that when CRS was trying to link 
BDS clients with vaccination campaigns, it was often not successful for a variety of 
reasons. With respect the wrong vaccination procedures employed by government 
veterinaries, the project manager lobbied the Governorate Secretary General at the 
Project Coordination Steering Committee on the Governorate Level, to change these 
wrong practices and to carry out house-to-house vaccination campaigns, in which 
each women would have her personal needle to vaccinate her poultry with. 
Fortunately, the Secretary General agreed and gave orders to representatives of 
veterinary directorates, health directorates, agriculture directorates, and social 
solidarity directorates to employ this new technique. Now a day’s vaccination 
campaigns at the village level are carried out door to door. Each house keeping that 
vaccinated her birds receives an official card showing the date of vaccination and the 
number of vaccinated poultry. The lack of cooperation of the local veterinary services 
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in Fayoum is another reason mentioned for the failure of the vaccination campaigns. 
For example, in one instance, although the CRS project invited a government 
veterinary to a vaccination campaign organized by the CDA, he never showed up31. 
            Another BDS activity of the project was to create horizontal and vertical 
linkages between traditional poultry keepers from one side and veterinarians, chick 
wholesalers, large poultry producers, the local government, and micro-entrepreneurs 
to increase poultry keepers’ resilience to AHI and improve their coping strategies. 
Among the linkages activities, CRS and BEST in Fayoum in coordination with the 
Fayoum Poultry Research Center (FPRC) managed to conduct nine field visits for 35 
micro-entrepreneurs from Fayoum to FPRC to learn more about hygienic poultry-
raising practices and different breeds of Balady chicken available for purchase and 
benefit from these linkages with large-scale farms. In addition, CRS and BEST 
arranged a visit to around 50 women from various districts at Faoyum to the 
Integrated Project for Poultry Production (IPPP), known as Al Azab, in Fayoum that is 
under the auspices of the local Fayoum governorate, which sell different hybrids of 
vaccinated poultry. CRS project organized a very successful field trip for its 
beneficiaries to the IPPP in Fayoum and successfully linked women with such 
credible source of day old chicks. A number of the traditional poultry keeper bought 
vaccinated chicks from the IPPP, which show the change in behavioral patterns. “I 
stopped buying any poultry from middlemen and I get all my chicks from Al Azab 
project.” In addition, other BDS beneficiaries affirmed that they obtain their chicks 
from secure sources such as government poultry labs and small private farms. Several 
women were too afraid to buy their chicks from live markets. Soad Ragab said, “I am 
afraid to buy chicks from the live weekly markets because the poultry my neighbor 
                                                 
31 Catholic Relief Services, “"Business Development Services to mitigate the AI Risks of Women 
Micro-entrepreneurs in Egypt", 4th Quarterly Progress Reports, Submitted to the UNDP, 21/10/2007.   
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bought from the market was sick and died.”  However, the effectiveness of such 
activity is in question since some women did not benefit from these linkage services 
and still buy there chicks from unsecure sources. Ironically, one of the project 
extension officers did not know anything about the IPPP project. When asked about 
her source of chicks, she stated that she bought them from street merchants or live 
markets. This extension officer is the one who should raise women awareness and 
guide them to secure sources of chicks. It was evident that the project needed to raise 
the extension officer’s awareness.  
               In addition, BEST and the CDAs assisted traditional poultry keepers to 
conduct home visits for pioneering and innovative businesswomen in Senrow, El-
E'elam villages in the Abshway district that employ safer chicken coop models. The 
project beneficiaries were introduced to good practices employed by other women by 
seeing models of chicken coops in their houses. These visits were made in light of 
positive relationships between CRS and BEST and the Agriculture Directorate in 
Fayoum. This activity filled an existing gap in the BDS project design since it did not 
initially include any poultry coops to overcome the cultural issue of mixing different 
species and mixing poultry of different ages.  Mr. Mohamed Ashraf, project manager, 
realized this shortcoming and planning to integrate this component in the design of 
the next project phase. He wants to take the design of licensed chicken coops by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and replicate the model for the project clients at a reduced 
cost. However, this also meant that CRS did not engage in an elaborate needs 
assessment to detect the needs of poultry keepers and their traditional customs in the 
initial design of the project.       
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Project Challenges  
              One of the early challenges that faced the project, which was reflected upon 
during one of the interviews with CRS project staff, is the inability of the project 
steering committee to identify and recruit credible CDAs. Even after choosing two 
CDAs in two districts in Fayoum (Zawet Al Karatsa CDA and El-Mazatly CDA), El 
Mazalty CDA had a lot of requirements. There was conflict of interest between CRS 
and Al Mazalty CDAs since it wanted to recruit its project staff and to have full 
control of the micro-credit component. However CRS was skeptical of the full control 
of the CDA resources and decisions, and CRS was also afraid that the CDA would 
manipulate the project activities and funds. To avoid this, the CRS suggested to only 
rent the CDAs premises to be the project facility and made sure that the extension 
officers hired by the CRS project manager are from the same villages they are 
working in. The efforts to persuade Al Mazalty to adhere to the CRS demands slowed 
down the implementation of the project in Fayoum. Zawyet Al Karatsa CDA agreed, 
however Al Mazatly refused CRS offer. CRS had to replace Al Mazalty CDA with 
Kafr Mahfouz CDA, which disrupted project activities on the short-term.   
             Despite the legitimate concern of the CRS, their decision to alienate the CDA 
from managing the project has jeopardized the local ownership of the project. The 
CDA employees were not part of the project staff and the CRS externally hired staff 
was the ones implementing the project in the communities. In addition, the CDAs had 
no say in the selection of staff and were not even part of the recruitment process of 
extension officers that are from the local community. This resulted in the creation of 
several obstacles that hindered the effective implementation of the project such as the 
unwillingness of traditional poultry keepers to attend awareness sessions in the CDAs 
since they are not familiar with the project staff. Moreover, the CRS did not work on 
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building the capacity of local CDAs since it did not provide the CDAs with any 
technical, managerial nor financial support, except for the premises rent.  
                Another related challenge to the CDAs degree of involvement, the CRS 
project manager confessed that recruiting qualified staff was a main implementation 
obstacle during the initial phases of the project. Despite wide dissemination of job 
announcements, the number of qualified candidates who applied for the jobs was very 
limited.  Moreover, some of the staff nominated for these positions declined in the last 
minute due to more competitive salary offers from other NGOs.  Therefore, staff 
recruitment and training took more time than what has been originally planned.                
              Another challenge that faced the project was the sustainability of BDS 
activities after the project’s duration elapsed. The project staff claimed that poor 
traditional poultry keepers are not willing and cannot afford to pay any nominal fees 
for the BDS activities they make use of. One of the project staff stated, “It became a 
custom that women do not pay for technical assistance and capacity building 
activities.” However, during interviews with women, most of them expressed their 
willingness to contribute nominal fees to the awareness raising activities and BDS 
services. The researcher cannot tell whether the issue of financial sustainability of the 
project is really a challenge or the project staff is making it up to justify their attempts 
to mobilize additional resources from UNDP.  The sustainability of such local 
initiatives is extremely crucial to the prevention and mitigation of AHI at the local 
level; without these BDS efforts, the achievement of sustainable livelihood outcomes 
of poultry keepers will be not attained.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
            This study attempted to explore the linkages between disaster risk and 
sustainable livelihoods both in theory and in the Egyptian context. The hypothesis of 
the study was that low level hazards are magnified by high vulnerabilities, which led 
to increase in disaster risks among vulnerable groups in Egypt. Impacts of disasters 
will destroy people’s livelihood assets as a result of income and capability deprivation 
and thus result in the failure of the attainment of sustainable livelihood outcomes in 
the Egyptian society.  
            During the last decade the literature on disasters has moved from 
conceptualizing disasters as only “acts of God” to examining the “root causes”,  
“dynamic pressures”, and “unsafe conditions” generating vulnerability on one side 
and the physical exposure to hazard on the other side.  The study showed that disaster 
risk is the product of the interaction of both hazards and conditions of vulnerabilities, 
and not solely the result of the physical hazard, as claimed by the “dominant disaster 
paradigm.”  In the 1970s and early 1980s, the vulnerability approach to disasters 
started dominating the disaster-development discourse and criticized the dominance 
assumption in disaster research that disasters are “natural” events. Disaster risk is a 
combination of the factors that determine the potential for people to be exposed to 
particular types of hazards and also the vulnerabilities that fundamentally depend on 
how social systems and their associated power relations impact on different social 
groups1. In other words, it was revealed that to accurately detect disasters risks, we 
should not only examine the different types of physical hazards, but also explore the 
                                                 
1 Wisner, Ben et al., 7 
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cultural, social, economic, and political processes that produce the “progression of 
vulnerability”. Thus, the “technical solutions” to preventing disasters with their high 
costs were no longer the mainstream view, and a new approach to disaster prevention 
and mitigation emerged in theory, which focused on the underlying causes of 
increased vulnerability to disaster risks.  
            In practice, the interconnection between disaster risks, vulnerabilities, and 
livelihoods in the case of Egypt was confirmed in this study. The study showed that 
Egypt is at risk of destructive “rapid-onset” natural disasters (primarily earthquakes 
and floods), susceptible to a large number of human-made disasters (road, maritime, 
train accidents and fires), and also vulnerable to “slow onset” hybrid disasters (Avian 
and Human Influenza and landslides). While exploring the potential hazards and 
recent disasters that have occurred in Egypt, it was revealed that there is a positive 
correlation between disaster risks and deep rooted population vulnerabilities in Egypt; 
the higher the vulnerabilities, the increased risks of disasters. Thus, the study showed 
that Egypt has a relatively high disaster risk that is a product of a variety of hazardous 
events coupled with the high vulnerabilities of the Egyptian population (such as 
population expansion in hazardous areas, rapid urbanization, and prevalence of urban 
illegal settlements). Vulnerabilities are both causes and effects of disasters in Egypt; 
for example, the cause of the 1992 earthquake’s devastation was primarily due to the 
high vulnerability of affected communities as a result of high population density and 
lack of enforcement of building codes. It was also revealed how different types of 
disasters had various negative ramifications on communities’ livelihoods. The 1992 
earthquake, for example, resulted in high number of people left homeless and led to 
the increase of illegal settlements, which indirectly led to a further increase in 
affected population’s vulnerabilities.  
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               In addition, it was revealed that disasters in Egypt exert an enormous 
challenge to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For example, 
the recurrence of flash floods in governorates of Upper Egypt and the concentration 
of poverty in these governorates is an indication of the correlation between disasters, 
vulnerability and poverty, which will definitely affect the attainment of MDG1, 
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger.   The GoE’s MDGs Midpoint Assessment 
Reports (2004 and 2008) failed to refer to any disaster that occurred in Egypt and thus 
did not explain how these disasters could have posed a challenge to the achievement 
of the MDGs. The GoE did not recognize the socio-economic impact of disasters on 
achieving the MDGs; the mid-term progress reports did not even regard the increased 
disaster risk as one of the challenges to development. That is why the fourth chapter 
examined the government’s political will with respect to the issue of disasters.  
            After examining the legal framework and the institutional arrangements 
within the GOE at the strategic, central, and local levels that deal with disasters, it 
was apparent that there is a lack of political will manifested in the absence of an 
adequate legal and institutional setup for DRR.  It was showed that the disaster-
related legal and institutional frameworks in Egypt are still trapped in the civil 
defense and crisis management eras respectively. The current disaster management 
institutional arrangements do not incorporate risk analysis in their functions, which 
reveal that DRR is still not a national priority. All government entities examined at 
the strategic, central and local levels are currently involved with post-disaster 
emergency management. The current disaster management framework is mainly 
concerned with preparedness, emergency response, and relief and rescue efforts. The 
GoE moved in the 1990s from a “civil defense” age to a “disaster management” phase. 
However, this institutional shift from civil defense to disaster management did not 
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bring about a shift in the legal system, which meant that all institutions working on 
disaster management in Egypt do not have legal foundations. This study showed that 
the current disaster laws in Egypt, formulated in the outdated war context of the 
1950s, are still trapped in the ideologies of the civil defense era.  
             The study revealed how the GoE did not undergo any fundamental changes 
necessary to incorporate DRR concepts, policies and mechanisms in its pre-disaster 
planning since it would involve sensitive political measures. The “dominance of 
structural engineering measures and disaster preparedness measures”2 reflects their 
inherently lower political sensitivity when compared to the problems that arise from 
genuinely reducing risks and vulnerabilities such as the redistribution of income, the 
reduction of poverty levels, the tackling of the root causes of inequality and 
communities disempowerment3. Managing risk depends on political commitment by 
policy makers since the politicians find it difficult to redirect priorities from visible 
development goals to abstract long term possible threats4. Decision makers claim that 
it is hard to gain votes by pointing to a disaster that did not even take place. Thus, the 
GoE tends to react to disasters on an ad hoc basis by formulating an Inter-ministerial 
Disaster Committee to deal with the disaster after it has taken place; this committee 
deals with the symptoms of disasters rather than the causes as were the case in the 
AHI crisis, Al Salam Ferry disaster, several train accidents, and recently the Swine 
Flu disaster. In addition, other national priorities often contest with reduction of 
disaster risks since there is a prevailing misconception among government officials 
that development efforts such as employment creation, poverty reduction, and 
educational reform will automatically reduce disaster risks. 
                                                 
2 Lavell, Allan, “The Impact of Disasters on Development Gains: Clarity or Controversy”, 2. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Christoplos, Ian, Mitchell, John, and Anna Liljelund, “Re-framing Risk: The Changing Context  of 
Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness”,  Disasters, Volume 25, Issue 3, 195.  
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             Moreover, the lack of political will among decision makers in Egypt with 
respect to pre-disaster planning explains the failure of the government in reducing 
disasters risks. The lack of government commitment to reduce disaster risk lies in the 
lack of knowledge, lack of a culture of prevention, and limited resources. The GoE 
recently incorporated some risk reduction rhetoric in its disaster work in the wake of 
international DRR trends. Government officials use DRR terminology and 
inaccurately affiliate it with crisis management processes. In addition, government 
officials lack the awareness and understanding of pre-disaster planning; they 
misinterpret prevention and mitigation and confuse them with preparedness, the phase 
just before a full-blown disaster takes place. DRR efforts are currently inaccurately 
associated with the occurrence of disasters among policy makers. The researcher 
believes that government officials are “risk illiterate” since they are unaware of DRR 
knowledge that is a direct result of the lack of a “culture of prevention”, a nation-wide 
phenomena spread among policy makers as revealed by interviews with government 
officials at IDSC and with veterinaries during the field work. In the wake of increased 
international pressures to “obtain commitment from public authorities to implement 
DRR policies”, the National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management was 
renamed National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management and Reducing its 
Risks without undergoing any substantive amendments in the committee’s functions, 
which reveals the lack of genuine political will to shift to DRR.  
            The GoE has failed to adequately institutionalize the DRR agenda, and thus 
put vulnerable populations at high risk of potential hazards.  Egypt still has a long 
way to go by first gathering political will, then by formulating new laws and decrees 
that would incorporate DRR measures, and finally by creating an institutional 
structure conducive to reducing disaster risks. The case study further showed that the 
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political commitment of various government entities in Fayoum governorate is still 
lacking in the wake of the AHI crisis.  
            The field findings have revealed that the AHI crisis destroyed vulnerable 
population livelihood assets and disrupted the attainment of sustainable livelihood 
outcomes of traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum. The study showed that cultural 
norms and traditional practices increased the vulnerability of poultry keepers in 
Fayoum and made them more susceptible to AHI. The poultry raising traditional 
customs and improper slaughtering practices are among the root causes behind the 
high risk of AHI among women in Fayoum. One of the improper poultry raising 
practices is the free movement of poultry inside and outside the household, which can 
be dealt with by confining poultry to coops and thus decreasing the vulnerability to 
AHI. The case study also showed how the AHI crisis had destroyed several livelihood 
assets of women who raise poultry as part of complex livelihood strategies. The AHI 
outbreaks in domestic poultry have led to, among other results, the loss of one of the 
primary sources of household income, loss of protein consumption, increased stress 
and depression among poultry keepers, and the refraining of women from engaging in 
social obligations. The case study further reveled how women in Fayoum were forced 
to alter their livelihood strategies and adopt new coping strategies to deal with the 
repercussions of the AHI crisis by shifting their micro businesses to cattle production.  
             The field work also revealed, according to traditional poultry keepers in 
Fayoum, that the government veterinary services in Fayoum were unable to prevent 
the spread of avian influenza in poultry due to lack of resources and qualified 
personnel. Highly centralized local institutions with weak financial and human 
resource capacities were a disabling environment for reducing AHI risks in Fayoum. 
In addition, poultry keepers were fearful of government personnel and perceived them 
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as threat to their livelihood survival.  During interviews with poultry keepers, it was 
revealed that women tend to get rid of sick or dead poultry by throwing them in water 
ways, burying them, or burning them in garbage areas and they do not report any 
suspected infection to government authorities since they are afraid that the 
government would cull the entire flock. The women even believed that the 
government is trying to kill their poultry through government vaccination campaigns; 
this widespread misconception among women in Fayoum grew out of the fact the 
poultry was dying after being vaccinated. Shortly after the 2006 outbreaks, the 
government veterinaries were vaccinating birds with the same needle, which is an 
improper vaccination practice that might have perpetuated and deepened the AHI 
crisis. This misunderstanding was even reinforced among women in the wake of the 
government early approach to cull thousands of birds during initial outbreaks and the 
national campaign to urge women to stop raising poultry all together.   
             Through closely examining the CRS project in Fayoum, the case study 
revealed that although the CRS BDS activities had some positive impacts on the 
livelihoods of poultry keepers in two villages in Fayoum, some of these mitigating 
activities were not successfully implemented in practice due to the top-down design of 
the project; the project staff failed to carry out needs assessment prior to the project 
design, which led to the limited success of, for example, the awareness raising and 
educational sessions. The study showed that the awareness raising campaigns and 
educational sessions conducted as part of the BDS project activities altered some of 
the incorrect slaughtering practices of beneficiaries; however the majority of 
traditional unhygienic poultry raising behaviors were not successfully changed due to 
the inability of the project to tackle embedded cultural norms. In addition, the 
vaccination campaigns that were coordinated by the project staff had limited 
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effectiveness since the project relied on government veterinaries that did not have the 
incentive and the capacity to carry out proper vaccination campaigns in the first place.  
             To conclude, AHI impacts have been proved to affect the livelihoods of 
vulnerable groups in Fayoum. Attending to small scale frequent bird flu events and 
the vulnerabilities associated with them is a preventive measure to ensure that these 
random outbreaks would not turn into a full-blown massive disaster in the long term 
and thus would deeply affect vulnerable populations’ livelihoods. Institution building 
with the aim of improving the quality of governance is required to reduce disaster 
risks. The GoE should substitute “disaster driven” decision making with “hazard and 
vulnerability driven” policies at all levels of government. The GoE should work on 
reducing the vulnerability part of the equation (Disaster risk = Hazard x 
Vulnerability) since preventing the hazard from taking place is usually very difficult 
or even impossible to achieve. On the other hand, reducing the vulnerability context is 
relatively easier to address through dealing with the cultural, social, economic, and 
political dimensions creating these vulnerabilities. The increased impacts of disasters 
in Egypt is due to the tendency to treat symptoms rather than causes; the reason for 
this bias is because vulnerabilities are deeply rooted, and any fundamental solution of 
the root causes of vulnerability would involve massive political change. With regard 
to the AHI crisis, the numbers of positive human cases will continue to increase 
rapidly in Egypt until the GoE seriously addresses the “root causes”, “dynamic 
pressures”, and “unsafe conditions” behind the vulnerability of rural poultry keepers 
to the HPAI H5N1 virus. The livelihoods of traditional poultry keepers in Egypt will 
only be sustainable when they can cope with and recover from AHI stresses and 
shocks and maintain their livelihood assets.  
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APPENDIX 1 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION FIELD WORK  
1) Semi-Structured Interviews with Government Officials 
• Dr. Mohamed Fawzy, Director, Department of Crises and Disaster Management 
(CMDR),  Information Decision and Support Center (IDSC), Prime Minister’s 
Office; 
• Ms. Heba Ibrahim, Senior Researcher, Department of Crises and Disaster 
Management (CMDR) , IDSC; 
• Mr. Said Aly, Disaster and Crisis Management Coordinator, Ministry of Local 
Development, Egypt.   
2) Semi-Structured Interviews with UN Officials 
• Dr. Mostafa Mohaghegh, Head, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UN/ISDR) Regional Office for West Asia and North Africa (WANA); 
• Dr. Ayoub Al Jawaldeh, Deputy Country Director, WFP Country Office, Egypt; 
• Mr. Jean Luke, Regional Planning Officer for Avian and Human Influenza, 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA),  
Egypt;  
• Ms. Amany Nakhla, Regional Planning Analyst, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), Egypt;  
• Ms. Rania Hedaya, Program Analyst and Disaster Prevention and Recovery Focal 
Point, UNDP Country Office, Egypt.  
 
CASE STUDY FIELD WORK: FAYOUM GOVERNORATE  
1) Semi-Structured Interviews with Government Officials at Fayoum 
• Dr. Soraya Ramadan, Animal Care ,Veterinary Directorate, Fayoum Governorate 
• Dr. Ashraf Lutfy EL Sayed, Veterinary Unit, Mansha’et Bany Etman Village, 
Snoras District.  
• Dr. Rabeea El Sayed El Araby, Veterinary Unit, Mansha’et Snoras Village, 
Snoras District.  
• Mr. Abdel Wanees Attiya Gibriel, Me’awen, Veterinary Unit, Ezbet Gibriel 
Rashwan, Mansha’et Bany Etman Village, Snoras District.  
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2) Semi-Structured Interviews with CRS Project Staff: 
 
• Mr. Mohamed Ashraf, CRS AI Programme Officer and Project Coordinator;  
• Mrs. Sabah Mohamed, Extension Officer at Zawyet El Karatsa Village, Fayoum 
District;   
• Mrs. Mona Mohamed Ali, Extension Officer at Zawyet El Karatsa Village, 
Fayoum District;  
• Mrs. Iman Mohamed, Micro-Credit Officer at Zawyet El Karatsa Village, 
Fayoum District; 
• Mrs. Iman Ragab, Extension Officer  at Al Mandara Village, Fayoum District; 
• Mrs. Nora Rabei Soliman, Micro-Credit Officer at Manshaet Baghdad Village, 
     Fayoum District.  
 
3) Interview with BEST Staff (headquarters in Fayoum) 
 
• Mr. Ahmed Mahmoud Abdel Alim, AHI Project Coordinator 
• Mrs. Manal Ibrahim El Dessouky, Marketing Specialist  
 
4) Semi-Structured Interviews with Women (Total of 25 Interviews) 
Ten Semi-structured Interviews at Zawyet El Karatsa Village (Known as Al Zawyat),  
Fayoum District: 
• Sabah Rabeea 
• Sayeda Al Sayed 
• Amal Mohamed 
• Hayat Abdel Maboud Zayed 
• Sahar Attwa 
• Rabab Qurany 
• Afaf El Sayed Ibrahim 
• Sayeda Qutb 
• Sokareya Abdullah 
• Soad Ragab El Sayed 
Five semi-structured Interviews at Manshaet Baghdad Village in Fayoum District: 
• Laila Ewiess Mohamed 
• E’tbar Abdel Azim Tawfik 
• Gamal Eid Ahmed 
• Magda Abdel Tawab 
• Nora Soliman 
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Five semi-structured Interviews at Kafr Mahfouz Village, Tamia District: 
• Sayeda Said Mohamed 
• Noha Ramadan 
• Nadia Ewiss Aly El Said 
• Nagah Mohamed Mahmoud 
• Laila Mohamed Salem 
Five semi-structured Interviews at Al Adel Village, Snoras District: 
• Howayda Mohamed Hassan 
• Kawkab Abdel Mawgood 
• Sabah Khamees 
• Nadia Shafei 
• Safaa Hamoda 
 
 
5) Four Focus Groups in Fayoum Governorate (Total of 40 women) 
 
First Focus Group in Zawyet El Karatsa Village, Fayoum District  
• Magda Ibrahim 
• Zeinab Abd Al Wahab 
• Amal Anwar Hassanein 
• Mona Nasr El Dine 
• Sabah Mohamed 
• Rida Ramadan Abdel Aziz 
 
Second Focus Group in Al Mandara Village, Fayoum District  
• Sharbat Mohamed 
• Samar Ragab 
• Manal Attiya 
• Karima Abdo 
• Darahem Shaaban 
• Hayam Aly 
• Zeinab Sheraei 
• Maha Mohamed 
• Doniya Ramdan 
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Third Focus Group in Al Adel Village, Snoras District 
• Howayda Mohamed Hassan 
• Sabra Abdel Mawgood Rashed 
• Fatma Nady 
• Marzoka Kamel 
• Madiha Sayed 
• Nora Sayed 
• Manal Fathy 
• Hala Hashem 
• Intesar Qourany 
• Sahar Rizk 
• Hayam Qourany 
• Amal Sawy 
 
Forth Focus Group in Al Adel Village, Snoras District 
• Rawya El Sayed 
• Fayza Abdel Mowlah 
• Latifa Abdel Mawgood 
• Sahar El Said 
• Redah Abdel Tawab 
• Fatma Moawad 
• Hamdeya Awad Allah 
• Doha Abd Al Ged 
• Wessam Hamed 
• Marwa Mohamed Abd El All 
• Neama Abd El All 
• Marwa Atteya 
• Sabah Toba 
 
6) Two Case Studies in Fayoum Governorate:  
 
• Howayda Mohamed Hassan , El Adel Village, Snoras Dirstrict 
• Sayeda Al Sayed, Zawyet El Karatsa Village in Fayoum District 
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APPENDIX 2 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Household Information: 
1) Name: 
2) District/Village: 
3) Marital Status: 
4) Age:  
5) Level of education:  
6) Number of family members (of which children)? 
7) Number of people who regularly eat meals in your home? 
8) Number of people earning income in your home? Who?  What is their job?     
9) Total household income?  
10) Your contribution to this income, approximately, if any? 
11) Who is the principal decision-maker in your household? (head of household):  
12) Consumer assets owned in the household? 
13) Do you own land? 
14) Total earnings per month during the summer?  During the winter? 
 
Poultry Raising Information/Cultural Habits: 
 
1) Do you currently own poultry? 
2) If No, did you own poultry before the AI outbreak?  
3) If Yes, what is your flock size? Is it different species? Or all chickens?  
4) Where do u keep them? Do you keep them together (if different species)? 
5) What is the purpose for raising poultry? 
6) Do your children help you take care of the poultry? How?  
7) Do your children play with the poultry? How? 
8) Do you slaughter poultry? 
9) How do you slaughter poultry? Do you wear gloves/plastic bags or masks?  
10) If yes, do your children engage in slaughtering poultry with you?  
11) Origins of poultry ? From where?   
12) Is there in your village live bird markets and shops for selling fresh birds? 
13) Do you prefer eating fresh slaughtered poultry or frozen ones? Why?  
14) Did you vaccinate your birds? by whom? If not, why didn’t you vaccinate them?  
15) Trading of poultry?  
a. How much poultry do you sell a week/month?  Does this vary in different seasons? 
b. How many eggs do you sell a week/month?  Does this vary in different seasons? 
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Avian and Human Influenza: 
1) Do you know what the Avian Flu is?  How did you first hear about it? 
2) Can you describe it? Of the following, which do you believe were symptoms of 
Avian Flu for your poultry? 
3) Has the Avian Flu affected your livelihood? (If so) In what ways?  
4) Has AI affected the quantity of your poultry?  (If yes) To what degree? 
5) How did AI affected your eating habits/ consumption patterns?  
6) Has AI affected your household income?  How? 
7) Have Avian Flu affected your behavior? How?  
8) Do you take any other precautions to protect against Avian Flu?  (If so) What kind?  
9) Do veterinaries come to your village to do surveillance?  
10) What do u do when veterinaries carry out surveillance campaigns? 
11) Did any of your poultry died recently? What did you do?  
12) Do you think women should contact officials when they find dead poultry? Why?  
13) If you're poultry died from AI, what did you do with your dead poultry? Or what will 
you do if this happen?  
14) What did you do with your remaining live poultry? 
15) How do you think Avian Flu is spread amongst the poultry? 
16) How do you think AI can be transmitted to humans? 
17) Do you fear being infected with Avian Flu yourself? Do you fear your children bet 
infected?  
18) What are the measures you take to prevent yourself from the disease? 
 
Vulnerable Population Opinion on Government Role: 
1) What do you think the government is doing to prevent the spread of Avian Flu? 
2) Did you vaccinate your chicken in the government vaccination campaigns? Why? 
3) Where you compensated for the loss of your poultry? 
4) What do you think the government should do to prevent the disease from spreading? 
 
 CRS Project Beneficiaries (BDS Clients): 
1) Did you have economic activities/enterprises other than poultry before you were 
affected by Avian Flu?  (If so) What kinds of activities? 
2) Since the Avian Flu affected your enterprise, have you shifted to another type of 
activity other than poultry?  (If so) What kind of activities?   Why? 
3) How did this project help you better cope with the AI crisis?  
4) What did you learn from the awareness raising sessions and any other BDS services? 
5) From where you buy your poultry? Al Azab project? If yes, was CRS the linkage? 
6) Are you willing to pay a nominal fee in the future for BDS activities? Why? 
